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Summary 
The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the rationality of the continued use of soviet 
management practices in post-soviet industrial enterprises a decade after the 
'transition to a market economy' on the basis of a detailed case study of a textile 
enterprise in Ivanovo oblast' in Russia. 
The thesis consists of two parts. The first part of the thesis comprises a critical 
review of the western literature on the management-controlled enterprise and the 
literature on the ·soviet industrial enterprise. The thrust of the critique is that the 
dominant management discourses abstract the enterprise from its social context and 
present western management practice as the epitome of rationality. Against this, 
Marxist-inspired approaches emphasise the embeddedness of the enterprise in a 
particular form of social relations, and so the embeddedness of management 
rationality. This provides the underlying theoretical thread of the analysis of the case 
study material. 
The second part of the thesis comprises a detailed case study of one textile enterprise. 
The analysis; of the case study material is presented in three chapters, covering 
management structures and practices, the wage and payment system and labour 
discipline. -r,he analysis of the case study data shows that the rationality of soviet 
I 
management practices is underpinned by the peculiar character of the social relations 
in the workplace which were characteristic of the soviet system of production and 
which have been sustained, and even strengthened, in the chaotic and unstable 
circumstances of the market economy as managers put a priority on maintaining 
social stability as a condition for maintaining the stability of production. The centnil 
findings of the thesis are briefly summarised in the conclusion. 
viii 
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1. Introduction 
This study analyses post-soviet management and managerial informal practices at a 
Russian enterprise in order to understand the content, nature and direction of 
industrial restructuring in the Russian privatised sector. This work developed out of a 
comprehensive case study at a textile firm in the Ivanovo region and is based on 
extensive fieldwork (Bell and Newby, 1977; Parker, 1998). The research has focused 
on changes in ownership, management and labour organisation and problems of 
reform experienced by the researched enterprise after privatisation and continued 
well after the emergence of outside ownership. The aim of the research is to address 
the issue of enterprise behaviour in the context of transition in the face of the claim 
that Russian managerial strategies are irrational (cf. Hendley, 1998). 
The transformation of the Russian economy in the 1990s has been understood by 
economists as a relatively simple transition from one system, the planned economy, 
to another, the capitalist market economy (cf. Sachs, 1993; Aslund, 1995; Blasi et al., 
1997). EnterPrise behaviour has mostly been examined to establish the degree to 
which it conformed to, or departed from, a pre-established Western capitalist model 
, 
(see ~ricson: 1998). Institutional legacies have been largely neglected or regarded as 
remnants of the past order. However, comparative and historical studies make it clear 
that differences between managerial practices ·and structures are determined by the 
environment in which they developed (Clark, 1979; Sapelli, 1990; Lazonick, 1991; 
Dore, 1973). Accordingly, changes in Russian management practices under transition 
can be better considered as pragmatic adaptations to a changing environment 
(Grabher and Stark, 1998; Clarke, 1993; di Leo, 1993). I maintain that the continuity 
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in managerial practices can only be understood in relation to the peculiar nature of 
the past Soviet social order. 
Drawing on the studies of Marxist authors such as Bob Arnot (1988), Simon Clarke 
(1993), Rita di Leo (1973), Donald FiItzer (1986), and Hillel Ticktin (1992), I 
contend that the Soviet system was founded as a form of domination on the limited 
control over production by the ruling elite. These scholars found that, while Soviet 
workers were never allowed to decide what (and how much) to produce, they 
retained considerable autonomy in the workplace. In practice, they were left alone to 
sort out the vagaries of Soviet planning. It is to this condition that the concept of 
'negative control' is applied!. The ruling elite is tom between deciding to assume 
direct control over production through managers, and the need to preserve the social 
foundations of its power. A central argument of this study is that the existence in the 
former Soviet Union of "(negative) workers' control over production" continues to 
hinder the full transition tQ capitalism (Arnot, 1988; Clarke, 1993; di Leo, 1973; 
Filtzer, 1986; Ticktin, 1992). 
Background to the research 
This resear2,h project has developed out of my previous academic background and 
, 
subsequent working experience. I read for my first degree from 1988 to 1993 in the 
. Faculty of Political Sciences of the Naples Institute of Oriental Studies (I.U.O.), 
I Interpretations differ about whether to consider the increasing control by workers as the 
result of worker resistance. D. Filtzer (1986) supports this view, while S. Clarke (1993) 
argues that it results from the retreat of management. R. di Leo (1973) interprets managerial 
retreat as a result of a political compromise between management and workers. All of these 
scholars share the view that for the capitalist transition to succeed a change of social 
relations in production has to take place with the risk of igniting class conflict. 
2 
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specialising in the Economics of the Socialist Countries and in Economic History. 
My final thesis on 'Scientific Management at the Fiat motor company and in Russian 
Factories' combined my disciplinary interests. 
The window of opportunity for such research occurred later in 1997, after I joined a 
foreign trade ministry sponsored programme, which included a paid internship in 
private firms operating in the former socialist countries. This way, I managed to 
spend five moths working for a consulting firm that was involved in an enterprise 
restructuring project in the Ivanovo textile region of European Russian. I spent most 
of this time on placement in one Russian firm, living and working closely with 
Russian managers. This gave me an invaluable insight into the problems and 
opportunities facing the textile sector in Russia and particularly the range of 
problems facing Russian managers, as well as into the communication gap between 
Russian managers and western European consultants. Formal and informal contacts 
with a variety of agents involved in the restructuring process made me aware of a set 
of unsolved questions to which western business tools and their theoretical 
underpinnings had no solutions, hence prompting my commitment to resume my 
academic studies in search of an answer. 
For this re,\son I registered at Warwick, working within the Russian Research 
Programme directed by Simon Clarke. After two years at Warwick spent reading 
literature and working, among others, on an EC report on the textile industry and 
employment, having been accepted for a PhD and obtained full funding for it, I set to 
return to my Russian site to conduct my fieldwork research. 
3 
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Sources and methodology 
The bulk of the fieldwork for this study was conducted in the 2000-2002 period. 
During the first stage, I worked for four months in the factory. I lived in the town and 
visited production managers in the shops daily. My later fieldwork consisted of 
several visits, which together amounted to more than one year. During these visits, I 
spent most of my time in managers' offices so as to become a 'piece of furniture' in 
the shops (Parker, 1998). The research was conducted by means of in-depth, semi-
structured interviews with workers, managers, and industrial consultants. It included 
participant observation, and the exainination of published and unpublished data about 
the enterprise and the town. Individuals were surveyed with the help of a 
questionnaire followed by interviews. Production managers were surveyed in this 
manner, including one chief of production, five shop chiefs, and altogether 20 
foremen and leading technicians. Approximately 100 workers were collectively and 
individuaIly interviewed by me. 
Given the considerable suspicions toward formal interviews, my existing position as 
a factory insider was important for the successful completion of my fieldwork. My 
fieldwork ~as made possible by unrestricted access to the research settings. This 
does not mean it was easy to achieve. Becoming an insider has been an essential part 
. of my activity on the site, which implied cultivating friendship, participating in local 
life within and outside the factory, becoming in my work as much as possible 'one of 
them'. The role of gatekeepers was essential in keeping continued access against the 
threat posed by continuous changes in management and their attitude toward an 
awkward foreign student. In tum they became my key informants on most issues I 
researched and the mediators with other sources in this and other factories. 
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I tried to offset the "risk of biased findings derived from relying on key informants by 
triangulation, direct observation, consulting local documents, and comparisons with 
other cases researched in the department. Direct observation was an essential part of 
my work. Barriers to communication often made it impossible to achieve information 
by interviewees in a neutral context, irrespective of their willingness to co-operate. 
My constant presence in managers' offices allowed me to reformulate research 
questions on the basis of common observable experience. 
'Then I became alert to the "Russian ways" and undertook to explore them. 
In so doing I tried to combine the participants' view of the subject and their 
self-understanding, on the one hand, and the descriptive discourse which 
would make it clear for an outsider on the other' (Ledeneva A. V., 1998, p. 
4). 
In general, my personal experience as an insider, with the risks it entails for 
objectivity, has been constantly taken into account by me, rather than concealed, in 
the data analysis (Bell and Newby, 1977). 
The Struggle/or Access: Exposing the Centrality 0/ Personal 
Relatjons !tips 
The objective of this section is to chart the difficulty of access, to uncover the 
. obstacles, practical, relational and cultural, which surrounded my life and research 
work at the enterprise and its surrounding community for more than three years and 
the ways I tried to overcome them. 
One conviction, I can confidently and continuously refer to, stands at the centre of 
this experience: the centrality of personal relationships. Writing on doing research I 
5 
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feel that, other than narrative and methodological concerns, this endeavour is 
constrained and inspired by the need to walk back through the memory of the whole 
of these years' struggle to recover the essential passages of becoming an insider. A 
glance at the circumstances of my latest visit to the company town can offer a 
starting point. 
After waiting for a visa for several weeks, in mid June, I could eventually 
confirm to my friend in town that the long promised travel was in fact to 
take place. Arrangements were to be made in a rush despite terrible 
communication problems: the slow mail, unreliable Internet and lack of· 
telephones. Well enough, they had relatives in the city with a telephone and 
a car and they agreed to collect me at the airport. They could drive me safely 
home, he is a police officer among others, with a six hours ride to town 
directly from the airport. My landlord, whom I have known since 1997, was 
ready to receive me without problems despite the last minute confirmation. 
The real struggle was to begin the next day, and for a week to follow, to get 
a pass (propusk) from the new administration. This did not prevent me from 
enteripg the factory, though reluctantly, security personnel remembered and 
trusted me sufficiently. As for my work, I turned to what has now become 
, 
an old habit both for me and the managers who host me in their offices. I 
I 
would sit with them, present my questions and concerns, arrange under their 
advice and guidance, but never without substantial arguments, whom and 
how I should interview people or seek information. Now that I am conscious 
of the invaluable advantages of following them in their daily business, I 
would not have failed to note and record (but not on tape!) as many 
conversations, meetings and events that took place in this office. My life at 
the office, for all the disturbances the Russian chaos could bring to us, was 
safely modulated by the reassuring "vse reshaem" (we'll fix it all) of my 
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manager friend, to which I could anticipate with the, equally peculiar to him, 
"ya uzhe dogodalsja" (I already suspected). At the end of the period 1 had 
collected more answers than the questions I asked, for the first time my 
field-note diary was overloaded with interesting anecdotes. Social life well 
complemented my stay, at moments in between a talk about prices, the 
hassles of "family" life and the high spirits of a birthday party I felt I had 
become a town dweller, almost forgetting and making me forget the 
temporary character of my stay. For a sufficient number of people my 
resources, my knowledge and my origin had become more of a resource to 
spend in relationships than an obstacle to their establishment. 
When I headed for the first public presentation of my work in late June 2001, what I 
had in mind was in fact to explain how becoming an insider was an intrinsic 
necessity of my research work and inextricably tied to the command of my topic, 
managerial practices and behaviour. The question, which in turn emerged and I will 
try to answer here, is in fact why I was led to think and operate in this direction and 
how I actually managed to achieve such a level of intimacy with this working and 
social environment, with those areas of it that I found useful or simply accessible to 
my intervention. The questions at the forefront, both chronologically and 
methodologi'cally, relate to the experience of access beginning in 1997: the need to 
escape isolation and rejection, breaking out of my association with consultants; the 
gradual integration into the social structure of the company town; last but not least 
the development of strong ties with a gate-keeping figure. 
Out of neutrality, taking the Russian side. 
What is the kind of approach one should take towards one's investigative 
environments? Should one assume it possible to carry out fieldwork in a sort of 
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uncompromising self-sufficiency or rather incorporate into one's working style and 
interpretative framework those inputs emerging from respondents and their 
community? If so, where is the line where compromise endangers our pledge to 
"neutrality"? All these questions, the answers to which could make up a good deal of 
our research strategy, were not actually on my mind once I was dispatChed to the 
- field to support the research work of our consultants. 
My position at the enterprise was immediately defined by the conflictual nature of 
the relationship between "western" consultants and Russian managers. Aside from 
substantive issues, it was primarily their working style, that put them at odds with the 
Russians. 
First, their psychological attitude was generally formal, assertive and inflexible. Even 
those who demonstrated sympathy for Russian reasons could not manage to modify 
the western research approach and interpretative framework. 
Second, consultants were subject to a high turnover, justified by the need to provide 
specific expertise. Furthermore, they travelled back and forth, keeping their working 
time with RuSsians within a tight schedule. They could communicate only through an 
interpreter and did not venture outside the luxury hotel where they were confined in 
their spare time. It is noticeable that Russians openly lamented the limits that this 
working style imposed on the development of personal relationships, which they 
clearly deemed a precondition for any further co-operation. 
Third, they limited their contacts to senior management, which with the exception of 
the Director and his cronies, were a series of dull figures unpr~pared, as I learned, to 
provide any useful insight into enterprise issues. 
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The outcome not surprisingly was that on both sides a sense of discomfort reigned, 
which bred suspicion and non-cooperation, and hopelessness at understanding each 
other. Not secondary, this was ensued by continuous questioning on the side of the 
Russians concerning our right to conduct research and use enterprise resources. 
My reaction was to open debate with the Russians on all those matters that were 
objects of controversy. I also made myself available to accept their guidance and 
advice in conducting my work, eventually identifying room for co-operation between 
my personal research agenda and their need to cope with Italians. 
Practically, I accommodated myself modestly in the town and moved to conduct my 
research with production managers in the shops on a permanent basis. This in turn 
allowed me to open serious discussions with them about the analytical tools we 
normally used for data collection, meeting their interest and consideration for my 
willingness to take into account their opinion. The outcome was somewhat 
outstanding, I not only was granted the right to conduct research on an individual 
basis, overruling previous decisions to evict me from the city, but I was elected to 
accompany t?eir delegation abroad. This when neither my skills nor my status alone 
could justify these decisions says something of the premium paid by Russians to trust 
and friendsh!p. 
My moves, far from being a strategic or ideological option, were at first dictated by 
the immediate need to secure my presence in the research settings but were also 
motivated by sympathy and desire to understand the reasons on the other side. 
Taking sides was neither limited to a manifestation of sympathy nor fell into a mere 
surrender to others' expectations. Breaking out of a supposedly neutral 
professionalism, which was in fact seen by respondents as a constant discrimination, 
was a precondition to gain their trust and access the research field. 
9 
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The role of gatekeepers: gaining access. 
A preliminary and fundamental task for a researcher on fieldwork is to secure 
continued and safe access to investigative settings. In the case of a Russian industrial 
enterprise the role of gatekeepers is played necessarily by the Director or anyone able 
to influence his decisions. Through the process described above I became acquainted 
with key managers who were determinant in deciding my fate on this ground. In 
particular, I established a trustful and long-standing relationship with a young shop 
chief whose help was paramount in securing my position at the enterprise and 
supporting the practical and intellectual challenges my fieldwork entailed. Here I try 
to unveil the determinant role of personal relationship in deciding, and delimiting, 
access. 
Nik was first presented to me by the consultants as a young, intelligent and ambitious 
shop chief who worked as a contact man for any practical and formal concerns at the 
enterprise. Not surprisingly, for a soviet enterprise, a man from production was 
selected to act as reference point rather than a PR person, as he had the appropriate 
knowledge, ~he language skills and the interest to interact with foreign specialists. 
More importantly, for the matter discussed here, he was a protege of the then-
Director and, a good friend of the Chief Engineer. 
As mentioned in the previous section, the Director's reservations about the presence 
of consultants at the enterprise were strong enough when I arrived and relationships 
deteriorated markedly over time. His irritation reached a climax when he openly 
refused to send a car to fetch one of our specialists after he had been deployed to a 
far-flung factory. I was the next "victim". After a twelve hour long journey from 
Moscow, I presented myself at the factory gates where, to my bewilderment, I was 
told that the Director wanted me to leave and a car was waiting to take me back to 
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the regional capital. The most curious aspect of this decision was that he implicitly 
extended his authority outside the factory premises. In fact, as a feudal chief or 
police authority, he was practically expelling me from the city radius. As I had 
familiarity with the militiamen at the gates they allowed me to contact Nik who, in 
turn, arranged to conduct a negotiation. The meeting itself was a piece of theatre of 
past soviet times: my friend asked me to assume a humble posture, keep silent and 
assent to any remark on their side. In the presence of the Director he explained that I 
was going to conduct research independently, severing connections with the 
consultants, putting myself at their disposal for any further need. Consent was 
achieved. 
For the rest of the time my co-operation with the enterprise, in practice the mutual 
exchange of ideas and favours with Nik and less often with the C. E., further 
contributed to consolidate my position. 
In the following years friendship and support, including invitations, were confirmed. 
Yet, when PhD fieldwork proper was to be initiated in fall 2000 the situation 
changed abr4ptly. New owners were taking over the administration; changing names 
at the top and jumbling established networks. Let's look at how previous connections 
operated in tre new context and the attitude of outside ownership. 
A new Director was sitting now in the command room with whom I was told 
I had to renegotiate my right to access and work at the factory. The fact was 
repeated twice as the situation was constantly evolving. under bankruptcy 
proceedings. in between the end of 2000 and early months of 2001. My 
friend once again volunteered to open the gate but this time he muttered 
there was no guarantee of success. The new Director was quite suspicious 
because of my attachment to the old management but primarily for the 
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intrinsic weakness of his position in between two combatants, insiders and 
outsiders. I had to complement the efforts of managers by introducing 
myself as a researcher from a "prestigious" academic institution. The accent 
in any case was on long-term ties with the enterprise, where I was 
universally taken as a trusted collaborator. I also had to present formal 
statements and a work plan, promising to report regularly on my activity. It 
was clear though that what we were seeking was merely his tolerance. In 
fact once the goal was achieved he did not bother inquiring as to my 
dealings. The split within managerial ranks, under greater external pressure 
to subordinate, further complicated the situation. The relationship between 
Nik and the C. E. deteriorated, weakening my position. The C. E. at one 
point remarked "you do not need credentials, we know you very well", but 
later he admitted his hopelessness with the new authority. Again we were 
able to sort it out, but only because the cooling down of insiders/outsiders 
infighting combined with the fait accompli of my continued presence. The 
entanglements produced by take-overs, quite frequent in the area, were 
replicated in another enterprise where we were seeking access. Here, despite 
the usual presentation, presents and internal lobbying, our efforts were 
nullified by direct orders from above. 
, 
These events call for some comments. First, in traditional enterprises there is no 
middleman, secretary or PR, dealing with non-business visitors. (But new ones did 
not differ, all my interviews for a trade report in Moscow with 5MB new 
entrepreneurs were held with the Director.) One has to go through the internal 
hierarchy moving right to the top. 
Secondly, it is clear that a direct appeal to the top management (Vyschee 
Rukovodstvo) implies them handling the matter personally. What does a personal 
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relationship mean in this context? The dynamics reported above suggest: a) the idea 
of absolute discretion, in spite of any reciprocal recognition of respective functions 
and deployment of a set of procedures; b) therefore, the strictly individual character 
of the relationship with authorities, depending on their political agenda, authority, at 
worst caprice or personal interest (presents are always welcome up-front!); c) the 
centrality, to the contrary, of status and connections. 
Thirdly, when anyone from the former FSU heard my tale, they would almost 
automatically remind me that "in Russia you start to build the house from the roof 
(krysha)" or "You don't start anything there without protection". Still, this point has 
to be handled carefully: long-term acquaintance does not always produce trust and 
the conflictual, and ever changing, political and economic status of an enterprise 
weighs heavily on this point. The difference can be made by agreement with 
gatekeepers rooted in the personal and social experience at the factory, which creates 
a lasting commonality of interests. 
Integrating into the social texture of the enterprise 
The initial bi.ographical experience of a researcher in an alien and unfamiliar context, 
as a tiny provincial town of Russia can appear at first glance, is dominated by 
• 
loneliness, fear of rejection and a natural tendency to seek acceptance. 
Building connections is obviously functional to qualitative research, providing 
opportunities to find respondents and collect information informally. Here I would 
like to stress that this process took place as a response to the primary need to 
overcome insecurity and feel socially and morally in accord with the researched 
community. 
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The questions were how and where to socialise with people and possibly open 
ground to find reliable respondents. As I have noted, access was not fonnally bound 
to specific guidelines, nor did it offer some hint or support concerning whom I 
should work with and how. 
My contacts with those I could first get in touch with, from militiamen to canteen 
workers, revealed how easy it was to get about in the factory and familiarise with 
people. The impetus was offered by my desire to prove my adaptability, living in a 
poor area, showing up regularly in the factory, taking on their eating, and especially 
drinking, customs. Discussions were no less important, as one can imagine the 
curiosity of people who had hardly seen foreigners. Here empathy played a major 
role in securing confidence. 
On the other side, office (non-production) mangers, who were in tum my main 
target, demonstrated themselves, even when superficially amicable, less open to any 
sort of complicity. 
The climate was altogether different in production. My friend Nik, every time I 
travelled there, felt it natural that I would stay with him in his office, alternatively he 
selected among other shop chiefs a "quiet" and "reliable" place where I could stay . 
• 
Though I tended at first to accept with reservations, I had gradually to admit that it 
was both a pleasant and useful solution. These offices, adjacent to production shops, 
were constantly stonned by personnel of every sort. Workers, clerks and other 
managers popped in or congregated for complaints, talks over personal or work 
matters or simply for a chat. It seemed that people were quite free to move around, 
this obviously more in the case of managers and technicians than mere (female) 
workers. 
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Nik was of the view that nowhere else could I find support and an approach from 
outside was senseless, "people have their talks and chats at the factory, they cannot 
dedicate their spare time to you", he used to say. Not only was social life flourishing, 
in these managerial comers, but also social life outside the factory was organised 
along the same lines. To my surprise, parties were often organised on a brigade or 
shop level and even partners, whichever their sex, would hardly participate. Outside 
managerial circles, both male and female workers were equally committed to 
sticking to their fellow comrades both inside and outside the factory. I therefore 
spent more and more time there,. becoming almost "a piece of furniture" in 
managerial offices. 
Though people of every status and profession visited the offices, and my friends had 
acquaintances also in the central offices, I established a stricter relationship with their 
closer fellow mates in production. It was among these managers that I tended to look 
for help and support, not only to find respondents or information, but also to satisfy 
some basic needs like transport, accommodation, food etc .... Since my availability of 
resources was, as one would expect, much larger than the majority could afford this 
was a controversial point in any relationship. I had the perception that this large 
divide woui,d rather keep people at bay. To the contrary, with these managers 
I 
exchange of favours would tend to offset this material and psychological gap, turning 
my knowledge and financial resources into a resource to spend in a relationship. 
Eventually I got accustomed to the idea that asking a friend was always the first 
option to purchase and a recommendation could do better than a formal impersonal 
request. 
While my inquiry into managerial structures was registering the malfunctioning of 
formal command lines and horizontal co-operation, creating abysses in between 
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employees and offices, my experience was telling me about personal relations based 
on friendship and mutuality, a network of connections and obligations, which I 
gradually joined. 
Nik and his friends more than once made reference to their group as a "Mafia" or 
"Komanda", as opposed to other groups within the enterprise and to the fact that I 
was now "one of us". 
My gradual integration into Nik's "komanda" reverberated in the rest of the labour 
collective. In my country, in Italy, a traditional fonn of asking a stranger about his 
identity, his name, is the question "to whom do you belong?". I realised that during 
casual encounters with people from outside our circle, to disentangle from the 
awkwardness of mutual unfamiliarity, continuous references were made on both 
sides to my friends and whereabouts in production. Ideally, they represented a 
response to such a question. My status and the corresponding prerogatives were 
, being defined by the set of relationships I was able to maintain. 
Structure of the Thesis 
This study consists of two main parts, a literature review, where I present the main 
theoretical ard historical issues concerning the theory of the enterprise in the West 
and in the USSR, and the analysis of the case study proper. 
In the first substantive chapter, I introduce the study with a review of the theories 
concerning the nature of the finn and the role of salaried managers in shaping it. The 
reconstruction of the main strands of thought contributing to the debate around the 
modem business enterprise will help understand the theoretical underpinnings of the 
western economic models applied to transition and restructuring. Further in the 
chapter I will look into alternative approaches which could offer an interpretation of 
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social and political implications of structural changes in the world of production on 
the basis of the analysis of its mode of production and labour process. 
In the second substantive chapter I provide an historical and analytical account of 
soviet management. I look at the fonnation, crisis and attempts at reform of the 
soviet economic system with a focus on management and the labour process. 
Management in the soviet experience has been fundamentally viewed in two 
different ways: mainstream economic analysis has stressed its character as a 
command system directed from above, advocating liberalisation as the only solution 
to the stalemate of economic stagnation. A different approach by social historians 
and critical scholars of the Soviet Union has stressed the autonomous role played by 
workers and managers in moulding the system. Their analysis provides the key 
contradictions of the system, which are at the basis of the problems in transition. 
Subsequently, I introduce the case study with a background chapter, reviewing the 
main features and developments in the textile industry and markets both at world 
level and in Russia. This will help focus on the main operative and strategic concerns 
of Russian managers and to understand the environment in which they move and the 
set of threats and opportunities they face. 
, 
Chapter Five is concerned with the organisation and functioning of enterprise 
managerial structures and their evolution during transition. I will report extensively 
on functions, role and activity of key units and explain the problems they faced. The 
first part is dedicated to attempts at refonn under insiders' control. I will show the 
rationale behind managers' decisions to retain most of the elements of the past order 
ano the obstacles to restructuring they encountered in the market. The part on outside 
ownership will show how lack of change resides in the interests of the new business 
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elite and how post-soviet management has been modified to operate in the new 
market environment. 
The two other chapters of the case study focus on specific topics, which represent 
key issues in management, namely wages and discipline (Le. the stick and the carrot), 
and permit "us to analyse the labour process. In order to understand the forms and 
reasons for widespread resistance to reforms by workers and managers, I will make 
extensive use of narratives and discourses by senior and line managers as well as 
workers. 
In Chapter Six an analysis of the functioning and change in the reward and incentive 
system will be carried out. This represents a key managerial function and therefore is 
crucial to. understand what sort of adjustment is taking place in post-soviet 
management. The chapter provides an account of the formal and informal practices, 
which reproduce the soviet form of social relationship on the shop floor and the 
modifications they undergo under new and old management. I explain why, despite 
its inefficiency, the soviet-time wage and incentive system has been fundamentally 
retained. 
In Chapter Seven I present and analyse cases of labour and technological discipline 
• 
violations. i discuss the policies carried out before and after privatisation by 
management. Professional identities, gender issues and forms of authority will also 
be covered to ascertain the intricacies of conflict and consent on the shop floor. I 
eventually look into the labour process to ascertain managerial rationality in 
tolerating violations and the conditions forcing workers to perform them. The 
findings of my research are briefly summarised in a concluding chapter. 
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PART ONE 
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2. The rise of the managerial enterprise in the West 
The problems of the Russian enterprise are commonly understood among 
practitioners and scholars essentially as managerial matters to be coped with with the 
traditional tools available in the field. Nevertheless it is equally agreed that the whole 
society is experiencing an holistic transfonnation which entails redesigning all the 
major institutions and the roles of their constituent members. If this is so, the process 
of restructuring management should include a rethinking of the role, prerogatives and 
mutual relationships among the corporate actors, in particular management-employee 
relations, relative to both the market and non-market environment. 
The investigation of these issues requires a broad theoretical consideration of the 
nature of the finn and the capabilities of management in shaping its features. This 
part of our work is precisely devoted to equipping us for this analytical task. The 
reconstruction of the main strands of thought contributing to the debate around the 
modem business enterprise will satisfy two objectives. We want to understand the 
theoretical I.!nderpinnings of the western economic models applied to planning 
transition programmes and, at enterprise level, the recommendations for 
restructuring. At a different level we are searching for alternative approaches which 
could offer an· interpretation of the social and political implications of structural 
changes in the world of production. 
The specific needs of our work lead us to limit this review to the basic assumptions, 
trends and mutual relationships of the major strands of thought. 
Our enquiry into the theoretical underpinnings of the practice and ideology of 
transition has brought us to focus on two different but related fields, namely the 
theory of the finn envisaged in neoclassical economics and strategic management as 
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part of a broader strand of organisational and managerial theories. On the one side, 
we have those scholars, mainly economists, who continue to cling to the paradigm of 
the "market economy", though substantial differences have grown out of the new 
Industrial Organisation (10) economics (R.H. Coase, O.E. Williamson, H. D~msetz, 
A Alchian). As we shall see, this approach, which exceeds the boundaries of 
neoclassical orthodoxy, has mainly attempted to inject realism into model-based 
theories. It is held that 10 economics, while making organisation a legitimate subject 
of enquiry, continues to maintain that limits to firm control over markets and 
managerial discretion are desirable, even though implausible, because of their praise 
for the perfect competition ideal (W. Lazonick, 1991; G. Sapelli, 1990). 
Secondly, the field of Strategic Management deserves special consideration. In the 
first place, it represents the box of tools of consultancy discourse and practices; at the 
theoretical level the most thoughtful contributions from this field offer a valuable 
insight into managerial issues (I. Ansoff) while others seem to retreat into integration 
with 10 economics (M.E. Porter). 
A completely different approach stems out of those works which recognise the 
modern business organisation as the most influential economic institution of 
capitalist Cot,lOtries and the pace-setter of economic growth. It is within these diverse, 
though in our view complementary and concomitant, set of studies that we have 
found the methodological, analytical and theoretical elements which have shaped and 
sharpened our research focus as well as contributing to the elaboration of our 
interpretative framework. The main references in economic thought are the classical 
conceptions of Schumpeter, Marx and Marshall and the more recent seminal works 
of E. T. Penrose and A. Chandler. On the methodological ground the boundaries 
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erected by the neo-classics are challenged to admit contributions from other social 
sciences and a central role is attributed to historical inquiry. 
In this perspective the enterprise is dealt with as an organisation which struggles to 
survive by matching internal resources and capabilities with external challenges. A 
marked difference with the traditional interpretation offered by conventional 
economics rests on the role of strategy, the conscious co-ordination by managers as 
opposed to the invisible hand of the market. The theories of business organisation 
hold organisation and strategy to be key to performance and focus on the conditions 
and determinants of innovation within the finn in. a dynamic and multi-sided 
relationship with the environment. The field of reference is primarily Business 
History and the Italian Storia d'Impresa. As for the first, other than Chandler 
himself, we will look at the work of William Lazonick, whose comprehensive 
critique of equilibrium economics has been a key to our understanding, and Neil 
Fligstein for the analysis of the internal dynamics of managerial groups and the 
institutional and legal aspects of finn growth. The works of the· Italian historians of 
the enterprise are equally essential to understand the nature of the enterprise in an 
, 
historical perspective as an increasingly complex institution of the capitalist 
economy. T~e main loci of their researches of interest to us are technological change 
I 
and the organisation of labour and the historical development of the managerial elite 
and its institutions. Their work will be placed in the larger category of the Marxist 
interpretations of the growth of modern capitalism, assuming the creation and 
extraction of surplus value in the workplace as a powerful and unsurpassed 
framework for the explanation of innovation. This will lead us to touch on the main 
elements of the current controversy about technological and social change centred on 
the concepts of Fordism, post-Fordism and flexibility. 
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Differences of perspectives notwithstanding, historical approaches to the 
innovative firm share a tendency to develop a theory of the firm with strong 
analytical and predictive force. 
The role that the vast array of theoretical contributions presented hereafter plays in 
this work might become clearer by considering the place they occupy in my 
intellectual biography and under which circumstances they came to be part of it. 
The encounter with business management and conventional economics was 
prompted by the brief but intense experience, recalled earlier in the methodological 
section, in the world of consultancy in Russia and Italy. Neo-liberal economic 
policies, after having inspired a precipitous privatisation programme in the early 90s, 
continued advocating State withdrawal from economic affairs, other than 
macroeconomic stabilisation. Enterprises were left struggling in an uncertain 
environment while the entire social and institutional infrastructure of the country was 
experiencing a process of rapid decay. 'Democratic' policy-makers and mainstream 
western economic analysts deemed these disastrous outcomes a necessary adjustment 
process, confident in the restoration of the 'natural' laws of the market for an exit to 
, 
the crisis. At the same time they seemed to ignore entirely the complex social and 
economic dynamics their reforms had unleashed. To the extent that these policies 
were justified and legitimated by the ideals of market economy and free enterprise, 
enshrined in western conventional economics, I felt the need to critically enquiry into 
such theoretical arguments so as to identify their interpretative flaws and expose their 
fundamentally ideological character. 
The urge to look into managerial theories has been more immediately related to my 
initial involvement in enterprise restructuring. Practitioners of business management 
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were by training and professional experience alerted about the difficulties faced by 
management and the complexity of the tasks imposed by privatisation. They could 
display opinions diverging from 'marketeers' on key economic policy issues. This 
notwithstanding, what I observed were enormous difficulties faced by consultants in 
establishing effective communication with their Russian counterparts on the basis of 
a common understanding of enterprise affairs and problem. The question arose 
whether it was the operative and analytical tools they were equipped with that could 
be responsible for the limited capability of consultants, fostering a specific enquiry 
into the materials which appear to me the most relevant to the profession. 
If the firm of mainstream economics and business management stands for the 
ideological and operative foundation of respectively transition and restructuring in 
Russia, it is from their critical appreciation that our research departs. It is also for this 
reason that it seemed logical to treat these theories first. 
The literature that occupies the final part of this chapter, namely business and labour 
history and labour process studies, provides, instead, the reference point for my 
analytical o~entation. Business and labour history has long been part of my 
theoretical and analytical background since the early 1990s when I embarked on a 
comparative: study of labour organisation in Soviet factories. Its understanding of the 
enterprise as a complex institution structured by the interplay of social, economic and 
political elements has greatly enhanced my ability to compare and contrast the 
development of soviet and' capitalist economic organisation as fundamentally 
different, historically grounded, experiences. Labour history, and labour process 
analysis in particular, has provided the key focus for comparative analysis, namely 
manager-worker relationship, and therefore the formulation of our initial research 
questions. It is the main theoretical underpinning of our argument that social 
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relations in production, their inherently contradictory character and potentially 
conflictual manifestation, should be taken into account to understand the constraints 
to the action of agents and the nature and direction of change. 
The firm in the market economy 
The firm of the "Theory of Firm". 
The main issue conventional economics set out to deal with is the allocation of 
scarce resources to alternative uses. It argues that it is the price mechanism, 
commonly referred to as the market, that guarantees that resources will be bid out to 
the most valued uses. Most of the efforts in economics were devoted to building up 
and refining equilibrium models where exchange across the market between demand 
and supply guarantees an efficient outcome, understood as the highest utility of the 
parties. The concept of efficiency, which arises from this approach, is apparently 
static in so far as no concern is paid to the mechanism by which resources are 
actually crea,ted and further developed. The main focus of the discipline is exchange 
not production. 
As for development issues, the idea of the division of labour taken from Adam Smith 
is interpreted by referring to his proposition that it is the extent of the market, with 
the appearance of new firms and new industries, that determines the growth of the 
economy, even though Smith himself had elsewhere pointed to the division of tasks 
within the firm, with the example of the pin factory, to explain rises in productivity. 
To the contrary, the prevailing idea was that the market not the enterprise was the 
most efficient form of economic organisation. The capitalist economy was to be 
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designated, and still is, as a market economy or rather a free market devoid of any 
bureaucratic control or co-ordination obstructing free competition. 
The classical economists leaned in favour of a highly decentralised economic system, 
with individual firms operating through the impersonal mechanism of price-based 
exchange, as they polemically opposed the monopolistic institutions of the 
mercantile age. In the hands of their successors their framework was to become a 
substantially dogmatic and ahistorical model. The highest representatives of 
neoclassical thought (L. Robbins in Lazonick, 1991; pp. 67-68) concluded that the 
creation of wealth was not of concern to the discipline, which instead has to set the 
relevance of issues according to the internal values and pressures of the discipline 
itself. What is the role of the firm then, and what is the role of the entrepreneur, other 
than exchanging inputs and output on the market? If we "look at microeconomics 
textbooks we find a theory of the firm reduced to cost curves, whose determinants 
are either presupposed as given or determined by the market (S.G. Winter, 1991; pp. 
180-185). The entrepreneur is free to expand the output until marginal costs equal 
marginal revenues, driving profits close to zero under perfect competition. The 
exclusive concern for prices and output levels led Edith Penrose (E.T. Penrose, 1963; 
p. 10) to th'~nk that the conventional theory of the firm was rather to be ignored 
, 
altogether than to quarrel with, since it was of no use in understanding the firm in the 
"real world". One contradictory aspect of this theory lies in the concept of the firm 
itself (see S.G. Winter, ibid.). Market economics conceives the agents in the market 
as profit-seeking individuals exemplified in the latest marginalistic models by 
consumers/owners of inputs. Nevertheless it is the firm not the individual that holds 
the stage in the theory, apparently betraying the commitment to methodological 
individualism. This implies recognition that the firm be intended as a collective party 
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where diverse interests, potentially conflicting, have to be amalgamated to guarantee 
full co-operation. The case made by A. Smith confirms that the issue was considered 
of relevance by the classics. Nevertheless, their commitment to individual ownership 
with its intrinsic limits led them to doubt the significance of its internal dynamics in 
the achievement of economic outcomes. Beginning with A. Smith and lS. Mill, the 
fathers of the discipline professed a very low opinion of salaried managers, then 
referred to as stewards or even servants, treating their employment as unnecessary or 
dangerous (see S. O. Winter, ibid.). When they looked at the British economy of the 
first industrial revolution, it was not the growth of firms but the extension of the 
market by innovators-entrepreneurs which afforded the growth in productivity and 
the expansion of the economy via market exchange and fierce competition (and the 
brutal exploitation of a new kind of labourer, the wage worker). Alfred Marshall, 
while distinguishing between internal and external economies and diseconomies, 
expressed a strong belief that external economies continue to dominate, limiting for a 
long time ahead the incipient establishment of oligopolistic and monopolistic forms 
of economic dominance. 
History was: to tell another story, where firms and their constituent parts played an 
essential role, but economics as a discipline was to be established on this approach. 
This made possible, among other things, the establishment of a clear-cut separation 
of economics from the other social sciences, depriving it of essential methodological 
and empirical foundations. Conventional economics in this respect performs 
essentially an ideological function as the repository of the myth of the market on 
which capitalist societies, whatever their real mode of operation, rest. 
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The firm of the marginalist theory is a production function, its scale and scope adjust 
to technological indivisibilities and, in turn, technology is taken as given. In the 
perfect competition model, the assumptions about perfect rationality and absolute 
mobility of factors and information make it impossible for individual firms to 
become dominant and reap higher returns. In this way, it is argued, resources are 
effectively employed, allowing the principle that the seeking of personal gains by 
self-interested individuals can serve the good of the whole. It is of utmost importance 
to understand how this doctrine continues to inform both methodology and practical 
considerations when economists turn to investigate and command solutions to 
problems in the "real world". 
As we shall see, greater complexity and change of assumptions notwithstanding, 
conventional economists continue to regard perfect competition as an unchallenged 
ideal of efficiency; any departure from it produces disturbances and distortions of the 
"markef'. Historical events as well as technological constraints and managerial 
strategies are commonly regarded as extra-economic accidents which explain the 
failure of the model to materialise. In particular, the attainment of higher returns by 
firms, usually in the presence of asset concentration, is viewed as a cause of higher 
prices and ~ower output than might be achieved under perfect competition. The 
I 
argument in favour of less state regulation is usually justified on this ground, as it 
should elicit greater competition and so limit managerial discretion. 
Even when the hard fact of large enterprises was admitted in the theory, usually on 
the ground of technological considerations, no theory of growth was developed, 
leaving the causes and trends of integration unexplained and so maintaining a 
suspicious attitude to managerial strategies. 
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The theory of the firm revised 
The lack of interest in the finn and its internal dynamics are common features among 
marginalist economists, but at least from the 70s a new strand of thought emerged 
that accepted dirtying their hands with the oddities of economic life, though 
continuing to praise the marvels of the market ideal; they are, respectively, 
Transaction Costs theories, Agency Theory, Oame theory and Evolutionary Theory 
(see W. Lazonick, ibid., also pp. 181-188; O. Sapelli, ibid., also pp. 7-33; D.E 
Williamson and s.o. Winter, 1991; D. Schendel, 1991). These new approaches aim 
at devising explanatory models of industrial organisation focusing on the 
market/organisation relationship, internal dynamics and behavioural issues. 
These theories are built around a set of problems and behaviours drawing on discrete 
phenomena among those commonly observed in the real business world, 
undennining the smooth operation of the market conceived by the neoclassical view. 
Their stating point is the admission that the perfect competition model is inadequate 
to analyse organisational phenomena because it relies on absolute decentralisation 
pennitted by the untenable assumptions of costless infonnation, technological 
• 
knowledge :and perfect rationality. Therefore different combinations of new 
assumptions are introduced, namely bounded rationality, infonnational asymmetries, 
asset specificity, uncertainty and opportunism. Through this it became possible to 
explain the emergence of finns other than as mere production functions. 
The enterprise is regarded as a different fonn of organisation characterised by 
managed, i.e. conscious, co-ordination as opposed to the impersonal mechanism of 
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the market. Nevertheless, criticism of the traditional theory notwithstanding, market 
co-ordination remains the desirable choice while organisationihierarchy arises out of 
market failures and is regarded as a last resort. 
Thanks to its greater attention to details and higher complexity, 10 economics 
elaborated sub-models analysing specific economic phenomena which have attracted 
great attention from practitioners as well as scholars from other social sciences, and 
managerial studies in particular. As a result, hopes have been raised about co-
operation across disciplines as well as fears of a renewed attempt by economics to 
assert its dominance without shedding its dogmatic approach (see D. Schendel, 1991; 
ibid.). These theories enjoy a widespread appeal and are currently used to analyse 
governance issues such as the employer-employee relationship, vertical integration, 
governance control and managerial behaviour and strategies. Among them, T. C. 
theories are of particular interest because they represent a more coherent attempt to 
create a new paradigm of economic organisation, distancing themselves from 
conventional explanations and utilising in a new way the notion of costs. 
The theoreti~al bases of the new approach were laid by the articles of R.H. Coase 
(1937), "The nature of the firm", and F. Knight (1921), "Risk, uncertainty and 
Profit" (R.~. Coase, 1993, pp. 18-75, and H. Demsetz, 1991; pp.159-179; on Coase 
see W. Lazonick, ibid., pp.168-170, on Knight, pp.175-6). 
• Knight's analysis of the firm as an institution for efficient risk sharing is 
based on risk aversion and costly knowledge; Coase's theory, known as the 
transaction cost theory of the firm, has as its central theme the relevance of 
costly managing and exchanging.' (H. Demsetz, ibid.; p. 161) 
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The development of the TC theory came with the elaborations of Williamson and 
A1chian and Demsetz; they attempt to build a new theory of economic organisation 
based on the comparative analysis of costs within the firm and across the market. We 
shall treat them separately as their approach differs in some respects, though their 
common features and limits are the object of a critical consideration. 
Williamson concentrates on Coase's argument that market and hierarchylfirm are 
different forms of economic organisation and differ in the cost of their use, identified 
as transaction costs. His aim is to "operationalise" these propositions in order to 
devise a logic of economic organisation. The starting point is the market, its 
observable replacement by managed co-ordination raises the question of why 
hierarchy is preferred to market exchange, known as the "make or buy" option. 
Moving from a traditional economic perspective, he concludes with Coase that when 
transactions are more efficiently dealt with by hierarchy they are internalised. 
Wiliamson rejects the orthodox view of the firm as a productive unit and pays no 
consideration to technological aspects. He chooses, therefore, transactions as the 
basic unit of. analysis. The aim of his analysis is to identify factors responsible for 
transaction cost differences. 
This analysi,s would allow T. C. theory to assume a predictive and operational 
, 
character regarding the choice of the most effective form of organisation. The 
puzzling question about the nature of the firm and its size, he argues, can be 
answered by aligning transactions with governance structures in a discriminating 
way. 
The last focal point of Williamson's research is the discovery of inter-temporal 
process features as uncertainty impedes ex ante incentives to determine the outcome 
of transactions. We should underline that the introduction of a dynamic perspective 
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on a logical ground differs from dynamics drawn on historical investigation and 
appears closer to a Game Theory perspective. 
The conditions for market failure, according to Williamson, lie in the new 
behavioural assumptions of bounded rationality and opportunism. 
Bounded rationality implies human agents are rational, i.e. profit-seeking, but only 
limitedly so. Opportunism is 'defined as a deep condition of self-interest-seeking that 
contemplates guile' (O.E Williamson and S.G. Winter, ibid.; p. 92). 
The combination of these two elements makes the economic environment uncertain 
and risky. Under these conditions, transactions characterised by frequency of 
. recurrence and asset specificity become difficult to arrange and fulfil under a 
contractual agreement. The risk of opportunism and the related costs of contract 
arrangements can be avoided by resorting to integration. Under hierarchy the high 
powered interests of agents are replaced by low powered interests of employees 
incuning the need for incentives and safeguards with their own specific costs. 
Asset specificity plays the central role in determining the choice between market and 
hierarchy, the higher its level the greater the risk of opportunism and the advantages 
of managed,co-operation (see W. Lazonick, ibid., pp. 206-227). 
In a contractual framework, asset specificity stands for long-tenn commitment by 
one of the parties, which derives from investments in non-redeployable assets and 
implies risk of heavy losses. The function of assets in the theory resembles 
technological indi visibilities in the classical view, as they impede costless and 
perfect mobility of inputs. 
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Equally, the reason for asset specificity is not searched for precisely because 
Williamson has not developed any argument accounting for managerial decision-
making, other than mere choice among given options. 
Williamson's position about the managerial role and the enterprise is fully unfolded 
when comparing what he considers the two main approaches to the job of managers, 
"economising" and "strategising" (O.E. Williamson, 1991; pp. 75-95). 
The "strategising" option, in his view, is stuck to power issues which are either 
irrelevant or short-lived in an appropriate economic perspective. Strategy here is 
essentially intended as a deterrence policy, building on market power. 
Economising, on the contrary, deals with efficiency and relies essentially on cost 
matters. In the long run Williamson claims cost differences decide the 
competitiveness of business organisation and he insists that rather than differences 
among organisational solutions within firms, we have to focus on the tension 
between market and hierarchy. 
He distinguishes between first order economising (FOE), effective adaptation and 
reduction of' waste and second order (SOE), lower production costs, and so prices, 
and increased quantity. What is left for managerial discretion, and for the firm to 
, 
manoeuvre, 'is a policy of adaptation to external circumstances, FOE, while 
efficiency remains to be checked by the traditional cost function, SOE. Integration, 
extending managerial co-ordination, is not the first choice option for Willliamson but 
the last resort in case of market failure because bureaucracy imposes a high cost due 
to adverse selection. 
Williamson departs from the neoclassics also by affirming his interest in historical 
research and the possibility of testing his framework against the empirical findings of 
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economic historians. He provides an historical explanation for Take Over (TO) 
movements which exemplifies his conception of business management as well as the 
methodological links which he intends to establish with other social sciences. 
Two opposing views apply to the issue, one stressing TO as resulting from excessive 
managerial discretion, powered by expansion drives; the second highlighting the 
importance of a free market for corporate control for healthy selection of managerial 
teams and as a permanent threat to their greed. 
In Williamson's view, an historical explanation seems more plaUSible where the TO 
movement in the 60s is linked with the generalisation of the M-form, as emerges 
from A. D. Chandler's findings about the North-American managerial enterprise 
(O.E Williamson and S.O. Winter, ibid.; pp. 104-108). 
The M-form comes as a result of the attempt to solve the overload on general 
managers in the former U-form. The new form yields unexpected efficiency gains 
due to separation between top and divisional managers, driving the former off the 
operational ground. TO, as well as divestment, can rather be understood as the 
selective deVice which spreads the new more efficient organisational mode. 
Here TO represents the reproductive link in the biological analogy. Interestingly, 
, 
such an explanatory construct, taken from functionalist sociology, was deemed 
useless and misleading by Edith Penrose (E.T. Penrose, 1963; p. 2) in respect of 
being devoid of consideration of the role of human decisions. 
Whatever his professed consideration for other social sciences, Williamson seems to 
ignore their major contribution: the inquiry into human actions and the investigation 
of their causes, among which human conscious decisions are to be taken into 
account. 
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In tune with the latest discourse around the nature of enterprises, Williamson 
concludes that strategic management makes central offices operate as internal capital 
markets, while divisions begin to be understood as profit centres. 
The approach from A. A1chian and H. Demsetz diverges from the above for the 
deeper reliance on the neoclassical assumptions. Their critique of WiIIiamson 
focuses on his clear cut distinction between firm/hierarchy and market. They 
understand the firm as a nexus of contracts and coherently refer to it as firm-like 
arrangements. The existence of these arrangements does not depend on problems 
inherent in difficulties in devising long term contracts. Nor can a case be made for 
TC alone, as opposed to more efficient firms, because governance costs are to be 
considered with market exchange, as incorporated in purchased goods, and within-
house production. Their point is that Williamson continues to presuppose production 
costs equality and therefore does not focus on intra-firm cost comparison, 
confronting instead the firm with market. 
They make the internal functioning of the firm their central theme. Consistently with 
their contract,ual approach, the firm consists of a horizontal relationship among 
tearnworkers/input providers. Adopting assumptions from agency theory, moral 
hazard and opportunism, they observe that output restriction, the form assumed by 
opportunism within the firm, leads to the adoption of performance monitoring. It 
explains the supervisory position of management and governance costs. What strikes 
one here is the credit paid to the idea of free labour, which clearly contrasts the very 
reason for shirking, a typical form of workers' resistance to work intensification. As 
for the nature of contracts, as S. E. Masten points out, parties in a contractual 
agreement are free to pursue their personal goals within the limits set by contractual 
clauses and any other general legal rules applicable to contracts (S.E. Masten, 1993; 
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pp. 196-212). Quite different is the position of employees, who are always held to act 
in the interest of the employer and under his undisputed direction, with the only limit 
being that which is unlawful. 
Far from posing problems of monitoring, teamwork under managerial control has 
been able to increase to a greater extent the measuring ofindividual efforts, affording 
the "special productivity" which, according to Demsetz, offsets internal costs (H. 
Demsetz, 1991, ibid.). 
The understanding of horizontal, mutually agreed, co-operation within the firm 
descends from the belief in the perfect mobility of inputs/factors. Along with it, the 
right to hire and fire by management would be offset or even outweighed by threats 
by employees to leave. Unlike Williamson, Demsetz does not concern himself with 
the problem of asset specificity, in the form of non-redeployable fixed capital, 
because of the above mentioned presumption. In reality the mobility of the labour 
force is the condition for the existence of a labour market, where it is freely available 
for the firms to hire. Conversely, strategies by firms to establish effective control of 
different segI,TIents of the labour force determine the forms and the degree to which 
they can secure privileged access to resources and gain dominance among 
competitors. ' 
, 
It is an intrinsically contradictory construct, which cannot be solved once and for all 
but can only be observed and analysed, relying on the partial solutions that have 
emerged to the present as a result of continuous innovation by firms. 
The idea of the firm as a nexus of contracts based on non-hierarchical co-operation is 
currently referred to to explain or urge the flexibility discourse on enterprises. It. 
would represent a shortening of contracts, for rapid moral obsolescence reduces the 
need for long-term mutual commitment and cumulative knowledge advantages. 
36 
Claudio Morrison: Soviet Management and Transition PhD thesis June 2004 
The TC theories all agree on this proposition, that the firm at its best is nothing else 
than the continuation of markets by other means, and the managers, if not given to 
opportunism, replicate the co-ordination of resource allocation normally operated by 
the market. 
As for the other theoretical strands, Game Theory appears to have little practical 
impact. Agency Theory, though set to study a limited set of phenomena, has gained, 
as we saw, great appeal. Its main assumptions are opportunism and informational 
asymmetries. It maintains instead the belief in perfect rationality and derives models 
of complete contracting. It is concerned with the design of incentive agreements and 
the allocation of decision rights among parties with conflicting interests. The central 
themes are the principal/agent relationship and corporate control. This theory tends 
to consider all managerial problems as depending on incorrect incentives, assuming 
away any other source of malfunctioning. 
Evolutionary Theory instead presents itself with a sharp and thoughtful criticism of 
conventional theories (ET) challenging the alleged dynamic feature of the TC 
approach (ab?ut the ET see S.G. Winter, 1991; pp. 179-196 and G. Sapelli, 1990; pp. 
8-9). Consistently, the adoption of an explanation based on evolution by selection 
• 
brings forward the idea of an innovation process fuelled by interactions with the 
I 
environment. 
R. Nelson and S. Winter introduce the important concept of routines. Routines 
guarantee the reproduction of the organisation but also constitute a limit to the 
possibility of change. Their routine-based evolutionary firm is clearly at odds with 
the selective approach to firm problems implied by the use of transactions. They 
judge it more appropriate to consider the firm as a whole; its size can be considered 
the result of cumulative adaptations more than spot choices between market and 
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hierarchy, the level of efficiency is more realistically established at firm level while 
individual subunits may continue to operate below average if it is consistent with the 
overall functioning of an integrated system. 
Business organisation and Strategic Management 
The lesson we draw from conventional economics can be synthesised as the 
following; 'A well-functioning economy is a market co-ordinated economy. The 
ability of an organisation to influence the allocation of resources and the distribution 
of income is an undesirable abnormality - "market imperfection'" (W. Lazonick, 
ibid., p.62). This approach has clearly little to say about the real world. At their best 
these models can offer a guide for adaptive strategies. Reality tells us that they are 
short-lived, only structural change prompted by innovative strategies can sustain 
growth and overcome potentially system-threatening crises. The growing ability of 
firms to perform these strategic tasks has been a function of the development of 
internal organisational capabilities embodied in a mUltiple layer of managers. 
The increase in consistency of their functions has brought forward a new field of 
studies, a di~ect expression of the business world. Strategic Management (SM) 
focuses on current and forthcoming issues of concern to the practitioners with a 
, 
strategising perspective (D. Schendel, I. Ansoff and D. Channon, 1980; R.P. Rumlet, 
DJ. Teece and D. Schendel, 1991). SM represents the emergence of a reflective 
consciousness of this professional group, the content and consistency of its analytical 
tools reflect its changing perception of the environment and the level at which 
responses meet challenges. The field has flourished, on the practical ground, out of 
teaching and consulting activities providing services to the business community. 
The seminal works of Penrose and Chandler laid the theoretical and empirical 
foundations. which permitted overcoming the intellectual barriers to the study of the 
38 
Claudio Morrison: Soviet Management and Transition PhD thesis June 2004 
managerial firm, affording scientific legitimacy. Essentially, the SM field rests on the 
belief that 'the strategic direction of business organisation is at the heart of wealth 
creation in modem industrial societies.' (R.P. Rumlet, D.l. Teece and D. Schendel, 
ibid., p.6). 
In the first post-war decades the strategic field, originally known as Business Policy, 
was concerned with long range and lately strategic planning. These managerial 
systems reflected the then-secondary and periodic priority attached to the 
relationship with the environment (for the idea of managerial systems see Ansoff, 
1980, pp. 131-149; for the history of the discipline see D. Schendel, 1. Ansoff and D. 
Channon, 1980, ibid., and D. Schendel, 1994). It becomes immediately evident if we 
consider the long-term effect and relative stability of investment decisions by big 
corporations in the 50s and 60s. General Managers in charge of planning were 
primarily concerned with a quite narrow range of issues consisting of markets, 
products and technology. The division of labour between top level and operational 
areas reflected itself in the idea of corporate strategy as divided into two 
organisational activities: decision and implementation, i.e. content and process. They 
are somewhat equivalent to Chandler's strategy-structure model where strategy· 
formulation '~omes logically and historically prior to structure, which is to be set in 
\ 
place and instructed to execute the former. The tension between these two moments 
is one of the recurrent themes in the field. 
The other "fundamental dilemma" lies in the way the relationship with the 
environment should be understood. 'For those who learned about strategy in the 60s 
( .. ) the field of SM ( ... ) has always been about opportunity and threat, somehow 
raised by forces out there, matched by strengths and weaknesses, something in there, 
possessed by the firm and manipulated by managers.' (D. Schendel, 1994, p.1). 
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Significant changes, from the 70s onwards, were to reshape both the managerial 
agenda and the paradigm of the field, leading to the SM conception. The separation 
between conception and implementation subsided, replaced by the inclusive concept 
of strategic change; preoccupation with behaviour and action outgrew traditional 
concerns with decision. 
The new issues on the managerial agenda were corporate capability, the 
environment-strategy-capability relationship and strategic change processes, 
including resistance to change. The successful manager in the field paradigm was 
conscious of the need for both plan and organic adaptation, avoiding the extremes of 
tight planning and unplanned incrementalism. 
On the theoretical ground, the main question was about the causes of superior 
performance. Till then, the state-of-art in the field was dominated by the idea of "fit" 
(M.E. Porter, 1991), a loose general framework, through which individual cases were 
looked upon as devising specific solutions. Strategy was meant to unify functional 
policies, to establish general goals, to align strengths and weaknesses to opportunity 
and threats a!1d to create and exploit distinctive competencies. 
From the 80s two conflicting views divided the field, regarding the" relationship 
• 
between the firm and the environment and the major determinants of economic 
outcomes. One is Porter's powerful analysis of Competitive Advantage (CA), the 
second is the Resource-Based View (RBV), inspired by Penrose's insistence on 
internal resource development to drive enterprise growth. 
Porter intended to build a new theory to overcome the generalising framework of the 
"fit" approach so as to provide tools to understand a firm's competitive environment 
and its relative position. He was responding, it seems to me, to the functional need 
for tools which could guide general managers and consultants, irrespective of the 
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discrete industry/product and size/structure of the selected firm. The need resulted 
from the shortening of the time period for strategic change, greater managerial turn-
over and increased division of labour among managerial layers. 
Preliminary challenges in theory building were identified in the choice between 
model and framework, the understanding of the chain of causality, the related choice 
of the time period and finally the basic unit of inquiry (M.E. Porter, 1991). 
Porter's approach (M.E. Porter, 1991, pp. 80, 85) has delivered a theory of 
competitive advantage, seeking the" causes of superior performance of the firm at a 
given period of time, what he will later refer to as the cross-sectional problem. It 
'addresses the choice of strategy given whatever array of capabilities the firm and its 
rival possess at any time' and whatever 'the process by which the superior positions 
were attained' (M.E. Porter, 1991, p. 105). The basic unit of analysis is the single 
business or industry, irrespective of the number of activities under corporate control. 
Porter makes his central theme the idea that 'firm success is a function of two areas: 
the attractiveness of the industry in which the firm competes and its relative position 
in the industry.' (M.E. Porter, 1991, p.99). The short time horizon and the focus on 
the industry effect made Porter's view popular but contested in the field since he 
really constrained managerial discretion and firm action within a narrow range of 
options. 
To understand industry structure Porter devised the popular five-forces model, 
featuring threats by new entrants and substitute products, bargaining power of buyers 
and suppliers, and internal degree of rivalry. Notably no mention is made of any 
factor other than conventional economic ones. Within industries, Porter continues, 
firms are successful if they reach an attractive position, that is one that guarantees a 
sustainable competitive advantage relative to competitors. 
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The search for CA leads Porter to study firm internal configuration, which he 
understands as a collection of activities. Activities use and create assets such as 
skills, routines and knowledge. 'The activities in a firm can be schematically arrayed 
in what I term the value chain. c. .. ) A firm's strategy is manifested in the way in 
which it configures and links the many activities in its value chain.' (M.E. Porter, 
1991, p.102). Last in the chain are "dri vers", the empirical firm-specific determinants 
of superior performance of activities. 
The determinants of CA are neither permanent nor valuable in themselves. They tend 
to fade away if not reinvested in and especially because of changes in buyers' and 
competitors' positions. This relates to the idea of value and value chain. The value 
Porter refers to is the buyer's value, "customer satisfaction", speaking business 
language. 
Activities create value neither because of the intrinsic properties of assets nor 
because of their use independently from the market. Activities may contribute to 
create value but certainly they are a source of costs. By breaking down the firm into 
its elemental, parts as activities and reassembling them into a chain, Porter creates a 
device to analyse the contribution in terms of costs and value of each of them and to 
, 
identify prec,isely value and costs mismatch. 
This formulation seems to be in stark contrast with the view of the centrality of 
enterprise inspired by Penrose, as in fact: 
'The resource-based view (RBV) of the firm, founded on the ideas 
developed by Penrose (1959), suggested that what was really more 
important than industry structure was the resources possessed by the firm, 
deployed by the manager, and used and further developed by the 
organisation.' (D. Schendel, 1994, p. 2). 
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While the point about resources and capabilities seems largely agreed upon, and in 
fact incorporated by Porter himself, the problem with the RBV is deemed to be its 
circularity or tautology. Why are resources valuable? And why do they make the 
enterprise more competitive? Porter may answer, consistently with his idea of value, 
that only a competitive structure, the market, can give the answer, 'stress on 
resources must complement not substitute for stress on market position.' (M.E. 
Porter, 1991, p.108). 
The two theories reflect two different perceptions of firm problems, which happened 
to trouble managers and academics at different times. While REV is regarded as 
suitable for relatively stable environments where competition is low and enterprises 
can safely plan their expansion with an inward-looking perspective. Porter's view 
appeared and became popular because it delivers a conception that allows problem-
evaluation and problem-solving, at a time when enterprises were, and still are, 
troubled by stiff competition, low productivity and rapid obsolescence and so were 
pressed for constant change. Furthermore, the idea of a value chain to which each 
component of the enterprise contributes, with its services compensating for its costs, 
replaces the traditional top down model, implying conflicting interests and 
exploitation,' with a neutral horizontal model. 
o 
\ 
From the theoretical point of view, Penrose's view radically challenges conventional 
views by putting the firm and human decisions within it at the centre. To the 
contrary, Porter apparently reconciles his approach with the belief in the ultimate 
centrality of the market, and opens up to the new IO economics still opposed by 
RBV scholars. 
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The greater concern for theory, and the converging trends in SM and 10 economics 
fields, make it necessary to redefine the "fundamental issues in strategy" and its 
relationship with economics and other social sciences at large. 
SM, it is argued, is about the direction of business organisation and it is of concern to 
senior managers. Firms are organisations struggling to survive in a competitive 
environment and this implies making choices. Strategic choices include the selection 
of goals, the choice of products to offer, policy-making for positioning in the 
industry (competitive strategy), the design of· organisational structure and 
administrative systems. 
They assume that these choices have critical influence in success and failure of 
firms' performance; it is the integration of a set of choices to make a strategy (see 
R.P. Rumlet, D.l. Teece and D. Schendel, 1991, p. 6). 
Economics and SM, they insist, rejecting beliefs in future merging trends, do not 
match as disciplines since their object and content differ, as well as their 
methodological approaches. The main object of the former remains market exchange, 
while it is o·rganisational capabilities for the latter. Microeconomics has a strong 
inclination for modelling which entails little attention to ongoing processes and the 
• 
retention of:a strong doctrinal component. To the contrary, SM has to choose the 
object of inquiry aiming at sustaining its predictive power. Therefore its content is 
constantly changing. In particular its exponents reaffirm that Competitive Strategy, 
allegedly closer to new economics, is methodologically integrative, requiring 
contributions from a broad variety of knowledge bases. 
The potential of the most thoughtful contributors to the field to overcome intellectual 
standstill from a conventional static perspective is highlighted by Porter's attempt to 
move "towards a dynamic theory of strategy", setting a new starting point for 
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research. In order to go beyond immediate concerns for competition, asking 
questions about why enterprises are what they have become, a new perspective is 
needed which he refers to as the longitudinal problem. The long-term determinants of 
enterprise development and success he identifies boil down to managerial choices 
and environmental dimensions. Porter is driven to the consideration of factors which 
broadly fall into the category of external economies, such as state support, intense 
competition and co-operation with locally based firms. He nevertheless admits that 
none of them can predict economic outcome or long-term performance. Empirical 
evidence shows that unfavourable conditions can be as strong a spur to innovate 
creatively as the best environment can prove ineffective to stimulate competitive 
responses. Nevertheless the question remains unanswered regarding 'the balance 
between environmental determinism and company/leader choice in shaping 
competitive outcomes.' (M.E. Porter, 1991 p.1l5). 
The theme is still one of major concern in the field and is in fact one of significance 
in other approaches too, as we shall see. The latest contributions in SM advocate that 
'both organisation and competition are clearly important in shaping strategy and 
performance.' Therefore it is pointless to maintain that they are separated and instead 
it should be', admitted that they are 'fundamentally endogenous. That is, reciprocal 
I 
interactions at multiple levels of analysis between the environment and the firm 
shape business strategy and performance, while interactions between strategy and 
performance, in turn, shape both organisational capabilities and competitive 
environments.' (R. Henderson, W. Mitchell, 1997, pp. 5-14). 
Historians and non-conventional economists have long advocated such an intellectual 
outcome, though now the debate has shifted further than this early recognition. 
Whatever the limits, social and ideological, of the discipline itself, they should not 
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diminish the significance of the broadening scope and greater complexity of the 
analysis. They reflect the greater ability of corporate senior management to 
understand and intervene in a systematic way in different and ever changing 
environments, but also the growing difficulties that they experience in dealing with 
the job. 
The permanence of a troublesome dimension in strategy-making is confirmed by the 
alarm launched lately in the Strategic Management Journal (D. Schendel, 1997) and 
the attempt to regain a general view matching global competition with strategy at the 
level of the corporation, if not beyond. Quick adaptation, which prevailed from the 
80s, enshrined in 10 models, is rejected. Greater attention to people and process 
issues is emphasised as an essential component of effective execution. The need for 
policy making, also in co-operation with political and public policy, is eventually 
declared. These points are certainly innovative and again respond to the permanent 
feedback from changes in the business world. Yet the way major changes are looked 
upon as unforeseen, almost accidental events, while desirable to counter excessive 
self-confidence from a certain managerial ideology, still falls short of the role large 
groups have played consciously or unconsciously in shaping these events. But for 
understandi~g this we have to put aside the concern for the success of the individual 
, 
firm and focus on the firm as an historical institution, key to the growth of modem 
capitalist society. 
The managerial enterprise 
The works of E. T. Penrose and A. D. Chandler, from different perspectives, were a 
milestone for following generations of economists and historians (E. T. Penrose, 
1963; A. D. Chandler, 1962, 1977, 1990). They made the growth of the firm their 
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central theme, recognised the development of organisational capabilities as key to 
this process and made it possible to look at planned co-ordination, not the market, as 
the engine of economic development. They talk about entrepreneurial functions, as 
distinguished from operational management, operating through conscious strategies 
put in place by an administrative structure whose capabilities are at the heart of long-
term growth and superior performance of individual firms. Penrose's reference to the 
goal of long-term profits and Chandler's clear point about the managerial structure 
becoming entrepreneurial highlight the collective, organisational rationale of firm 
behaviour, which is devoted to growth by constant innovation. 
Business organisation in historical perspective 
Penrose states the purpose of her study to attempt to construct a general theory of the 
growth of the firm. Unlike any previous economic argument about the firm, she is 
not interested so much in the size as in the 'internal process of development leading 
to cumulative movements in anyone direction.' (.E. T. Penrose 1963; p. 1) In her 
opinion, there are neither given limits or definite tracks constraining this 
development,; which is the outcome of the internal dynamics of the firm. 
She makes the firm the basic unit of analysis and sets the task of abstracting out of 
, 
empirical cases the. principle and determinants of its growth. The external 
environment. admittedly omitted to focus on internal resources, can be adequately 
interpreted in the perspective of management. Furthermore, she reverses the common 
understanding of economic reality by defining the modem economy as a 'private 
enterprise industrial economy' as opposed to a market economy (E.T. Penrose, ibid., 
p.6). Conversely the nature of the economy is defined in terms of the kind of firms 
that compose it. 
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She· further specifies the object of enquiry to ground it in an historical· and 
organisational perspective. The finn she focuses on is the modem managerial finn 
emancipated from individual ownership. A remarkable point is made here that, with 
the institution of the limited liability company, the finn has removed an essential 
organisational and economic limit to growth. The separation of ownership from 
control is the logical and historical consequence without which no managerial role 
and no growth can be imagined beyond the limits of individual entrepreneurial and 
financial capacities. 
The managerial finn is defined, in the first place, as an autonomous administrative 
unit. It is a discrete organisation distinguishable from a broader category of 
institutions for its attachment to the use of a collection of tangible and intangible 
resources for productive purposes. The use of these resources is the job of managers, 
the 'how' of it depending on their decisions. As for the time period and the scope 
effected, decisions can be distinguished as strategic and operational. Conflicting 
claims arise between general and operational managers over the use of resources. 
Penrose highl,ights the difference between resources, freely disposable for multiple 
purposes, and the services they render, which are a function of an activity. Internal 
• 
capability as ,a source of competitive advantage is relative to the way activities are 
. 
carried out and resources combined. Capabilities she refers to are especially human 
and derive from co-operation and learning by doing. (see W. Lazonick, 1991, ibid.; 
pp.299-301). 
Which is the motivational drive leading managers constantly to increase the scale 
and scope of their activity and engage in innovation? The answer, she argues, is not 
to be found in the pursuit of traditional individual goals. Profit-seeking may be a 
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plausible one if understood as total long-run profit, which itself represents only a 
measure of success and the base of further expansion. 
A few years after ''The Growth of the Firm", the historical findings of Chandler were 
to relieve the scarcity of empirical sources Penrose lamented. Chandler's pioneering 
historical research provided an open recognition and an early explanation that by the 
last quarter of the last century powerful forces in western societies were conjured up 
to replace the entrepreneurial business firm, driven by profit maximisation and 
individual self-interest, with a hierarchical organisation which took over many of the 
functions mainstream economics attributed to the invisible hand of the market. 
Historical findings prompted him to put forward a new principle of industrial 
organisation, synthesised in the strategy-structure framework. This organisation was 
the industrial managerial enterprise, its main features appeared to be hierarchical 
organisation, characterised by a multiple layer of managers, and the concentration of 
assets by horizontal and vertical integration. 
The managerial enterprise, Chandler argues, was to be become by the 20s the most 
influential nO;1-governmental institution in the western countries, the highest 
intensity, and the pace-setter of the industrial growth, being in the United States. The 
starting point 'Of Chandler's narration is the technological revolution that occurred at 
the end of the nineteenth century, bringing a new set of business opportunities both 
in product and process innovation. 
Those entrepreneurs who made the three-pronged investment in production, 
distribution and organisation were to dominate the new industries of the. Second 
Industrial Revolution and shape their future advancements. They did so by exploiting 
the competitive advantage provided by the economies of scale inherent in mass 
production technologies. In those sectors where high volumes did not imply 
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economies of scale, large organisation failed to consolidate, where markets were 
fragmented and dispersed, the early development of mass production facilities was 
impeded. Though it seems here that Chandler engages in a static competitive analysis 
of organisational and technological units, his explanation based on economies of 
speed, when understood correctly, avoids the risks of a functionalistic interpretation. 
But why could a small firm with smaller productive outlet not master the new 
technology and why was the incorporation into a centralised organisation to prevail 
over looser forms of institutional arrangements devised to co-ordinate the different 
stages of a production line? The answer lies in a combination of technological 
constraints, cost advantages and market opportunities which arise from the link 
between mass production and mass consumption. 
The starting point of the argument is the assumption that the second industrial 
revolution had delivered a new set of technological devices and possible products 
which allowed substantial economies of scale if plants of optimal size were to be 
built. The development of mass production in this way was to have far reaching 
consequences;on the form through which business was administered. 
Mass production, as Henry Ford outlined, is not just production of goods in large 
• 
number, it is rather a highly standardised production process where any stage is to be 
co-ordinated and often physically connected to the others, making this activity 
resemble a line oriented to the final product. Chandler underlines in fact that the 
rated capacity of a large plant only in principle guarantees the drop in unit costs 
which account for the economies of scale of mass production. The actual economies 
of scale are given by the measure of throughput, it is the flow speed that determines 
the effectiveness. And while the rated capacity refers to physical characteristics, the 
flow speed comes as a result of managerial skills. A large integrated plant with a 
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high steady flow of inputs and outputs necessarily needs to be co-ordinated with 
backward and forward stages, so as to avoid high inventory costs, stoppages and 
uneven production which could offset the economies of scale. 
The use of product-specific machinery, responding to the need of standardisation, 
calls for professionalized managerial capabilities, both in the production and 
distribution outlets. As a result, the development of mass production and mass 
distribution, made possible by new technology, requires a third factor, namely 
organisational capabilities, to accomplish the new tasks posed by the former. They 
are, in the first place, the scheduling of orders and the specification of standards. 
Managerial hierarchies accomplish these tasks by presiding over three functions: co-
ordination, monitoring and allocation of resources in a multi-unit enterprise. 
Three layers of managers are recognised as essential to a model-type organisational 
layout: the lower level which directly commands the operations in a single unit, 
overseeing the employees' activities; and the middle and top management, which co-
ordinate, monitor and allocate resources to the individual units - middle managers 
carry out their tasks in the region of day-to-day operational activity within a 
, 
functional sphere, while top managers, comprising corporate office members, are in 
• 
charge of st~ategic decisions and respond in this respect to the shareholders' 
\ 
committee. 
Managerial operation was not sufficient, although necessary, for the enterprises to 
enter a stable path of growth in the face of fierce competition by other giants. 
Managerial control at top levels was equally important. 
Salaried managers were committed to the long-term growth of the organisation as 
they expressed a lower preference for short-term gains, unlike owners and 
shareholders who, in tum, where more hesitant to re-invest their profits and move 
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into new product and geographical markets. They also guaranteed continuity in the 
management of the finn. by constantly recruiting, motivating and evaluating their 
heirs and subordinates. 
The birth and consolidation of managerial enterprise having been explained, there 
remains to account for the fonns it assumed in its further historical development. 
Chandler recognises that changes in strategies have occurred since the 30s, but 
maintains that a sea change should be fixed around the 60s and makes clear, while 
attempting to draw an explanatory picture, that his work falls short of this historical 
period, which deserves an entirely new research. 
Because a major competitive threat to large companies, first movers in a product 
market, came from well-established challengers in related industries and other 
countries, managers reacted by expanding abroad and into related markets, which 
resulted in a drop of single-business or dominant-product finns and the introduction 
of the multi-divisional fonns. Large companies remained entrepreneurial by 
adjusting to constantly changing technologies and market 'opportunities under 
pressure of grpwing competition, revitalised by the free trade shift in the post-war 
decades. 
The focus on :the growth of the North-American industrial group leads Chandler to 
minimise its evolutionary character and causes for variability and change. Successful 
perfonnance appears an acknowledgement of superiority over other economic fonns, 
with the prevailing one representing a higher stage of development in the history of 
economic progress. 
Chandler's account focuses more on the organisation at the top; replacement of co-
operation based on the market mechanism with an internal hierarchical relationship, 
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than with the new pattern of relations at the bottom, where technology plays a central 
role in shaping resources and conditions of management power. This clearly suggests 
an idea of the neutrality of technology and the smooth character of its transformation. 
These limits can provide an explanation for the appropriation by institutional 
economics of the sympathy of Chandler himself and their attempt to use his findings 
in a critical way to reaffirm a substantially conventional approach. 
Economies of speed are fundamental here, because as fully unfolded they clearly 
break the ground to understand that productivity implies eliciting efforts on the shop 
floor. But, left as it is, this concept falls under the criticism of technological 
determinism. 
Business organisation: Organisational change and innovation strategies 
On these many points, criticism as well as consideration has ensued, fostering further 
theoretical and empirical research. We will consider those scholarly works on the 
coming of the large enterprise which, while recognising the pioneering work of A. 
Chandler, outline its flaws and limits and bring forward new hypotheses in a 
dynamic, socially and historically grounded, perspective. 
They came ~o develop tools which are much more sophisticated and interpretative 
frameworks ~hich suit a constantly shifting environment where conflict and change 
are the rule not an exceptional event. 
The work of Neil Fligstein recognises the groundbreaking role of Chandler, while 
departing from his conclusions in many respects. The main theme of Fligstein's 
research is invention and initiative by economic and non-economic agents, as well as 
resistance to them, representing the key to explain organisational innovation. These 
are not reactions to the market, as an objectively described context, but imply 
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altering completely the notion of what is normal business, a notion that is historically 
determined and not subject to any universal rationality. Fligstein undertakes this 
research by applying concepts taken from the theory of organisations to the history of 
the managerial enterprise. This theory overcomes the sterile presumption that social 
actors are either bound to an abstract economic rationality or to an all-embracing 
social construct which underpins the dominant approach of transitional theories and 
marginalist economics. Any collective task requires co~operation and a permanent 
organisation is just its most formalised expression. It can be defined as a structured 
field of action where actors interact according to a specific set of rules. The 
relationships developed in this space are the main determinant of both the position of 
the actors and the functioning of the organisation itself. 
This approach stems from the consideration that, whatever the formal aspect of this 
relationship, it remains largely dependant on the continuous negotiations between the 
parties, where the dominant party has his freedom of action limited in his ability to 
influence that of the subordinated. At any stage of a formal hierarchy a struggle takes 
place to limi~ the intrusiveness of the higher officials and attempt to seize any 
opportunity to increase the scope of action. The concept of strategy can be 
understood as a regularity inferred ex-post in relation to the above mentioned actions. 
, 
, 
The main consequence of structuring a field of action is to re-address the objective 
uncertainties of the problem concerned by shaping a new vision where it can be 
partially understood and solved. The control over uncertainties becomes an essential 
asset for the freedom of action of the actors. 
We can define power as the outcome of any structured relationship. Organisations 
are a source of power and their life, and in the first place their transformation, always 
implies conflict. Any resistance to change should be not dismissed as a form of 
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backwardness but just as the defensive aspect of a strategy aimed at preserving the 
freedom of an actor vis-a-vis an attempt to increase the constraints on him by 
augmenting the predictability of his actions. 
Theories of organisation have played an important role in understanding firm internal 
dynamics, but they risk overlooking the specificity of the firm with its hard core of 
technical economic rationality, as we are reminded by Penrose. As we will see, the 
conception of control devised by Fligstein and its corollaries incorporate many of 
these principles. The idea of control itself rests on the admission that the operating 
principles of an organisation are not set once and for all in its book of procedures and 
organisational charts. They are rather the outcome and the cause of informal 
relations, which include conflicts as well as co-operation. This is so because no 
organisation perfectly matches the context in which it operates, i.e. is subject to 
instability, but rather embodies an historical, accidental, interpretation of this 
context, one upon which a certain group has built its legitimacy to govern. 
Managers of large enterprises divided into sub-units, he argues, develop a vision of 
how the busi~ess should be operated which partly reflects the social environment, 
partly the specific area in which they are active. These visions are conceptions of 
• 
control over ,the uncertainties they face and offer a partial solution by introducing 
\ 
some practices which have proved successful. The chance for managers from a sub-
unit to claim decision-making power over the company depends in the first place on 
their strategy spreading and becoming dominant in the external environment. This is 
made up of organisational fields encompassing the community of business actors 
they compete and co-operate with and the State. 
Historically, four stages in business history can be individuated, related to as many 
visions and domination by a certain group of managers: competitive, manufacturing, 
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marketing and financial. Their appearance and replacement by another stage is not an 
evolutionary process nor does it imply any improvement, it is just the outcome of 
contingent attempts to find a solution to the problems stemming out of the current 
structure. In fact each vision, by reshaping the relationship between the areas of 
business and the terrain on which co-operation and competition should take place, 
secures an area from uncertainties but opens up new unexpected problems. 
So the early tactic of unfair competition, based on systematic disruption of the supply 
and sales chain of competitors, led to high concentration of assets along the 
production line as a safety measure. It posed the problem of their internal 
effectiveness which reflected itself in the problematic choice of a form of co-
ordination on a legal ground. 
The attitude of the State in allowing or constraining binding relations among firms, 
through the development of an anti-monopolistic policy, was another terrain on 
which different strategies confronted each other. 
The rise of the single-product integrated combine satisfied at a given time all the 
questions posed by the market, the state and internal efficiency requirements. When 
its efficiency demonstrated itself to be one-sided by the rapid saturation of the market 
with a narrow line of products, the need to find a market for the large plant became 
dominant, but the initial reply by the manufacturer was just cuts in prodl:'ction, 
di vestment and price rises. That is, they reacted according to the limited rationality 
provided by their organisation and interpreted their environment according to the 
dominant idea of what business was: 
When some less integrated and structured enterprises demonstrated that they could 
succeed by expanding their offer of final goods and pushing on sales, a new strategic 
vision confronted the existing one. Nevertheless, a new organisational field, 
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characterised by the dominance of multi-divisional finns, did not develop until the 
State began to target sole-commodity monopolies and the prolonged crisis of the 
1930s demonstrated their vulnerabilities to overproduction. 
The crisis is specifically the result of the difficulties of abandoning widely accepted 
business practices, which had made the fortunes of top managers and shaped the 
whole structure of enterprises and the web of their relationships. 
Equally the intervention by the State appears to be far more problematic than the 
anti-monopolistic rhetoric seems to present. Investigations led usually to 
unfavourable rulings towards specific fonns of action which seemed particularly 
harmful, so allowing new ones to develop with the same purpose. Fligstein argues 
that state regulation and antitrust policy did not harm competition but rather 
stimulated it. It did not happen because of a particularly effective set of rules or their 
enforcement but as 'a result of a social and political process that defines and 
redefines markets' (Fligstein N., 1990; p. 32). 
Fligstein's work pushes a great deal further the boundaries and the depth of business 
history, yet th¢ scope of his work continues to lack essential elements of the picture. 
As regards the relationship between technological and organisational innovation as 
well as the social implications of it, he seems to discard them at a theoretical level, 
even though he affinns the making of the managerial enterprise to be the outcome of 
a social and political process. It seems difficult for many to surrender to the fact that 
the enterprise, if it is an organisation and a social institution, accomplishes many 
functions which entail different rationales. The organisational one is certainly one of 
them, but it does not suffice. 
William Lazonick offers a comprehensive theory of innovative business organisation 
which attempts to combine economic theory with historical evidence. He develops a 
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systematic critique of conventional economics, including new 10 economics, arguing 
that it has misused the legacy of the classics. Economists have outlawed a theory of 
capitalist development, precluding themselves from understanding the dynamics of 
economic growth and the real nature of enterprise. The classics had fundamentally 
individuated the dynamics of the capitalist economy, which resides in the growing 
division of labour within the enterprise accomplished by innovative change of both 
technology and organisation and performed by the entrepreneurial function. If only 
the economists would have continued to pay attention to history, which saw a shift in 
the economic dominance from British personal capitalism to USA managerial 
capitalism and eventually to the co-operative one in Japan, they would have 
discovered the growing role of managed co-ordination and the centrality of the 
managerial-controlled firm to it. 
The importance of historical research for economic analysis is paramount, still the 
use of history is not sufficient. In fact, every time traditional economic theory has 
been applied to empirical data in order to individuate sources of growth in 
productivity and explanation for firm behaviour, it has failed to answer its questions. 
In fact, as we have already seen, focusing on output and prices, it was impossible to 
find out the reason for higher productivity, which resides in factors' quality and is 
, 
not always measurable quantitatively. 
A theory of economic development is needed to make sense of the empirical data. 
Lazonick sees in the combination of the lessons of Marshall, Schumpeter and Marx 
the possibility to build such a theory. What they lack, because of the different time 
horizon, is the clear leaning in favour of the enterprise and its organisational 
capabilities as the long-term dominant institution in the economic realm. Lazonick 
refers to Penrose but centres on Chandler's historical approach to back his thesis. 
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The innovative concept which emerges from his exposition of economic 
development is the combination of planned co-ordination and differentiation. That is, 
greater division of labour requires, and does not contrast with, integration within firm 
boundaries. On these foundations he revises the traditional theory of the firm, 
presenting one where the equilibrium of the neo-classics is the starting point from 
which to escape, not the end to aim at. 
He takes the idea that strategy is the logical starting point to explain economic 
outcome, the attainment of competitive advantage. He therefore distinguishes an 
innovative strategy, where external constraints are set to be overcome, according to 
the Schumpeterian model of the innovative entrepreneur, and an adaptive one which 
corresponds to the 'firm in equilibrium'. 
The existence of the former limits the ability of the latter to survive in the long run 
because, implementing dramatic changes in technology and organisation. the 
innovative firm is in a condition to produce goods of better quality at lower cost. 
Thanks to continuous innovation, the innovative firm can gain and sustain 
competitive advantage, leaving the adaptive ones in a marginal position . 
. 
He introduces the idea of competitive advantage, following the managerial literature, 
as constant development of internal capabilities, especially managerial, which allows 
for sustained superior performance and determines the position of firms and 
countries over time. His economic hypothesis, conversely, is that the equilibrium of 
the classics, where enterprises take technology, information, et cetera as given, is 
plausible in the short term but is the result of an adaptive strategy, which includes 
maximisation of returns from given factors and technology. This strategy leads to 
economic stagnation and decline because there are limits to the possibility to 
command greater returns from a given configuration of resources. But firms face 
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risks too; competitive and internal uncertainties constantly threaten the attainment of 
the expected returns. 
The development of capabilities through innovation is only one condition for 
competitive advantage, the other is the ability to use them, the distinction here is 
between economies of scale and economies of speed first introduced in the analysis 
by Chandler. In the firm the ability to obtain the expected economies of scale, 
turning high investment costs into low unit costs, relies on a combination of 
organisational and technological devices which determine a certain throughput. 
Unlike Chandler, Lazonick argues that this essential component of internal 
economies, and in fact of industrial dynamics, consists of the ability of managers to 
elicit sufficient efforts from workers. Lazonick recognises that competitive 
advantage begins with the relationship ont the shop floor and accepts, though with 
revisions, the Marxi::).n idea of value. In a strategic perspective, here too the 
enterprise has a choice between sweating workers and pursuing innovation by 
introducing effort-saving technology. He argues, to support his thesis, that Marx. 
himself admits effort-saving innovation which could raise productivity without 
increasing the level of exploitation, or even reducing it. But while Marx 
distinguished' between relative and absolute surplus value, to separate the effect of 
. 
. 
greater pressure on the work-force from the one implying structural changes 
determining a growth in the productive forces, Lazonick limits his argument to the 
first. 
If production and distribution are related as Marx and the classics thought, so that the 
productivity of factors depends on their expectations of returns, an innovative firm 
can share the higher returns expected by new technology with the workers in order to 
gain their co-operation. History shows that enterprises which have dominated the 
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different epochs of capitalism have always shown some fonn of amelioration of class 
conflicts, due to the need to gain co-operation from workers to yield the expected 
gains from higher productivity. It would be pointless to overload workers ushering 
turmoil in the work-place, because this would jeopardise production and affect 
productivity. Lazonick too considers the fact of deskilling and the introduction of 
managerial control on the shop-floor but he does not relate it to the Marxian 
. hypothesis that technological innovation and organisational change strengthening the 
position of managers vis-a-vis workers would lead to further exploitation. His point 
is that co-operation is in the interest of management, which is true, and he 
fundamentally believes that a model like the co-operative relationship established in 
the Japanese system is taking the lead (whether this partnership interests the workers 
is another point). A process of segmentation and integration is individuated, through 
which functional specialisation is coupled with productive co-operation. Historically; 
neither British nor American capitalism solved the problem of limited and contrasted 
relationships with workers. The underdeveloped management in Britain succumbed 
to craft control, which upheld traditional working methods and prevented 
restructuring; North-Americans won over craft labour, but at the cost of establishing 
a pennanent divide between white and blue collar workers, the relationship between 
. 
generalists a~d specialists in the managerial hierarchy was based on the exclusion of 
workers. The Japanese, according to this model, represent the revolutionary and 
ultimate solution of collective capitalism. This utopian hypothesis of a definitive 
amelioration of class conflict and the reality of a third industrial revolution to 
accomplish it has held the scene, and still does (though weakened), from the mid-
80s, and we will look at it in the next section. Here we anticipate so as to highlight a 
controversial point in Lazonick's argument, that he fails to recognise the main point 
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Marx makes about relations in production being not just a concern of unremunerated 
efforts but of social subordination. For this we need a theory which accepts the 
plurality of rationales in the enterprise and its nature as a social institution which 
internalises not just economic functions but also decision-making powers over every 
aspect of workers' life and the organisation of the social environment. The limits to 
effective corporate control and strategic planning notwithstanding, the co-operation 
of workers and employers implies necessarily the interests of the latter, as 
entrepreneurs and managers, to dominate. The alleged return of the skills to the shop 
. . 
floor is not a step back into the nineteenth century, craft management for Lazonick 
himself was to fail, but necessarily implies the workers assuming the point of view of 
the enterprise so as to limit the need for supervision and tight control. How did it 
occur and to what degree can we accept that such a radical change has truly taken 
place? The review of Marxian approaches in the next section entails the debate 
attempting to answer these questions. 
The enterprise in the capitalist economy 
Until now our discourse has followed a trajectory moving from market absolutism to 
the gradual recognition of the firm; managerial decision and some sort of dynamic 
, 
, 
perspective based on historical analysis; the tension between inside and outside the 
firm; and organisation at a general level, related or opposed to the market and the 
broader society out there. Historical and managerial perspectives escape this 
dilemma as far as they recognise that the world out there is immanently related and 
interacts with the world of production and the latter is the key to change in the 
former. The mechanism generating the movement, though, is not agreed upon and it 
seems that even when Marxist ideas are adopted the aim is to demonstrate that in the 
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end development by enterprise innovation may be contradictory and troublesome but 
these conflicts are ephemeral if they can be composed, as in Lazonick, or they pass 
into a larger category of conflicting interests which power the engine of change, 
without affecting the quality of economic activity or economic institutions which 
host them. 
If we define the firm/market dilemma as an horizontal problem, the relationship 
among capitalists/firms/economies, a Marxist perspective is built around the vertical 
problem of the capitalists versus working class relationship. The capitalist firm 
creates value in the process of production, but it also invariably extracts surplus 
value from alienated workers because this is the only condition for it to generate 
profits. Furthermore, the alienated relationship which allows exploitation implies that. 
the society itself is organised according to relations in production, so that these 
relations are immediately identifiable as social relations. So, in the first place, no 
amelioration is possible, either within production or outside it, compromises are held 
to be temporary and subject to instability. 
Marxist econ,omic theory is essentially a theory of capitalist development, that is of 
the attempts of the capitalist system as· a whole to overcome its contradictory 
, 
relationship ,with workers. Individual enterprises, their own dynamic and strategies, 
I 
are often of little interest to Marxists. They assume the market as a fictional element, 
for distribution is not separated from production but dependent on its organisation, 
competition among enterprises is secondary and serves only to determine the most 
advanced front of capitalist development. 
Marxist economists and historians, and latterly sociologists, have concentrated on 
organisational and technological changes to detect the forms assumed by the 
capitalist organisation of the creation and extraction of surplus value. Here different 
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stages or modes have been derived according to the technological patterns within the 
general tendency to subordinate labour to capital in order to increase relative 
productivity. We will see in more detail the controversy about whether these stages 
have a stable configuration or they are better understood as a more blurred, varied 
sequential succession of strategies. 
Top level organisation has invariably been interpreted by influential contributors, 
from M. Dobb to Sweezy and Baran, as leading towards greater concentration of 
capital. The ideas of a monopolistic epoch and the "financialisation" of capital have 
captured some aspects of the picture, but the explanatory framework remains vague. 
and the internal mechanism and structures are not detailed. Most of these theories 
foresee this process of concentration as leading to the last stage of capitalism. 
Management has been largely looked at in its role at middle and lower levels to 
monitor, exert command over performance and ultimately replace workers' 
knowledge of the production process with "scientific" instructions from the top. 
The body of Marxist theory is so vast and the ramifications of the related debates so 
varied that w~ would not dare to summarise them in a thorough manner. Consistently 
with our focus on the managerial enterprise, we review those contributions which can 
, 
cast light on the understanding of the nature of the enterprise and changes in 
I 
organisational and technOlogical patterns, as they openly criticise and integrate 
theories presented in the previous sections of the chapter. 
The enterprise as historical subject and institution 
The intellectual contribution we want to refer to here fully assumes the capitalistic 
nature of the firm, in the Marxian sense of generator of surplus value, without losing 
anything of the complexity inherent in the study of this institution. This theory 
assumes the possibility of contributions from social sciences from authors oriented to 
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understanding the firm in a dynamic organisational perspective, as opposed to 
contractualistic and neoclassical models. 
In the first place, the theme is one of redefining the concept of the firm in relation to 
the environment (G. Sapelli, 1990; pp. 3-32). The question, Sapelli argues, is no 
more one of having accepted the use of history but the role of historiography as 
combined with other social sciences. 
The contributions of Penrose and Chandler are fundamental to define and describe 
the firm as an administrative organisation with an economic function. The other 
contribution to consider is the series of studies of financial and patrimonial groups, 
which reveal the complexity and richness of the organisation of different 
bourgeoisies. A crucial role in advancing on this ground is also given by reflections 
about the nature of the organisational phenomenon in business enterprises. 
The idea advanced by J. D. Thompson seems to overcome the conflicting views of 
organisational theories about the proper rationality. It assumes that a threefold 
rationality operates in the enterprise: the business-specific core dominated by 
technical-ecotlOmic rationality aiming at efficiency through routines; a second one 
characterised by the competitive and interactive relationship with the external 
• 
environment;: while the last one is the managerial system proper, with the strategic 
function of overseeing the relationship between subsystems (G. Sapelli, ibid.; pI3). 
This plurality of "cultures" and rationales defines the enterprise as a social and 
technical organisation whose individuality is determined by the way in which it 
accomplishes these functions. 
Secondly, it leads to an idea of a relationship between enterprise and markets which 
is defined by organisation. Developing this point, Sapelli makes it clear that the only 
way to go beyond the "vexata questio" is to answer 'the question ( ... ): can a rich 
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array of markets exist without organisations that generate them?' (Paul Auerbach, 
1988, in G. Sapelli, ibid., p. 21). Here we reach the heart of the problem which 
enables us to overcome both managerial and contractual theories; the enterprise is 
not a thing but a process which creates social and functional ties and so organises the 
environment, reinventing its own space both within and outside its boundaries. 
The market properly speaking does not exist, we have rather competition among 
organisations within an institutional, political and legal context. The internal 
dynamic of the firms cannot be reduced to any static picture, they are invariably 
altered by discretion, creativity and social mobility. This explains why they are a 
strong source of power, through social change, as well as one of conflicts. 
One of the laws governing industrial dynamics that is apparently recognised here is 
the differentiation via managed co-ordination which can include both "market" and 
"firm" according to the strategic decision of management. Greater social co-
operation is subsumed under more sophisticated organisation. It assumes greater 
liberty of the actors within the boundaries of the organisational goals. 
At this stage riot just the separation between firm and market/society falls but it is to 
be recognised that the political and social worlds are being revolutionised by the 
growth of the managerial capabilities of the firm. The internalisation of functions 
does not refer only to the economic sphere but also to the political one. On this 
theoretical basis it is possible to attempt a history of dominant business groups whose 
organisational forms have characterised capitalist development (G. Sapelli, ibid.; pp. 
43-66). 
The concept of group refers to the centralised management of autonomous 
enterprises by an economic subject. The relevance of placing the research at this 
level is given by the possibility of identifying the strategic level and the different 
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forms it has assumed over time. He individuates five different forms, patrimonial, 
financial, industrial, managerial and networks. They should be understood not as a 
rigid taxonomy but rather as prevailing forms which have characterised the 
development of the group, the older ones being peripheral. 
The first is typical of the transition from feudalism to capitalism. Its core is usually 
represented by a family and the main strategic dri ve is the maximisation of returns 
from productive and commercial enterprises. It is the reflection of the strengthening 
of mercantile relationships. 
The financial group dominated in Continental Europe through the nineteenth century, 
determining the investment decisions of controlled firms. It was responsible for the 
high rate of industrial development in the second half of the century. 
The industrial group, which immediately became dominant in the USA, unifies 
financial prerogatives with competencies in industrial management. It was at this 
stage that a revolution of many aspects of production, distribution and R&D started. 
The managerial group grows out of the industrial one. It can be identified with the 
M-form desciibed by Chandler, with the oft-quoted separation between planning and 
operation. • 
The determinants that Sapelli identifies governing the development of groups are: 
"symbolic capital",differentiation and hierarchical governance. 
The first refers to the crucial role played by the creation of the limited liability 
company and the separation of the existence of the enterprise from the fate of 
individual capitalists, identified by economists like Penrose as well as historians. It 
can grow beyond the limits of personal finances and live a life of its own. The 
separation of ownership and control means that the concentration of the former, 
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related to individual matters, does not influence the latter, where concentration is 
more effectively subordinated to the imperative and forms of valorisation. 
Functional differentiation is a general principal of social organisation. Here it stands 
for the functional specialisation of economic activities. Its governing principle is the 
valorisation of capital. It appears either as integration of previously autonomous 
activities or as internal subdivision, like the Japanese zaibatzu. In any case, the 
unifying element is the development of managerial capabilities which directly or 
indirectly attempt planned governance of the growing division of labour. They allow 
the effective subordination of a greater number of activities to the economic and 
technical rationale satisfying higher capital valorisation. 
Sapelli underlines that differentiation and the growth of capital seem immanent to the 
. system, operating as laws of its long-run development. The efficacy of the strategies 
which sustain corporate control cannot be assumed as such. The ability to command 
authority and the forms to impose managerial power depend on scarce managerial 
resources and are constantly under threat. 
The other research track along which this strand of historians proceeds is the analysis 
of technological innovation and labour organisation. It is a common locus of Marxist 
• 
scholars and: the ground on which much of the current debate about the actual state 
and tendency of capitalism has developed. The exposition taken from Sapelli leads to 
the contribution of significant Italian economic historians like Castronovo, Bezza and 
Bigazzi (G. Sapelli, ibid.; pp. 273-293). 
The specific subject to which this argument applies is the rationalisation in Italian 
and continental industry in the inter-war period. The phenomena hereafter considered 
have come to be viewed under the inclusive and generalising concept of Fordism. Its 
use in different frameworks has been used to explain either a process of deskilling 
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and subordination with the introduction of the assembly line and/or a macroeconomic 
stabilisation model matching mass production with mass consumption. The account 
we discuss here highlights how the pace and form of innovation are more uneven and 
varied than this framework seems to suggest and offer a more grounded explanation 
of the underpinning determinants and dynamics. The research is conducted on three 
interrelated fields: technological innovation, social and economic change and 
managerial and entrepreneurial "culture". 
The empirical research has shown that technological innovation represented by the 
introduction of new machinery is not a steady process, varying among sectors and 
localities. The introduction of new machinery itself can be taken only as a general 
indicator of the underlying changes in the organisational sphere. The introduction of 
scientific management, then, cannot be reduced to an unavoidable stage of 
technological innovation which itself commands social change. A conscious plan 
from the management aimed at rationalising is to be admitted. Rationalisation can be 
defined as 'deployment of discrete resources (technical and human) to the pursuit of 
specific aims .(increase of the rate of surplus value extraction).' (G. Sapelli, ibid.; p. 
279). 
, 
A necessary implication of such a strategy was the development of a technical elite 
, 
between top management and ownership, on the one side, and workers, on the other. 
This new stratum was to accomplish the function of "scientific" study and the 
implementation and monitoring of new methods so as to assume full control over the 
production processes. The process involved the individual tasks of workers, breaking 
them down to their elemental components, as well as the overall planning of 
activities in administrative and manufacturing establishments. 
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This rationalisation implied the strengthening of the command over the work-force 
and the greater independence of the enterprise hierarchy from outside influences, in 
the first place from the state. State intervention, though aimed at sustaining this 
process at a general level, was regarded as a threat to corporate authority. During 
fascism the enterprises, while taking advantage of the complete defeat of the working 
class movement, were strongly antagonistic to attempts by the regime to lead 
modernisation through its institutions. When state intervention in the economy took 
place later, in post-war times, it became, together with stronger pressure from the. 
labour movement and organised unionism, a factor in the weakening of the form of 
control attempted with scientific management (SM). 
The position of the working class, its relative strength, affected the implementation 
of SM, its timing and the forms it happened to assume. Not until an historical defeat 
occurred were the enterprises able to advance towards greater control over the work-
force. Nevertheless it does not mean that the industrial front reacted in the same way 
to the favourable conditions offered by political supremacy under fascism. Only 
large enterprises underwent a program of thorough modernisation while traditional 
sectors, dominated by small and medium enterprises, limited themselves to 
introducing d,irect control and minor mechanical devices to curtail employment and 
I 
increase effort. The dictatorship did not appear to be the best environment for 
introducing rationalisation. The most relevant factor is here the dualistic character of 
the industrial structure in Italy and the persistence of despotic dominance of 
capitalists which lasted until the late sixties. In the post-war period the growing cost 
of labour and international competitiveness were to stimulate change. more than the 
Keynesian growth of internal demand. Innovation was coupled with a direct attack 
by industrialists on timid attempts to restore workers' rights in the workplace. 
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The limits and contradictions of the Italian experience due to political circumstances 
and economic backwardness notwithstanding, we would like to check the 
explanatory capacity of these principles against North-American experience. In this 
way, we can introduce the latest arguments about Fordism and Post-Fordism .. 
F ordism, Post-F ordism and the flexible enterprise 
The emergence of the managerial enterprise adopting mass production techniques 
described by Chandler saw the introduction of revolutionary changes on the shop 
floor. Two basic innovations are seen as leading the change: Taylorism and Fordism 
(see for Taylorism : C.R. Littler, 1978; J.E. Kelly, 1978; for Fordism: see N. Gilbert, 
R. Burrows, A. Pollert, 1992, and, in particular S. Clarke, 1992, pp.13-31);. These 
are both well-known topics as well as objects of long controversies. 
At a general level we can distinguish two different approaches, which identify these 
concepts with ideal-type models with a well-defined set of features. Regarding 
Taylorism, we have the separation between planning and execution, bureaucratic and 
hierarchical management, individual incentive systems; Ford was to introduce the 
technical device, the assembly line, to bring the ideal of scientific control of 
production into reality. The main problem with this system, at production level, was 
the rigidity implicit in the mass production technology which became evident when 
the market became saturated and demand differentiated under pressure of the 
demands for a more individualistic life style from mass-workers themselves. A 
specific strand of thought concentrated on the features of the system at 
macroeconomic level, individuating its condition of stability in the oft-quoted high 
salaries policy integrated by state welfare, allowing for mass production to be 
matched by a sustained demand. The loss of control by workers over production 
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started by Taylorism and consolidated by Fordism was compensated by a more fair 
distribution of gains yielded by higher productivity. 
These theses owe their attractiveness to the fact that they seem to fit perfectly the 
extraordinary economic boom and the social-democratic compromise of the post-war 
period. The history of industrial development and industrial relations are nevertheless 
more complicated than their political and ideological outcomes seem to depict. 
An alternative view stresses the substantial continuity that these phenomena had with 
the whole history of capitalist development: the gradual erosion of workers' control 
over production and the attempt to place it in the hands of capitalists' agents in an 
effective manner. In this perspective, it 'must not be thought that Taylorism was the 
only cause of an increasing division of labour. ( ... ) Systematic management grew out 
of the intensified problems of the integration of the new division of labour. These 
had been created by larger factories, more specialised machines and job roles pre-
Taylor, and the failure of the internal contract system under changed conditions.' 
(C.R. Littler, ibid., p. 189) The reality of deskilling accelerated by the divorce of 
planning and ?oing and the effective task control should not be opposed to the myth 
of craft control, left intact until Taylor and then Ford intervened to reap workers of 
, 
their skills. Eflually the idea of bringing skills back to the workplace, which should 
follow the end of Fordism, is fallacious and misleading. The innovations fostered 
under these revolutions had far reaching consequences consisting of 'the 
internalisation of technological dynamism, and the incorporation of scientific and 
technical progress into the labour process.' (S. Clarke, 1992, p. 17). The general 
principles of these productive methods are the decomposition and recomposition of 
the production process. This is fundamental to understand where lay the limit of the 
specific solutions this revolution brought about. Technology itself was not sufficient 
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to command the productivity level and labour subordination, that is the system was 
sufficiently flexible, ceteris paribus, only if workers were disciplined somehow. The 
early project of comprehensive control across the boundaries of the factory, a 
despotic and paternalistic social utopia, elaborated by Ford proved untenable against 
workers' resistance (see S. Clarke, 1992, pp. 20-23; F.Gambino, ibid., pp. 5-7). As 
in the marketing strategy, where Sloanism was to take over, the Ford-specific 
strategy was a substantially short-lived attempt. It is to be separated from the 
significance it acquired on the ideological ground and as a moment of the process of 
rationalisation. The same can be said of Taylorism, where the specific rules of this 
North-American engineer never saw widespread implementation and the ideological 
stress moved soon to human relations strategies. Yet the far-reaching effect of these 
revolutions in the management of the division of labour are to be distinguished from 
the strategic and tactical turnabouts imposed by inter-capitalist competition and 
social conflicts. 
The institutionalisation of social bargaining, the recognition of unionism and the 
welfare state, as far as you coul~ get from Ford's own view, came as a strategic 
answer to the inability to manage the relationship with the workers. Far from 
bringing stabi,lity to the system, these were to destabilise it as soon as workers began 
, 
to put in question managerial prerogatives in the factories and the institutional 
framework which granted authority to the work imperatives. Where these views 
divide is in the conceptualisation of stages. The followers of the thesis of A. Negri, 
so called autonomists, accept substantially the idea of Fordism. even though giving it 
a completely different interpretation, and set out to individuate the new contradiction 
of the Toyotist model. that they find not less "Fordist" than its predecessor. S. Clarke 
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seems to stress more the continuity underpinned by the permanent instability and 
unevenness of capitalism's solutions to its contradictions. 
This critique admittedly has implications for the interpretation of the changes which 
have occurred since the seventies and the legitimacy of a new mode of production 
which allegedly they brought forward, namely Toyotism based on lean production 
and shop-floor co-operation and the flexibility discourse-based variants of 'the 
western economies. 
First of all, we have an ideological interpretation imagining the end of mass 
production as an historical occasion to build the employer-employee relationship on 
a new co-operative basis, on the basis of the recognition from the first that the age of 
global competition and high-tech production necessarily implies a new kind of 
worker, polyvalent, educated and prone to co-operation and self-activation. The 
reference is in the first place to the Japanese model (see T. Ohno, 1988~ O. Bonazzi, 
1992; T. Kono, 1984). Here it is argued workers and technical experts jointly 
constitute a team committed to sort out problems on the line, these work-teams co-
operate with ;each other on a horizontal basis according to the well known kamban 
system. Participation in decision-making as well as profit-sharing and employment 
• 
stability guarantee workers' loyalty to the company. The outcome is internal 
I 
flexibility, constant improvements which allow better goods at lower cost. A variant 
is represented by Sabel and Piore (1984) who argue in favour of industrial districts as 
an historical alternative to mass production. Their flexibility, contrary to the Far East 
giants, is given by external economies, that is co-operation and mobility across small 
and medium firms, with political and functional institutions guaranteeing centralised 
functions. 
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These praises to flexibility have been criticised on two grounds; questioning the 
actual advantages for the working class of these new models and the consistency and 
relevance of the changes themselves. 
The critical leftist version of the information-technology-led revolution foresees the 
transition from Fordism to Toyotism as the disintegration of a till-now highly 
concentrated and centralised productive structure and its institutional framework. 
The concentration of decision-making power and financial resources do not 
correspond any more to the production of tight social and productive links. The 
effect is massive social and territorial displacement and the constant threats by 
multinationals as well as small firms to delocalise establishments, redeploy resources 
and shed workers. 
The labour market is the ground where control is exercised, since the new leading 
industries can limit access to jobs of a large army of unskilled labour while securing 
the services of a scarce and limited stratum of skilled labour. 
Within production, the rationale of Total Quality Management absorbing and 
institutionalisi'ng the informal aspect of relations on the shop-floor prevents workers 
from reproducing individual shirking practices and redirect co-operation and 
• 
solidarity within a safe gulf. The kamban system, replacing formally up-down 
transmission of instruction with the pulling by each station from the previous 'one on 
the line, eliminates much of the room for conflicts with the hierarchy and the need 
itself for long command lines and strict surveillance, replaced by information 
technology devices. Each team at any station depends horizontally on an equal group 
and they are all pulled by the market. 
At the macroeconomic level this new model, if it satisfies the need of more 
sophisticated markets, does so under constant pressure from competition internalised 
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by the kamban system. The result is that labour-saving technology becomes 
predominant, with disastrous effects on social stability if coupled with dismissal of 
the "welfare state" reoriented towards dealing with pauperism. 
Those who do not attach to Fordism any distinctive capacity to innovate or transform 
capitalism seek to demonstrat~ the mere tactical nature of the current changes, their 
lack of consistency or the capacity rather to intensify than to reverse the process set 
in place during Fordist age (the Neo-Fordist hypothesis); and actually plenty of 
evidence is available, as well as uncertainty about the future, which hardly confirm 
the strength of any trend. 
As for the dualism in the labour market, it does not seem that a dual system has been 
set in place which guarantees a minority and introduces greater flexibility for the 
peripheral workers. Not only in the west, where the question was out of 
consideration, but also in Japan it is increasingly difficult to guarantee full-time life-
time employment to core workers. On the other side, flexibility for the unskilled! 
peripheral is more the result of lack of strategies and inability to cope with 
uncertainties t,han long-term clear-cut choiGe (see T. Elger, P. Fairbrother, 1992, in 
N. Gilbert, R. Burrows, A. Pollert pp. 89-107). In small and medium businesses part-
time work see,ms to derive more from rigidity of the job market, especially the young 
and married women, than from entrepreneurial orientation. Employers prefer the use 
of flexibility in the sense of longer working time with fictional short-time and part-
time contracts, simply because they want to profit from the general weakness of the 
workers' movement, but their poor organisational capabilities impair the flexible use· 
of manpower. In Italy, flexibility in the use of existing workers and the intake of new 
ones under short-term contracts has been observed to vary considerably among the 
factories of the same group according to the bargaining power of the parties. The use 
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of these contracts is related to changes in job classification, usually at lower wage 
levels. The only certain point is that the defeat of the movement and the defensive 
position of the unions allows the introduction of new contractual forms oriented to 
cost saving on wages of both peripheral and core workers. 
As for job classification, as G. Sapelli observed about the previous phases of 
rationalisation, we should never consider it at face value because rationalisation 
always includes a political component of managerial power. 
A theme we would like to stress concerns understanding where the innovation is 
essentially "political", aimed at asserting managerial control to discipline workers, 
and where instead it is a real advancement of the productive forces guided by the 
imperatives of economic efficiency. This is certainly not easy to assess, especially if 
we think that to experiment and attempt innovation has always required a defeat of 
the workers' movement andlor low level of its mobilisation and organisation. 
Summary and Conclusions 
In the early ~990s the then-soviet elite declared its intentions to initiate the full 
transition to capitalism. Western neo-liberal economists openly favoured such 
resolve and s~t themselves to offer guidance to the new leadership as to ensure the 
full marketisation of the economy. Consequently, a stream of consultants, advisors 
and policy-makers swung into former soviet countries to teach the new course, while 
new generations of practitioners in the area began to be taught economics and 
business management by mainstream western textbooks. Within the limited scope of 
our study we asked, as a preliminary question, whether mainstream econorrucs was 
equipped for this task. In particular, we wondered how it understood the functioning 
of the enterprise, which is fundamental for restructuring and therefore transition, as 
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well as being the main topic of our research. The results at first sight are quite 
disappointing. For all its praise for economic freedom and free enterprise, the theory 
of the firm has very little to say about the enterprise itself and the behaviour of its 
actors. In fact, it recognises very little room for their manoeuvre vis-a-vis the self-
regulating mechanism of the market. Then again, to denounce the theory of the firm, 
and more generally mainstream economists' approach to enterprise affairs, solely on 
the ground of their unrealistic assumptions would be no less unfair than incorrect. 
As, in fact, serious efforts have been exerted within the discipline to overcome these 
original limitations. Perfect rationality and complete knowledge have been amended, 
history and institutions have been brought into the picture and inter-temporal 
phenomena considered to account for change. The behaviour of agents has been 
rendered less predictable, dependent on many more factors, and therefore the models 
have assumed a much more sophisticated outlook. 
Such attempts at injecting elements of reality into conventional economic models 
have not resulted in the elaboration of a new explanatory framework. The 
introduction of new variables has simply blurred the original picture allowing it to 
postulate outcomes other than free market perfection. Despite allowing greater 
uncertainty about market outcomes and admitting a wide gap between desirable and 
, . 
, 
expected configurations, it has rather shifted the pendulum of the discipline in favour 
of reasserting the desirability of ideal model-type principles. Renouncing the pursuit 
of genuine, i.e. critical, scientific enquiry has led those who have chosen this path to 
assume a fundamentally ideological function in favour of dominant capitalist 
institutions. This explains why, notwithstanding the diminishing predictive capacity, 
neoclassical economics has not lost anything in terms of academic authority and 
influence over decision-making, rather reinforcing its predictive power (see 
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Bourdieu, 1998; Clarke, 1996, p. 2). This has important implications for the kind of 
theory and analysis brought forward in the discipline, but I shall turn to it after 
considering the different case of business management as this is a key element that, 
despite all the differences, the two disciplines seem to share. 
As far as managerial disciplines are concerned, one should expect a greater degree of 
realism. Knowledge in the filed is both produced by and addressed to practitioners, 
therefore one would imagine it necessarily taking into account all social, cultural and 
political factors that permeate and constantly influence organisational structures and 
behaviour. On the other side, the peculiar function of this literature imposes some 
limitations. While managerial and organisational studies are open to all fields, it is 
also true that their scope is as limited by the need to teach and offer guidance to 
managers and companies rather than simply study them. As we observed earlier, the 
level of understanding that this literature offers can be seen as expressing the self-
consciousness that insiders possess regarding their own profession and broader social 
role. Therefore, unlike conventional economics, SM distinguishes itself not only by 
holding the managerial business enterprise as its main object of study but also for 
. admitting the possibility and desirability of conscious human action in economic 
affairs. As w~ saw, this also led it to consider the relationship with the non-economic 
, 
environment. The difficulty encountered at this level in shaping a long-term causal 
relationship between internal and external factors is an indicator of the limitations of 
this literature. It has been claimed that one of the reasons for the failure to 
successfully deal with these issues is the current short-sightedness which afflicts 
managerial work, narrowing down the perspective of analysts and practitioners alike 
to those factors and phenomena that determine successful performance in the short 
term. This is what has led SM to resemble conventional theories with their static 
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narrow treatment and directly to borrow their arguments. This has led to such a 
paradox: that, at the time when the corporate world has extended enormously its geo-
graphical and operative scope, making the enterprise the model of excellence in 
organisational performance, individual enterprise managers seems less confident and 
are thought to be much less able to shape their course of action. The paradox, it 
seems to us, is only apparent and very much reflects that ideological function 
initially attributed to conventional economics. As observed by reviewing alternative 
approaches to enterprise studies in the second part of the chapter, the crucial element, 
which both disciplines systematically fail to consider, is the origin, nature and 
consequences of power and conflict in economic organisations. This omission 
accounts for the lack of the key determinant that structures enterprises (and the 
surrounding environment) and constrains behaviour. No less significantly, the 
rejection of conflict deprives these theories of the possibility of explaining change 
other than at a fictional experimental level. 
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3. Russian Management - Soviet Legacy and Future 
Prospects 
This chapter provides our research into post-soviet management of industrial firms 
with an analytical and historical background. We will discuss how soviet economic 
institutions functioned and indicate the scope and limits of reforms attempted by the 
soviet leadership in the 70s and 80s, leading to the present attempt at capitalist 
restoration. This will serve a twofold purpose: 
To test the explanatory potential of the orthodox theory of the firm and of 
mainstream approaches to managerial behaviour presented in the previous chapter, as 
applied to the soviet context. This will shed light on the limits of, and to such an 
extent refute, those interpretations of the soviet system and transition theories based 
on them, which, by considering soviet management as a distorted version of its 
western equivalent, fail to grasp its peculiarities and fundamental contradictions. 
To present an alternative account of the functioning and evolution of soviet 
economic institutions, which draws on critical approaches focusing on the labour 
process as the determinant of managerial practices and enterprise behaviour. This 
will allow us to identify the social-economic structures and processes that resisted 
reforms under soviet rule and survived institutional change following its demise, 
allowing the soviet legacy to be fully accounted for in shaping transition and 
constraining restructuring. 
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Hence we will first try to understand the position that the enterprise assumed and the 
role management played in the wider framework of the soviet economy. Here the 
focus is on long-term structural features as they emerged from the debate among 
western and soviet scholars when unsuccessful reforms from the 60s onward 
produced growing awareness of both the specificity of the soviet economic system 
and the critical state in which it then existed. Although the organisation of the soviet 
economy had its roots in Stalinist industrialisation in the 1930s and in the period of 
post-War reconstruction, we will be primarily concerned in this chapter with the 
essential features of the 'mature' soviet system as it became bureaucratised after 
Stalin's death and persisted, without fundamental changes, until Gorbachev 
dismantled it in the late 1980s. Although we will review the failure of various 
attempts to reform the system to highlight the persistence of its fundamental 
inadequacies, we will not look in detail at the important, though not fundamental, 
changes that took place over this period. 
The soviet economy has been universally recognised as a specific economic system, 
but depending on the theoretical approach different pictures have been given of its 
, 
nature, characteristics and evolution. We will first look at those studies that view the 
soviet enterp~se as an irrational variant of its western counterpart and explain its 
I 
features as a result of its subordination to the command administrative structure. 
These studies have provided an invaluable insight into soviet managerial practices 
but for the most part have failed to address the main contradictions of the system. 
The failure of reforms before and after the demise of the USSR demonstrates that the 
removal of the institutional structure of the soviet system did not automatically imply 
the development of market forces and transition to capitalism. 
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We will therefore tum to the comparative contributions of a group of scholars 
who have developed their analysis on the basis of Marxist attention to relations in 
production. They all assume that the soviet system was characterised by a form of 
social domination in which the dominant stratum controlled the production surplus 
but not the production process? This explains the chaotic nature of the production 
process and the ambiguous position of management. Enterprise managers were tom 
between the pressure from above to achieve growing production targets and the need 
to secure the co-operation of workers in pursuing plan fulfilment. Managerial 
practices were therefore a rational response not simply to an institutional framework 
but to the constraints of a social process. The blurred process of transformation of 
Russian enterprises is a reflection of the contradict~ry attempt of the elite to secure 
its position as a capitalist elite without entering into open conflict with workers. 
We maintain that, historically, the soviet system was not the result of the installation 
either of economic planning or of a systematic bureaucratic direction of the 
economy. It resulted from the social conflict around the management of the economy 
initiated by the political drive of the Stalin-led Party to make the direction of the 
economy its· permanent base of power. The outcomes of the soviet system, namely 
the atomisatio,n of society and workers' negative control over the production process, 
I 
were to remain fundamentally untouched by successive attempts at reforms in the 
2 The soviet system, as a form of domination founded on the limited control over production 
by the ruling elite, is described by such Marxist authors as Rita di Leo (1973), Donald Filtzer 
(1986), Bob Arnot (1988), Hillen Ticktin (1992) and Simon Clarke (1993). These scholars 
argued that while soviet workers were never al\owed to decide what (and how much) to 
produce, they retained considerable autonomy in the workplace. In practice, they were left 
alone to sort out the vagaries of soviet planning. It is to this condition that the concept of 
"negative control" is applied. 
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post-war years, ultimately accounting for its long-term decline. These are the issues 
we should turn to, first when briefly considering the theoretical ·arguments about the 
nature of the system, subsequently when we will discuss the functioning of the 
enterprise. 
On the other side, economic growth and organisational changes introduced by 
reforms from Khrushchev to Gorbachev modified significantly both the material and 
institutional contexts in which managers operated. No less important, it is in the 
context of the late soviet period that growing expectations met with increasing 
disillusion about the possibility of modifying even slightly the status quo in the 
management of factories. This appears to have affected significantly managers' and 
workers' attitudes, including those featured in our case study, during transition. For 
these reasons our account of the features and problems in the soviet enterprise 
focuses on the late soviet period, followed by a discussion of the reforms up to the 
latest attempt at capitalist restoration. 
Managerial Control and its limits in ·the soviet economy. 
What were the position of the enterprise and the role of its management in the soviet 
economy? In',formal terms the soviet enterprise was the last link in the chain of a 
I 
command system characterised by strict uniformity and a stress on fixed hierarchical 
relations of authority and standardised tables of organisation. Managers were mainly 
engineers or accountants, selected and trained by the Party to carry out instructions 
from above. Western scholars of economics saw this as a deviation from the 
experience of free entrepreneurship and organisational diversity of the West 
(Berliner, 1957, 1988; Granick, 1960; Gregory, 1989; Linz and Mosckoff, 1989; 
Schroeder, 1989 for this and the next sections). The replacement of a horizontal 
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market relationship with a vertical administrative hierarchy impeded rational 
decision-making based on market prices and the discipline imposed by profit-seeking 
in a competitive environment. Even admitting the growing scope of conscious 
management in resource allocation, they pointed their fingers at organisational 
rigidity and over-centralisation as a limit to efficiency and economic development. 
It was soon realised, though, that the real practice of planning and plan fulfilment 
defied the description of a simple top-down command system. Starting from the post-
war period, soviet authorities and western analysts recognised that managers had 
larger autonomy than formerly stated and that their decisions could be detrimental to 
economic performance. Managers were able to meet plan targets only at the cost of 
systematically violating instructions and regulations, defying any attempt at 
imposing effective use of resources. Command levers were unable to achieve more 
than gross quantitative targets and the control system failed to detect infractions 
effectively. Well-known and largely accepted explanations from pro-market western 
scholars provided a great deal of documentation about the various levels at which 
contradictions. appeared; we will sketch them before passing on to give an account of 
. 
an alternative approach. 
The soviet $ystem: a centralised command economy? 
The shortcomings of the planning mechanism, its inability to synthesise and convey 
in an operational form the objectives of the centre to operative units are radical and 
undeniable. Since ultimate decisions about what and how much to produce lay in the 
hands of top-level political bodies, they incorporated the preferences of an elite 
rather than the needs of the population or the capacity of the productive system. 
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Nevertheless, orthodox analysis has focused on the technical ability of the system to 
ascertain its allocative efficiency. 
The planning mechanism was plagued by the separation of power and information. In 
order to design viable plans, the centre had to base its decisions on information 
concerning productive capacity and resources, which was available only at enterprise 
level. Secondly, it had to set targets consistently with this information, making sure 
that balances between supply and demand be guaranteed at every level of the 
production-distribution chains. The plan was in fact drafted for the whole economy 
simultaneously and left no formal channel for adjustments. Several assumptions 
should be met in order for this mechanism to work smoothly: unarnbiguousness of 
target indicators, willingness and ability of subordinates and control bodies to 
disclose information. 
The ability of the centre to convey its quantitative priorities to enterprises in an 
operative and unambiguous form has been much debated. Planners used synthetic 
indicators and normative coefficients in physical terms and since they were defined 
at aggregate l~vel they corresponded only approximately to what had originally been 
required by users. Descending the bureaucratic hierarchy they were disaggregated, 
becoming a~nable to manipulation. Other than clarity of targets, another problem 
was the priority scale among them, which emerged every time targets conflicted. 
Administrative transmission of targets did not provide quantitative elements for 
decision-making. Attempts at introducing "normative" (technically validated) 
planning and "economic" (price-based) indicators proved ineffective because they 
extended rather than reducing the scope for independent decisions by managers. 
The failure of planning was twofold: it was unable directly to manage the operation 
of enterprises because of inconsistency of targets but it was also unable to regulate 
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them by providing incentives to efficient decision-making. Managers were deprived 
of direct control over resources and their use but were not guaranteed that targets 
imposed from above would match inputs assigned to them. The uncertainty over 
supply was the cause of well-known managerial practices aimed at building a safety 
factor. Managerial performance was assessed primarily on the achievement of gross 
product in physical terms, so managers manipulated information about capacity and 
input availability in order to achieve easy plans. In this way they further undermined 
the rationality of planning, in particular they inflated demand for labour and supplies. 
More importantly, the pressure on production targets led to indifference towards 
costs and quality with consequences of generalised scarcity and poor quality of 
goods. The response at the level of the individual enterprise was hoarding of labour 
and supply, production autarky, modified product mix and so on. A vicious circle 
was established, where managerial practices tended to limit uncertainty and avoid 
risk of plan failure, which generated disruptions along production chains, 
reproducing the conditions which were the very cause of these practices. These 
analyses led to the conclusion that: a) the planning mechanism did not provide an 
, 
effective framework to regulate the soviet economy; b) managerial behaviour was a 
rational response to the set of constraints and opportunities in which they operated. 
The inconsistencies of planning favoured the idea that the soviet economy could be 
better described as an administrative-command system rather than as a planned one. 
Administrative methods were the actual means by which resources were allocated. 
Ministries, the. bureaucratic machinery that functioned as a mediator between 
political decision-makers and the production units, played a dominant role in the 
running of the economy. In the day-to-day experience of managers, most of the 
blame for vagaries of planning was in fact referred to the reality of ministerial rule 
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and both soviet and western analysts came to concentrate on ministry-enterprise 
relations as the actual source of economic malfunctioning. 
The soviet bureaucracy was affected by monopolisation, a high level of 
concentration of power and autarkic tendencies. A study of the behaviour of line 
managers in the ministries concluded that the logic of ministerial rule reflected the 
same rationale as enterprise management since they responded to the same set of 
constraints (Gregory, 1989). 
In relation to enterprises, ministries exercised "petty tutelage", a practice of direct 
intervention to question current management and production, which was a further 
source of insecurity and instability of factory life. Ministerial intrusive attitudes at 
the same time stifled managerial autonomy and stimulated their resistance to the 
disclosure of information. At the same time, such attitudes were justified by the need 
to guarantee co-ordination between· enterprises and among branches. The 
bureaucracy managed supply insecurity, and the perpetual deficit of supply was 
therefore the condition to justify its existence and the base of its enormous power. 
From an orthodox point of view, the analysis of soviet economic organisation proved 
that the practices of the agents were a rational response to the irrationality of the 
• 
system. The absence of the naturally equilibrating forces of the market left agents to 
pursue their interests in an environment characterised by unequal distribution of 
information leading to the establishment of a seller's market with all its negative 
consequences. Western economic orthodoxy concluded that the historical experience 
of planning had generated an over-centralised administrative hierarchy that kept the 
economy in a monopolistic grip and resisted any attempt at partial reform to avoid 
relinquishing its power. 
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The restoration of economic rationality should pass through the dismantling of the 
ministerial system and the resurgence of market relationships. 
In so far as this approach can be related to the expectations raised by the reform 
programme of transition started in 1992, it did not find confirmation in the 
experience of its implementation. Evidence shows that managerial practices 
intensified or evolved in new forms rather than being supplanted by western 
managerial styles. 
The soviet economic system: an imperfect system of social domination 
The limits of the orthodox understanding of the firm in the capitalist economy have 
been treated at length in the past chapter, so here we underline the following points 
in a comparative perspective. In the first place we have the idea that economic 
problems have a universal character enshrined in the rationality of economic man. 
This led western analysts to apply to the soviet economy and its agents the same 
methods of assessment developed in a capitalist context, despite their recognition of 
the absence of market relations. 
Secondly, the idea that market relations allow co-operation on an equal basis and that 
the market o,lears any position of advantage based on unequal distribution of 
information led them to consider, when recognised, the dominant position of the 
economic elite in the soviet context as an extraordinary case. 
Organisations though are more than simply technical devices or social functions, 
they are always social constructs where power relations materialise. Organisations in 
the economic realm are the formalised product of social relations of production that 
decide how wealth is produced and distributed. 
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As a sui generis social formation the soviet system, like the capitalist one, was a 
form of domination with its own specific rationality. Its peculiarity, and the cause of 
its instability, manifested in poor economic performance, was that the ruling stratum 
depended for the reproduction of its position on the control of surplus product but did 
not achieve the control of surplus production. 
Money could not play its regulatory role, imposing its universal and impersonal 
discip"tine on producers (both managers and workers) and guaranteeing distribution 
of rewards consistently with the position occupied in the production process. Without 
the medium of the commodity, social authority had to manifest itself in a direct way 
in the form of personal relations of dependency and surplus extracted in kind (a 
feature many suggest has rather strengthened after transition, despite capitalist 
penetration in the economy). 
Such a system was intrinsically unstable and required hyper-centralisation to counter 
centripetal tendencies coming from different layers of the elite, all competing for the 
appropriation of surplus3• This explains, among other things, why the strictly 
hierarchical a~ministrative structures centred on branch ministries remained the only 
viable mechanism to manage the economy in the soviet system. Any attempt to 
decentralise t~e system and grant greater autonomy to production units, aimed at 
gaining efficiency, resulted in loss of co-ordination and greater shortages, threatening 
to bring chaos to the economl. 
3 This is the central argument made by Ticktin (Ticktin, 1992) 
4 Naishul' observes that reforms based on the 'introduction of "economic methods" damaged 
the entire economy.' (Naishul', 1991, p. 33). This was the case with the introduction of 
'sovnarkhozi' at the end of the 50s and the 1965 enterprise reform. The more so with 
perestroika that, by loosening control over enterprises 'has resulted in the disruption of co-
ordination through vertical links.' (Ibid., p. 34). In a system characterised by overall 
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A corollary of highly personalised and hierarchical management is the separation of 
power and informationS. Hyper-centralisation in industrial management brings as a 
consequence a de-facto decentralisation. This results from the inability of the centre 
to handle all the decisions it is formally entitled to, producing disorganisation and 
waste of resources in production. Such a problem became common in large 
enterprises of the then-developing heavy industry in the West at the turn of the last 
century. It can be added that the sheer size of waste and the evident disorganisation 
of soviet production were the inevitable outcome of extending such a form of 
management, with the ensuing problems, to an entire economy. The response in the 
West was the managerial revolution, which meant, on the one hand, transferring 
decision-making over specific functions and areas down to professional managers, on 
the other hand, introducing scientific management in production, revolutionising the 
labour process. 
To understand why the soviets were unable or unwilling to make such a move we 
have to look at the other side of the spectrum of society to see what was the form 
assumed by t~e labour process in the soviet system6• The establishment of such a 
form of control implied that society was extremely atornised. This meant that 
workers wer~ deprived of any collective form to express their interests and raise 
, 
interdependence, but where producers respond to higher bodies rather than customers, 
granting freedom to individual economic units means permitting the arbitrary alteration of 
production programmes which in tum would create imbalances along technological chains. 
5 Filtzer argues that 'the elite could only maintain control through hyper-centralisation'. This 
engendered such a contradiction that the elite also needed managers to provide perfect 
information and loyally execute its plans. Evidently no incentive was provided for that as. in 
fact. the incentive was the opposite. both managers and workers had every reason to collude 
in circumventing instructions and concealing results (Filtzer. 1994. p. 2). 
6 See a brief but extremely clear statement of this argument in Filtzer (Ibid. 1994, pp. 2-6). 
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grievances, reacting instead with individualised forms of resistance, including 
disregard for quality, slack work, deceit and a high level of turnover. This 
exacerbated the level of disruption already resulting from the disorganisation of the 
economy. Managers, differently from what one would expect in capitalist economies, 
showed a lenient attitude toward discipline violations. They tolerated low 
productivity and sometimes colluded with workers in circumventing instructions, 
especially concerning the observance of safety rules, maintenance and quality 
standards, in order to bring in the plan and protect customary earnings. 
Managers entered into this pattern of informal bargaining and resisted any attempt by 
the Party-State to modify its terms as they needed workers' co-operation to overcome 
the numerous bottlenecks and uncertainties that plagued production at enterprise 
level. That is to say that workers, while deprived of any effective power, were forced 
to sort out for themselves the vagaries of the system, being granted in such a way a 
form of 'nega~ive' control over the design and execution of their jobs. Managers had 
to do so partly because of the shortage of labour and partly because they had neither 
better means to discipline workers, in the first place the power to hire and fire, nor 
incentives t6 elicit their efforts. It is apparent that this was a self-reinforcing process 
where work~rs' and managers' practices furthered disruption while trying to 
I 
overcome their immediate consequences with the intention of preserving their 
interests. Despite the fact that most disruptions derived from these very practices, the 
behaviour of workers and managers retains its rationale in the fact that they 
confronted the reality of soviet production as an external given environment. The a-
conflictual nature of industrial relations 7, which is at the same time a cause and a 
7 It is the main argument of di Leo's interpretation of the soviet system, which she refers to 
as the 'Stalinist compromise', that the soviet leadership retained its power by avoiding direct 
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consequence of alienation and demotivation in society, was the founding pillar of the 
political domination of the elite. At the same time, it was also the major barrier to 
economic development, therefore an obstacle to the long-term material reproduction 
of the system8• 
Without anticipating our conclusions, this brief theoretical overview allows some 
. considerations about the features of soviet industrial management, which in tum help 
sharpen our focus. In the 60s scholars seemed to recognise a common trend in 
industrial societies reaching across the iron curtain, imagining a converging trend 
dominated by the technological imperatives of mass production and bureaucratic 
forms of administration. Though abandoned in its original formulation, this 
'convergence' approach9 has surfaced again in the interpretation of the soviet 
economic decline as the failure to replace a 'fordist' rigid framework with the 
flexible and decentralised environment required by digital technologies. The 
discussion of the soviet economic system outlined above should suffice for outlining 
the centrality of social relations in production to the definition of economic problems 
and, to this extent, for highlighting the peculiar character of the soviet experience as 
compared to capitalist countries . 
. In this perspective it emerges how the soviet system was not simply an imperfect 
, 
system of economic administration, but more fundamentally a power mechanism of 
confrontation with the working class, therefore escaping any attempt to force economic 
discipline into the workplace (Di Leo, 1973). Seemingly, Simon Clarke argues in terms of a 
'retreat' of management from the workplace engendering the limited control of workers over 
the production process (Clarke, 1993). 
8 See Filtzer (1994) pp. 6-7, 
9 Rita di Leo, opening a discussion about future perspectives in post-soviet Russia, warns 
about the recurrent tendency 'to fall into the error of seeing convergence between the 
communist world, post-communism and our own world.' (di Leo, 1993, p. 3). 
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social control. The pattern of informal bargaining at shop-floor level that emerged 
within its framework amounted to no less than a specific form of labour process, 
therefore requiring more than simply new incentives or technology to be overcome. 
Finally, it is important to stress that the informal nature of managerial practices, their 
emergence and continued survival, indicate how the economic mechanism reflected 
no less pressures and autonomous, unforeseen, reactions from below than the 
strategies of the elite and the analyses of scholars. 
It is our task now to provide an historical account of enterprise structure and 
functioning in the late soviet period. We will present features and problems of the 
soviet economy from Khrushchev onward, describe the organisation of the enterprise 
and managerial practices and finally we will see how unsuccessful reforms led to the 
decision by the elite to reintroduce capitalism. 
The Enterprise in the soviet Economy 
In the previous section we have stressed the fundamental continuity in the type of 
economic m~nagement that prevailed in the Soviet Union on the basis of its 
underlying system of social relations as they emerged from Stalinist industrialisation. 
This does not, mean that growth did not take place, modifying both the material bases 
and the terms of the economic problems and therefore the solutions that were put 
forward by the elite. 
Problems and perspectives of the soviet enterprise from Khrushchev to Brezhnev. 
From the 1950s the soviet economy saw the gradual erosion of the conditions which 
had permitted the high growth rates of the first five year plans. The expansion of the 
industrial base had been achieved by an extensive growth of production capacity at 
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the expense of productivity. The constant expansion of fixed capital led to the 
absorption of reserves of labour, ending the condition of labour surplus and calling 
for a switch in development strategy (see di Leo, 1980, pp. 7-26; Naishul', 1991, pp. 
15-17). The mobilisation of labour reserves in the countryside and among the female 
population required the expansion and modernisation of the low-productivity service 
and consumer sectors, including agriculture, which had so far been neglected by the 
planners. 
Between the 1960s and the 1970s the soviet economy assumed the structural features 
of mature industrialised countries (di Leo, ibid, pp.65-77). The comparison, though, 
stays at the level of statistical aggregates. The reality was more one of adapting old 
structures toward new uses. The production of consumer durables was assigned, for 
example, to heavy industry. Industrial enterprises could be required to provide 
materials and labour to modernise collective farms and bring in the harvest. These 
practices, while putting strain on the enterprises involved, brought few advantages to 
the recipient consumer sector. Equally problematic was the case of new plants in this 
sector. 
New enterprises continued to be established following the model of the large 
I 
integrated factory, which dominated heavy industry in the inter-war period, despite 
I 
the fact that, especially for consumer goods, the western experience was one of 
decentralisation. This option had less to do with bureaucratic inertia or myopia of the 
planners than with the peculiarities of soviet planning and enterprise management at 
this stage. In the first place, concentrating the many production stages required for 
manufacturing a single good into a single factory, and under a single branch-ministry 
roof, meant reducing the economic links required to co-ordinate its production. This 
would simplify the job of the administrative system already strained to control 
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resources (see Naishul', 1991, p.16, 17,31). Secondly, the role of the enterprise as 
the sole provider of social services for its employees (housing, rest homes, child care, 
sometimes schooling, training, sport facilities), which had actually been expanding in 
those years, led to a preference for large, single-site establishments. This meant also 
that these enterprises were often oversized and undercapitalised. 
The priority criteria discriminating between sectors A and B (heavy and light 
industry), productive and non-productive work, which had been set during Stalinist 
industrialisation, continued to affect the allocation of resources, reflecting the 
different bargaining power of various branches, ministries and individual enterprises. 
The consumer sector was plagued by a relatively higher scarcity of resources with 
which to entice workers from other industries, while tighter plans meant heavier 
work loads and harsher working conditions. Under these circumstances this sector 
suffered a high turnover and a continued scarcity of qualified personnel (di Leo, 
1980, pp. 82-89). In general, the lack of collective means by which workers could 
raise their. grievances and improve their conditions made changing job across 
regions, indus!ries and enterprises the only available mechanism for mobility. 
The continued preference for capital goods industries was justified by the need to 
• 
provide additional resources for the expansion of the economy, in particular the 
consumer sector, but the under-funding in this area of the economy translated into 
low productivity and low quality of output. The low quality and scarcity of consumer 
goods were, in tum, causes of demotivation among workers and a reason for 
hoarding resources and engaging in unplanned or illicit activities on a worrying 
scale. These phenomena assumed the character of a vicious circle generalised to the 
whole economy. 
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The need to reverse this trend, raise living standards and so entice the workforce to 
actively support the efforts of the elite to restore efficiency in the system was first 
attempted with a spate of reforms by Khrushchev and Kosygin in the 1950s and 
1960s. 10 
The first initiatives following the death of Stalin were the repeal of the repressive 
legislation victimising workers for discipline violations and the introduction of new 
measures aimed at revitalising the initiative of Party and Trade Union basic units. 
Short of returning workers their political or union rights, the new policy was yet 
entrusted by the leadership with raising the morale of the population and should have 
mobilised the rank and file towards the modernisation of the productive apparatus. 
The wage reform, staged in the years 1956-1962, was to provide the material 
incentives to this end. The objectives of the reform were primarily a) to bring under 
control the wage structure and therefore the growth of the wage bill, b) to align 
wages with productivity by introducing 'scientifically-validated norms' (for a 
detailed discussion of the wage reform see Filtzer, 1992). 
'Under Stalin the wages system had been dominated by a plethora of different rates 
and wage scales' (Filtzer, 1994, p. 65), so that the same job with the same skill . 
. . 
content could: be paid at different rates even within factories of the same industry. 
The result was to deprive wages of any incentive function, except stimulating 
turnover. The reform set to simplify and centralise the system, restoring a relation 
between effort and reward (see Filtzer, ibid., p. 58). 
10 Here we will concentrate briefly on the effects on enterprise organisation and activity, 
looking in more depth at the aims of the 1965 enterprise reform in a separate section (see di 
Leo. Ibid .• pp. 105-112; Filtzer, 1994, pp. 56-60). 
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The centrepiece of the reform was in any case the attempt to force managers and 
workers into accepting 'scientific norms', i.e. centrally established output quotas. 
Under Stalin the policies of productivity had favoured individual norm 
overfulfilment to break factory level resistance to ambitious plan targets ll . The lack 
of relation between individual output quotas and plan level, though, meant that 
managers kept norms low, allowing easy overfulfilment by workers. In this way 
managers tolerated a low level of productivity. and inflated the earnings of rate-
busters, in exchange for their co-operation in overcoming production bottlenecks. 
Since the introduction of new norms was to achieve a generalised increase in output 
quotas with a corresponding loss in workers' earnings, the reform also proposed a 
corresponding increase in basic wages. 
The reform was asking managers to rationalise production, strengthening their 
control over the production process. This notwithstanding, managers resisted new 
norms and systematically circumvented the wage system because the irregularity of 
supplies and the unevenness of the production process required continued reliance on 
workers' co-C!peration, which in turn could only be achieved by the flexible, 
discretionary use of the payment system. 
The incentive's introduced with the more organic 1965 enterprise reform were to 
suffer the same fate. The reform introduced specific funds for bonuses and social 
welfare, which were to be financed by the enterprise directly out of its revenues. In 
this way, the amount available for rewards was made dependent on enterprise 
performance, i.e. overall plan fulfilment. Together with the provision of specific 
funds for welfare provision, this new incentive mechanism was intended to make the 
11 For an insight into the politics of productivity at the height of workers' mobilisation under 
Stalin see Siegelbaum (1988). 
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entire workforce benefit from better perfonnance, stimulating collective' 
responsibility. 
As part of a larger scheme aimed at introducing greater managerial autonomy and 
accountability, the refonn faltered, therefore failing to establish any relation between 
greater effort and larger funds. The fact that revenues depended on administrative 
pricing and technical evaluation meant that they did not necessarily bear any relation 
to actual economic activity. More simply, decisions to concede funds and grant 
actual supplies had a purely political character, as well indicated by the situation of 
the consumer sector, including textiles, which used to have its revenues 
systematically siphoned off to subsidise heavy industry (see FiItzer, 1994, pp. 168-
170). More generally, size as well as branch and location had more significance for 
provision of social facilities than actual enterprise perfonnance. 
On the other hand, managers once again manipulated the system, turning welfare 
provision (priority access to housing, scarce goods and services) into a discretionary 
tool to reward the efforts of individual workers. In so doing they were thwarting the 
objective of tire refonn while, at the same. time, acquiring a powerful means to assert 
their authority and elicit workers' efforts . 
• 
. 
I 
The combined effect of these processes was, at macroeconomic level, continuing low 
productivity, waste of capital resources and high wage expenditures. The planning 
system ended up strained by the need to co-ordinate a complex network of dispersed 
technological chains and by pressures to provide resources for wages and 
investments to all sectors (Naishul', 1991, ppI6-17). The enterprise management, 
more contradictorily, acquired greater leverage over workers by the personalised use 
of bonuses and the large array of social benefits now available. This overall had a 
'corrupting effect on' workers and managers alike, has' reinforced workers' 
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atomisation, and thereby has strengthened the elite's political control over the 
system' (Filtzer, 1994, p. 58). These are the elements which ushered in the Brezhnev 
era, combining economic stagnation with a cautious attitude to changes nurtured both 
by political self-confidence and by a greater understanding of the limitations of the 
system. 
The enterprise in the Brezhnev era: managers and the planning system. 
The overall result of the struggle over the functioning of the planning system in the 
thirties was, as is well-known, the establishment of a rigidly centralised mechanism 
of production and distribution which formally limited the control by management 
over the factors of production and their utilisation. The job of managers consisted in 
the negotiation and fulfilment of the plan. Factors of production as well as fixed 
capital were provided by the State and their characteristics and use defined in detail. 
The ultimate goal on which managerial work was assessed and rewarded was the 
achievement of the planned level of production in physical term. The most pressing 
constraints to which management was subjected in its pursuit were the insecurity of 
supply, the s~ortage of wage funds and materials and the irregular rhythm of the 
production process. Though all these phenomena resulted ultimately from the action 
, 
of managers t~emselves, they appeared to each enterprise as objective conditions. To 
overcome these constraints managers engaged in well-known informal practices. 
Despite the substantial changes in the political and economic environment, which we 
outlined above, they remained strikingly similar over time, constrained as they were 
by the contradictions of the soviet system of social relations. In the following 
section~ we will see how managerial practices led to the definition of the relationship 
with both workers and the state, contributing to shape the dynamic of the system as 
well as the position they occupied in it. 
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The Party-State faced a two-fold challenging task, on the one hand it had to convey 
its targets to the enterprises and provide the necessary resources to accomplish them, 
on the other hand, it had to ensure that these were used according to its 
specifications. To these purposes, a vertical and horizontal chain of command had 
been put in place to convey decisions and control their implementation, namely 
ministries and chief administration on the one hand and party, trade union and 
financial officials on the other. 12 These were also the main information channels 
through which the planning agencies received data on the current state of the 
productive system and the plan drafts negotiated at any level of the hierarchy from 
the single enterprise upward. 
The actual exercise of authority by the Party-State took place at two stages of the 
economic process: the negotiation of the plan and its actual implementation. 
The actual formulation of the plan itself, despite the formal involvement of all parties 
concerned, was fundamentally a top-down process, incorporating the preferences of 
the elite. Managers and workers alike had therefore no ground to co-operate in its 
conception and no interest in providing honestly the information required for its 
correct formu1ation. The golden rules that presided over the formulation of plans, 
'taut planning' and 'planning from the achieved level', meant that enterprises were 
obliged fully to utilise capacity and constantly to increase output. The fact that 
managers were held responsible for the fulfilment of the plan, but were not 
guaranteed supplies nor had sufficient control over production, made their interest 
12 On the control mechanism put in place by the Party-State to check managerial work and a 
detailed description of deceptive practices by managers we rely on the account of Berliner, J. 
(1957; 1988) and Granick, D. (1954; 1960). 
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run against the elite's determination constantly to increase productivity and therefore 
surplus extraction. Managers would therefore try to negotiate an easy plan, 
understating their actual capacity and availability of resources and inflating their 
requests for supply while planners would rather raise figures in the opposite 
direction. The plan itself was therefore a reflection of the relative bargaining power 
of the parties to the negotiation. Managers, particularly directors, despite being a 
section of the elite, acted as representatives of their community in trying to extract 
greater resources from the centre and. their popularity and prestige was also 
dependent on it. This resulted in continuous imbalances along technological chains, 
which again justified managerial resistance to disclosing information. This in tum 
called for higher bodies to overcome managerial resistance by putting enormous 
pressure on managers and control organs towards the achievement of output targets. 
Within the enterprise the overwhelming stress on gross output targets led production 
managers to silence those officials who were responsible for the financial and 
economic aspects of the activity. In a planned economy these were necessarily 
secondary aspects of the economic system, but they were still essential to measure its 
effectiveness and guarantee a flow of information to the centre. Their subordination 
to the produc~ion units cleared the way for manipulation of this means by managers 
, 
so as to conceal information and cheat about actual performance. Outside the factory, 
enterprise management tried to establish a web of connections, providing them with 
additional resources to face shortages and with silent approval in case of outright 
failures, lubricated by the exchange of favours usually referred to as blat (see 
Berliner 1., 1957; Ledeneva A., 1998). 
The ministerial structures soon learned that their performance was to be judged by 
the same criteria applied to the enterprises they were supposed to control. They were 
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quite eager to obtain a branch plan which could be safely attained by 'their' 
• 
enterprises and help them to receive all they needed. Nevertheless, the interest of the 
indi vidual enterprise could well contrast with that of the higher administration 
because the latter was just interested in the branch output regardless of the individual 
results of each enterprise. 
Local authorities too were held responsible and made their careers out of the 
productive success of their enterprises so they were all too interested to promote 
them at the expense of their control function. Furthermore, the social burdens 
imposed by the state on enterprises, as means to guarantee the loyalty and 
participation of the work-force, extended beyond the boundaries of the factory, 
strengthening the mutual involvement between economic and political bodies. Here 
too the ability of the top managers to exert their influence did not pass without 
consequences. Many functions performed by civil and political bodies relied in 
reality on the enterprise resources and their officials were often on the enterprise 
payroll. 13 
Other bodies t~at performed a control function were the banking system and the state 
financial agencies. Unlike the former, they had no connection with the enterprises 
• 
and were in ,a better position to perform their duties. The banking system was 
I 
responsible for running the accounts of the enterprise, allowing wage payments and 
inter-firm clearings. The enterprise was usually successful in circumventing control 
over wage expenditures, which were decisive to continue production with bonus-
13 On the 'mutual involvement' between managers and political bodies see Berliner, 
J.(1957), for the non-economic burdens as a source of conflict and diseconomies see 
Siegelbaum, L.H. (1988). 
103 
Claudio Morrison: Soviet Management and Transition PhD thesis June 2004 
driven storming. 14 The same could not be said of investment funds that, though made 
available by the law on profit in 1965, were usually held up or "confiscated" by 
ministries and fiscal agencies. In general, enterprises learned never to use capital 
funds or to ask for credits as this may involve intrusive actions by the banks. 
The fiscal system was directly connected to the payments mechanism: as enterprises 
operated on a non-cash basis and their finances were forced into compulsory 
holdings, tax collection was exerted on settlement. As a result, enterprises were 
always strapped for funds. This aspect of the economic belt between the centre and 
the enterprises was undoubtedly of secondary importance to the extent that the flow 
of goods was independent of financial balances, i.e. guaranteed at fixed prices by the 
planning bodies. They gained in relevance as soon as the reforms introduced self-
financing lS and enterprises themselves began claiming greater control over formal 
economic levers. The results were discouraging mainly because these bodies were 
quite effective at siphoning off financial resources from the most profitable 
enterprises. As a result, commodity currency remained for managers a safer means of 
exchange and. they grew warier about reforms which left the last word about the 
allocation of resources in State hands. 
14 Before the late 1980s, when Gorbachev's wage reform forced enterprises into full self-
financing, the wage fund, al least for basic wages, was subsidised in full by the state. One 
way to inflate the wage fund was therefore to increase artificially the number of jobs. This 
exemplifies how formal controls were quite strict but had no regard to the economic viability 
of the operations involved. 
IS A first attempt to introduce profit-and-Ioss accounting or khozraschet, in practice 
enterprise self-financing, was made with the so-called 'law on profit' envisaged in the 
enterprise reform introduced by Kosygin in 1965 (see di Leo, 1983). Partial and then full 
self-financing were respectively introduced in 1987 and 1990 (see Filtzer, 1994, pp. 129-
147). 
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The growth of the economy, as we said in the previous section, exacerbated the 
problem of co-ordination between branches. The ministerial system, though, proved 
irreplaceable after the ill-fated attempt at decentralisation under Khrushchev. As a 
result 'executive bodies proliferated' (Amodio, 1993, p 228). This could not remain 
without consequences. Unlike in the case of basic industries erected during the first 
five-year plans, the new ones required a greater number of diverse input per type of 
output, calling for a considerable number of executive and technical bodies to be 
involved in decision-making. The nature of negotiation changed as a result, 
resembling less a simple command system, featuring a top-down relationship 
between a single administration and its subordinate enterprises, than an 
'administrative market' based on an 'economy of getting approval' .16 In reality, the 
complexities of plan negotiation and adjustment that this change entailed and the 
greater uncertainty about supplies that it generated led to a growth in the scale and 
scope of the informal practices put in place by enterprises and ministries. 
Enterprises st,rove to reduce dependency on suppliers by engaging in autarkic 
production of goods and components. This required substantial investments, which in 
, 
tum turned ~ut only sub-standard output at higher costs. In the case of new 
technologies imported from the West, for which spare parts might be unavailable, 
16 It is the main argument of Naishul' (1991) that an entirely new system of administration 
emerged in the Brezhnev era, namely the 'administrative market' as opposed to an earlier 
command system. Actually all of the tendencies and problems that appeared at this stage had 
manifested themselves much earlier. He nevertheless provides a powerful description of the 
mechanism that led the planning system to a gridlock and succeeds in pointing out both its 
conservative character and extreme vulnerability. 
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this practice undermined the improvements in quality and productivity they were 
meant to achieve. Another practice was to reduce the range of goods and the number 
of components necessary to manufacture them. Standardisation, though, was carried 
out without reference to the needs of users, generating more problems for recipient 
industries and dissatisfaction among consumers. 
The growing in3ibility of the planning organs to stay ahead of the pressure from 
below to provide a growing array of goods and services for collective and, 
increasingly, private consumption, led to the expansion and consolidation of informal 
networks exchanging and producing goods outside the sphere of the plan. 
Economically this was again another blow to the system as it drove resources out of 
the planned sphere of production and distribution. Socially it was also problematic as 
it generated a visible disparity in privileges and consumption and undermined any 
official incentive policy (see di Leo, 1985). Politically, it helped the entrenchment of 
the economic and party elite at the expense of central organs, providing a powerful 
base for centripetal forces. 
As we observed, these tendencies were present at all times, stemming from the 
I 
instability of the system and generating conflicts among different layers of the elite 
• 
to appropriat~ surplus. In the late Brezhnev years, the inability of the centre to 
generate additional resources led to a stalemate. 
Linz's research on bureaucracy, based on first-hand interviews, provides evidence 
for this thesis (see Linz, 1988). Her main conclusions are as follows: a) the economic 
bureaucracy had increased its ability to estimate firms' capacity, hence managers had· 
less scope to win lower targets. b) They could still negotiate more resources to fulfil 
the plan, but they had to face increasing difficulties in procurement. c) The system 
was approaching its limits as the bureaucracy simply struggled to overcome 
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economic stagnation by stretching further the extraction of output without offering 
additional resources either for current production or investments. d) The work of 
managers was made more difficult by changes in norms and indices and renewed 
interest in quality and assortment. 
This critical point was reached as a result of the fundamental inability of the system 
to achieve significant increases in productivity, ultimately demanding greater efforts 
from workers. It is in the work place that one has to search for an explanation of the 
failure to modernise the economy and switch to an intensive form of development. 
The enterprise in the Bre'l.hnev era: Managers and workers 
The position occupied by managers in the factory, their functions and relationship 
with the workforce, were very different indeed in the Soviet Union as compared with 
its western counterparts. The struggle for power and industrialisation by the soviet 
elite shaped in an absolutely novel fashion the economic system by establishing a 
particular relation of domination over the working masses. The technical-scientific 
intelligentsia tn general was marginalised and excluded from decision-making to the 
advantage of , the Party elite and a new administrative apparatus. Factory managers in 
, 
particular saw their control and authority over workers seriously undermined. With 
Taylorism the capitalist enterprise had brought job conception into managerial hands, 
using continuous technological change to break workers' resistance and unity. In 
soviet factories, managerial authority, given the limited control over technology and 
allocation of resources, rested essentially on paternalistic relations. 
The soviet factory was primarily identified as a production unit and production 
managers, mainly engineers, were the core of the managerial structure. Nevertheless, 
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managers had little control over the production process. Central offices exercised 
little control over workshops, to which· most managerial functions were 
decentralised. The command line privileged vertical relations, with little care for co-
ordination among different stages of production. Each shop acted like the en.terprise 
with superior bodies, bargaining for its targets, price and supply. Even at shop level 
in fact line managers were not permanently involved in scheduling production and 
supervising workers, which was rather the job of foremen and shift leaders. The 
apparent result for observers was a production process proceeding in an anarchic 
fashion, with workers left alone to cope with the well-known vagaries of the soviet 
workplace. Workers' behaviour seemed to follow suit, with extraordinarily high rates 
of idleness, unjustified leave and tum-over and all the related consequences of low 
discipline. Why did managers flee from production and hand over their functions to 
workers, why in the face of continuous campaigns was the state unable to stimulate 
managers to manage and workers to work? 
This can be explained partly as a direct consequence of the peculiar nature of the 
planning system and the set of constraints and objectives it imposed on managers. 
The real goal on which managerial performance was assessed was the fulfilment of 
the plan target in physical terms, making secondary any consideration of costs and so 
, 
, 
reducing the incentive to verify how production was actually carried out at shop-
floor level. 
Secondly, the main problem managers had to face was the uneven flow of supply, the 
poor quality of materials and equipment which directly or indirectly jammed 
production flow and effectively impeded any tight scheduling. On the contrary, it 
required the constant co-operation of workers to overcome these disruptions. 
108 
Claudio Morrison: Soviet Management and Transition PhD thesis June 2004 
Scarcity also applied to labour, which meant that workers were in a strong bargaining 
position, as managers were very keen to keep extra staff to meet peak-time work 
demands (the all-out efforts to meet plan targets) and extra-factory work. 
Furthermore, "taut planning" meant that managers had an incentive to underestimate 
capacity and resist upgrading of norms and the introduction of centrally determined 
output quotas. This also represented an essential ground for collusion between the 
workforce and managers. 
Managers therefore, unlike their western counterparts, had little incentive to make 
their way into the production process constantly to increase productivity· and cut 
manufacturing costs, while they had every reason to accommodate with workers. 
This does not mean that managers had no authority over workers. Workers operated 
in an unhealthy and often very dangerous working environment and were forced to 
accept heavy workloads, especially when plan deadlines approached. Soviet workers 
had no right to strike or otherwise to act collectively to further their grievances. The 
Party and official trade unions acted formally in the interests of workers but only in 
so far as it coincided with the line of the enterprise direction and the higher bodies. 
Political atomisation meant that workers could resist managerial pressures only in an 
individual fonn, depending on their specific circumstances. 
In soviet factories, workers' performance still in the 80s was controlled by the use of 
the piece-rate system. This system was amenable to manipulation from below in 
capitalist enterprises, usually in the form of output restriction, in so far as both 
managers and workers were keen to achieve stable standards of output and 
maintenance of appropriate earning patterns (see Granick, 1957). Managers were 
interested in constant production flow and stable wage costs and bargained with 
workers over speed. It should be understood though that in the West it was central 
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offices that set standards and upgraded them constantly thanks to continuous 
organisational and technological change. In any case, output restriction in a capitalist 
enterprise could not be maintained indefinitely, as low productivity immediately 
acti vated pressures from above on the side of rising costs. 
In the soviet environment, lacking this form of check, managers left output norms to 
be set on the shop floor by informal bargaining with workers, tolerating low 
standards and high rates of overfulfilment. In this way they acquired an easy 
mechanism of incentive through bonuses for overfulfilment, but at the cost of low 
productivity, abnormal differences in earnings and equally high disparities between 
tight and loose norms within and among workshops and factories. The State, worried 
about declining productivity growth and rising wage costs, tried to counteract this 
with campaigns, reforms and incentive schemes aimed at tightening up discipline, 
raising norms and inducing managers to greater organisational efforts. Managers, 
though, resisted any attempt to modify the status quo. 
The main explanatory factor here is identified in the vicious circle between labour 
scarcity at general level and workers' negative control in the work place. The low 
. . 
discipline and the ensuing low productivity were tolerated in order to retain workers 
• but these phe,nomena only reproduced the conditions of poor economic performance 
. 
and continuous disruptions that led managers to labour hoarding. This argument has 
led to the consolatory conclusion that, once the distorting constraints of soviet 
planning were lifted and mass unemployment reintroduced, managers could regain 
control of production and achieve rationalisation (see Clarke, 1993). 
The' labour process engendered by Stalinist industrialisation corresponded to a 
structuring of a hierarchy in the shops and a corresponding labour organisation that 
defied managerial rationalisation no less than genuine workers' autonomy. 
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The soviet workforce was very far from being a homogeneous mass, it was in fact 
highly stratified and this was the base on which fragmentation and alienation could 
be realised and control achieved. 
Production was effectively organised around a restricted number of production and 
auxiliary workers who guaranteed the achievement of the plan. These shock workers 
enjoyed extensive privileges granted at personal level and usually disguised under 
the banners of socialist competition. They were the trouble-shooters and rate-busters 
on whom managers relied to bring in the plan. 
As for the large mass of unskilled auxiliaries and clerks who filled the factory 
payrolls, Clarke correctly points out that they did play a different role, being 
otherwise of little help in carrying out the production process. They represented the 
pool from which reliable "cadre" workers could be recruited and against whom the 
working elite could reflect its privileged position, but also an internal "reserve army" 
that could counterweigh the claims of skilled production workers, labelled as 
careerist by the less fortunate or less ambitious "others". 
So the soviet ~orkshop resembled at first glance the organisational model prevailing 
in capitalist factories until the inter-war period, before the rationalisation exemplified 
by the introquction of the assembly line. Yet, it did not stage the antagonistic 
confrontation found in the capitalist countries of highly organised skilled workers 
versus a managerial hierarchy determined to break workers' control and privileges. 
This kind of organisation did not simply restrain output growth but represented a 
formidable barrier to technological innovation, at least in the form in which it was 
taking place in the West. Still in the 1960s and 1970s the soviet leadership continued 
to look at western technology as a model and relied heavily on imports to fill the 
technological gap. To run production processes centred on assembly lines efficiently, 
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at the same time extremely rigid and vulnerable to minimal disruption, required an 
absolute control over the workforce no less than of the flow of supply. If managers 
did not feel practically in a condition to assert it because of the practical limitations 
they encountered in organising production, for the elite it was essentially a political 
problem. As we will see in more detail in the next section, the 1965 reform envisaged 
a revitalisation of managerial functions as a conscious response to the requirements 
imposed by the western technologies. I? It rapidly ran into the contradiction of 
assigning the task Of introducing the assembly line to those very shop hierarchies, 
which it would probably have supplanted. 
Under the Brezhnev leadership the idea of introducing western managerial practices 
was shelved, replaced with an appreciation of the specific forms of soviet labour 
organisation. The more general relaxation towards informal practices reflected the 
new approach. These policies though did not address the problem of modernisation 
in a new fashion, as they continued to rely on western imports and models. They did 
even less to address the dramatic fall in productivity growth, now approaching 
stagnation levels. 
Crisis and 'reforms: the soviet system in question 
The history of reforms attempted by the Party during the whole post-war period can 
be viewed in two different ways: they can be understood as a genuine effort to enable 
17 This seems to recall the earlier situation in the 30s that party leaders and planners faced 
when trying to adapt massively acquired western technology to start large-scale 
industrialisation with the new social and political conditions produced by the revolution (see 
Bailes, 1978; Bertolissi, 1978; Sutton, 1968). 
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enterprises to accomplish their productive functions by easing pressure on targets and 
making planning more reliable l8• The official political drive and the urge of planners 
and economists all pointed at reducing the "petty tutelage" of the ministries, allowing 
more freedom in the use of resources and even recognising the contribution of 
formerly illegal practices - use of resources for non-planned sales and services. 
Consistently with the theoretical approach outlined in the first section, we appreciate 
the argument that the perennial search for solutions was indeed driven by the elite's 
determination to restore control over the process of surplus extraction. The methods 
might differ, reflecting the different appreciation that the elite had of the 
contradictions of the system and the severity of the crisis that crippled it. But they all 
had to address the problem of labour producti vity and foundered on the fundamental 
task of restructuring the labour process (see Filtzer, 1994, p. 4). We will sketch them 
briefly, before considering the dilemmas posed by the decision to attempt the full 
transition to capitalism. 
The new policy of productivity: reforming through incentives 
Under Khrushchev, the early reformers gave themselves the task of overcoming the 
opposition of the producers to intensification of their efforts, looking at the large 
western prodocers of consumer goods as a model. 19 They felt as a key determinant 
18 Analysts became more aware of the contradictions of the system and increasingly sceptical 
about its ability to adjust itself over a long period of time (see Berliner, J. (1988) and Di Leo, 
R. (1980;1985». But it was not until the final collapse of the USSR that the state of 
disengagement from and dissatisfaction with the 'socialist system of social relations' of the 
elite fully unfolded. A role was probably played also by self-interested considerations by 
scholars on their academic positions. For an t<x-post analysis of the crisis and collapse of the 
soviet system from a radical prospective see Filtzer, D. (1994). 
19 On the social policy of USSR from Khrushchev to Brezhnev see Di Leo, R. (1983), on the 
Khrushchev reforms see Filtzer (1992). 
113 
Claudio Morrison: Soviet Management and Transition PhD thesis June 2004 
the need to guarantee to the enterprises a safer environment. The introduction of a 
generalised system of welfare in the enterprises together with higher wage equality 
was meant to establish a new social pact with the work force to reduce labour 
turnover and elicit the production discipline of modern enterprises. At the same time, 
the burden of the coercive system was abandoned in favour of material incentives. 
Top managers aspired to enjoy greater dignity and more resources for themselves 
and their workers. In reality, the implementation of the reforms appeared more 
problematic. The higher administrations continued to retain the same prerogatives as 
in the past and the most ambitious attempts to shift the economic levers in favour of 
other bodies failed to materialise (Filtzer, 1992). 
The management was given a powerful means to exert its authority, but also an 
economic burden, which was not fully recognised and was to be paid for at the 
expense of production. Managers saw it as a means to reduce turnover, increase co-
operation and the productivity of their work force. Hence they used welfare as a new 
resource to pursue their usual strategy, making the consumption of these benefits 
dependant on, the availability of resources and on the merit of workers. Under 
Khrushchev housing construction almost doubled, in an attempt to reduce labour 
turnover, one',of the main causes of which was housing shortages (Filtzer, 1992, p, 
,\ 
51), but shortages persisted and turnover remained, by soviet standards, high. The 
ruling class had imposed its welfare and wage reforms as a means to guarantee social 
stabilisation, combining full employment with effective control. But the idea of the 
reformers was to introduce a welfare system to redirect the strategy of the producers 
towards a model closer' to the western system of high productivity and high 
consumption. 
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With the command system unchanged, top managers could nominally be entitled to a 
large amount of surplus for bonuses and social expenses but had neither greater 
confidence nor better levers in claiming them. Only the privileged sector had enough 
resources to afford the effectiveness of welfare and it implied ironically the 
continuation of the poor provision of consumer goods by the beleaguered light 
industry, which in tum undermined the effectiveness of incentives even for workers 
'h 'd 20 In eavy In ustry. 
Despite its approximation, the Khrushchev wage reform and its accompanying 
political measures already revealed the difficulty of the task that the successors of 
Stalin had to face. The populist concessions over wages and welfare and the political 
mobilisation of the rank-and-file did not yield active support or raise morale in the 
factories, nor did they succeed in tying wages more closely to output, instead 
provoking crises in the system as wage differentials precipitated serious labour 
shortages (Filtzer, 1992), The uneven increase in wages and welfare provision under 
the Khrushchev reforms, which bore little if any relation to increases in productivity, 
undermined th,e concomitant attempt to consider labour a factor of production whose 
productivity had to be increased 'scientifically' by managers. This led to the 
abandonment' of the Khrushchev wage reforms in 1964, to be followed by a more 
focused experiment with western managerial methods. 
Reforming labour organisation: the Shchekino experiment and its consequences 
The continued reforms of the economy never intervened in the fundamental 
contradictions of the system. In the 1960s, though, the idea of introducing western 
20 For the role played by enterprise welfare in strengthening the enterprise profile see Di Leo, 
R(l980) and for the divide between sectors A and B, and its poisonous consequences in 
terms of economic effectiveness and social balance see Filtzer, D. (1994). 
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technologies prompted a reorganisation of labour, which amounted to a serious 
attempt at rationalising the labour process. Its failure showed the impossibility of 
f . h· 21 re ormmg t e sovIet system. 
In 1968 the soviet leadership resolved to attempt an experiment which contained 
many elements of novelty and seemed to indicate that the soviet economy was 
eventuallycoming to terms with western 'rationality' in industrial management. 
The soviet economy was experiencing a slow-down in productivity and low levels of 
resource utilisation that, coupled with the decline in natural population growth (in 
1970 92% of the able-bodied working-age population was already at work), would 
have made the model of extensive growth, with no further employable people, 
unviable, putting at risk further economic growth. 
The underlying causes were identified as labour shortages, low labour discipline, 
high labour turnover and underutilisation of capacity. While all of these elements 
were in fact familiar faults of the system as it had existed so far, they were now seen 
as an impediment to economic development. In those years in fact the country was 
trying to mak~ consumer goods a priority while maintaining the heavy burden of the 
military sector and without the possibility to access additional resources, especially 
labour. The need to increase the productivity of the heavy industry servicing the 
secondary sector became a priority. In particular, the focus fell on the poor' utilisation 
of the labour force in auxiliary jobs, which lowered producti vity and hoarded labour. 
The Shchekino experiment was carried out in a large chemical plant in Tula oblast' 
in central European Russia, not far from Moscow. The experiment, as in previous 
21 This section is based on accounts of the experiment in Arnot (1988), from page 106 
onward, and di Leo (1973,1983). 
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cases, was aimed at raising labour productivity by relating rewards more closely to 
results. In this case, though, the use of incentives was made dependent on the 
'scientific' reorganisation of labour leading to the elimination of overstaffing. The 
economised wage fund would be redistributed among the remaining workforce while 
those made redundant would be made available to other production units. 
Reorganisation was achieved by a) raising workers' qualifications; b) introducing 
multitasking; c) introduction of 'technically substantiated norms'; d) the use of 
internal committees supported by outside specialists to identify surplus labour. The 
result was combination of jobs and amalgamation of facilities leading to the shedding 
of excess labour, tighter discipline and (to a lower extent) higher wages. Productivity 
grew enormously and so did state revenues. This type of reform was extended but 
initial successes did not replicate themselves elsewhere and lost their momentum at 
the original sites as well. 
What were the causes of failure? They have to be partly ascribed to the planning 
mechanism. The experiment tightened control over labour but also increased 
managerial responsibilities. Managers agreed to participate on the basis of guarantees 
of a stable environment (i.e. even flow of supplies, stable plan and wage fund); the 
impossibility'to replicate this condition across the entire system made reformed 
enterprises more vulnerable against the caprices of ministerial planning and 
procurement. Managerial reluctance is only fully understandable against the 
difficulties they faced in the shops. The initial experiment had involved a great deal 
of studying and bargaining with workers but made clear their initial resistance to 
intensification of work and subsequent disappointment at the meagre economic 
rewards. Fear of dismissal was paramount in bending their resistance. Again these 
conditions could not be replicated. As managers themselves would not jeopardise co-
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operation with workers against the uncertain outcomes of rationalisation, large-scale 
restructuring was bound to fail. Moreover, much of the reduction in the labour force 
had been achieved by dismissing workers in 'peripheral' areas, reducing the social 
and welfare benefits, most importantly housing, that the enterprise could provide for 
its workers. Finally, the experiment was strictly limited in its scope, since the 
removal of workers who could be sacrificed without jeopardising plan fulfilment 
could not be repeated (Arnot, 1988). The very same combine that staged the initial 
experiment was outperformed by other factories a year later, raising concerns about 
the long-term effects of this strategy. According to managers themselves, the 
problem lay in the adjustment of planning to the new conditions in the enterprise 
which deprived managers of the usual safety net, extra labour and resources, 
necessary to face an uncertain environment (di Leo, 1973). 
More significantly, the experiment left unanswered the cruCial question as to how 
further increases in productivity could be achieved. The soviets always regarded new 
technology in a neutral way, lacking appreciation of the resistance to innovation 
displayed by management. Other than the risks of disruptions imposed by planning, 
the problem lay in the lack of self-generating innovation within the enterprises. As 
we saw in the, previous chapter, the Fordist revolution put into managerial hands the 
I 
ability constantly to revolutionise production techniques, with workers' ability to 
regain partial control over production (and over surplus distribution through 
collective action) providing an important incentive constantly to increase surplus 
extraction. The lack of this tool in managerial hands and the refusal of the elite to 
endanger its position through open confrontation with workers meant that these 
experiments, even when successful, were necessarily short-lived and gave only 
partial relief to the otherwise stagnating economy. 
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Reforms under Brezhnev 
The quite different type of refonns introduced in the 1970s indicates that the Party 
leadership considered much safer the utilisation of traditional administrative means 
. of surplus extraction coupled with the traditional appeal to workers' self-activation. 
Instead of replacing the administrative command system with new bodies or with 
economic levers, as tried before, the party set to improve the system itself by 
incorporating the infonnal practices which had so far emerged spontaneously to 
adjust and compensate for its deficiencies. 
The most important measures were the 1979 decree. 'on the improvement of the 
planning system', which envisaged the introduction of the enterprise 'passport' and 
the introduction· of the 'counter plan', stipulated in 1983, to be presented by 
enterprises (di Leo, 1986,319-320). 
The intention to fill the missing links in the planning system was also complemented 
by the introduction of an intermediate body, the ob'edinenie, or industrial 
. 
association, which was supposed to co-ordinate innovation, sales and procurement 
policies of a group of enterprises in the same branch. Supposedly associations should 
have been able to manage enterprises more closely and effectively than distant 
bureaucratic ministerial bodies (Schroeder, 1989). The immediate reference in the 
West was large corporations. This institution, and in general the policy of re-
centralisation, was also to characterise the initial stage of Gorbachev's reform of the 
ministerial system with equally disappointing results, other than the further 
entrenchment of the ministerial elite. 
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Labour organisation, away from western rationalisation, saw the experiment of the 
work brigades introduced in 1979 and generalised thereafter until 1984. The system 
at the same time recognised the practice of informal adjustment of work organisation 
and corresponding wage payments and expected it to be formalised, providing 
incentives for improvements. The key element was the introduction of collective 
responsibility for results that should supplant the individualistic approach to norm 
fulfilment. In theory workers were asked to save on use of labour and materials, 
participating in savings (see Filtzer, 1994, 70-71). This system endangered the 
authority of the shop hierarchy, which could only exist in the grey area of 
informality, it became therefore prey, like other incentives, to manipulation by 
foremen and line managers. By the same token it raised workers' suspicion. In any 
case, general problems that affected production flow made it simply impossible for 
these groups, any more than enterprises as a whole, to cut production buffers without 
running the risk of failing to fulfil their contract. 
From reforms to Transition: a bird's-eye view 
This account provides us with all the contradictory elements on the ground at the 
time when th~ last attempt to reform the system took place under the Gorbachev 
leadership.22 The well-known outcome should not be viewed in any of its aspects as 
22 The failure of Gorbachev's economic reforms is well explained by FiItzer (1994). It is 
important to notice that they differed little from previous attempts. The substantial difference 
with past situations was the absolute lack of additional resources in the economy to foster 
change, and therefore the need to increase surplus extraction. This led reforms 'too far', 
freeing enterprises from even the imperfect control which ministries exercised on them, 
generating an irreversible crisis. At that point the problem became essentially political, i.e. 
the socio-economic base, with all its problems, remained untouched. 
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the necessary result of a mechanical process. Once the parties recognised their 
inability to pursue their goals within the old framework and the whole system 
became the object of reform, each of them tried at the same time to make the most of 
their previous assets and to reach a better position in the new spheres opened up by 
the shift to an unregulated economy.23 Conflicting interests which were previously 
subjected to negotiations within the framework of the planned economy and involved 
a high level of co-operation were to become the leading force of disintegration. 
Top management at first resisted Gorbachev's reforms, particularly of enterprise 
management, and continued to operate in the traditional way, with directors 
subverting attempts to introduce workplace democracy and asserting their rights to 
'one-man management'. Many directors did not even welcome the increasing 
independence that was being offered to them, preferring the relative security that 
ministerial control provided them with. But as it became clear in the late 1980s that 
the transition to a market economy was proceeding, a growing number of directors 
met the reforms with enthusiasm and interpreted the reforms as an opportunity 
eventually to ~ssert a fully recognised control over the enterprise.24 Itsvision of the 
economic reality was nevertheless limited to its traditional sphere of control, as was 
its perception of the social process set in motion by the political split within the 
. 
I 
ruling stratum. Enterprise directors failed to detect the risks implicit in liberalisation, 
23 Di Leo, reflecting in 1993 about the failure of Gorbachev, noted how the soviet economic 
oligarchy first supported him, achieving independence from Gosplan and the Central 
Committee, then turned to the radicals, hoping to profit from the advancing process of 
economic and political disintegration. The two factions, though, split dramatically as 
reformers took a strong pro-market anti-industrial stance, aimed at regaining control over the 
economy (di Leo, 1993, p.5). 
24 A debate about the position of directors in the age of transition is reported in Lester, I. 
(1995) 
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which left them completely powerless against foreign competition and internal trade 
speculation. On the political ground, the emergence of the radical leadership of 
westerners utterly reversed their expectations: the double standard assumed by the 
new politicians between new entrepreneurs and old directors made it clear that a new 
set of interests had been established at the expense of the latter. 
We should then tum to investigate, on the one hand, the resetting of economic 
institutions, focusing on the privatisation process as part of a more general political 
and ideological "revolution",. on the other hand, we will see the adaptation of 
managerial strategies to the new economic environment. 
The team of "reformers" put together by A. Chubais at the end of 1991 inherited the 
task of reasserting control over the economy, i.e. the red directors, but this time both 
the means and the goals were to be, at least nominally, radically different. They 
engaged in a battle to lead the country on the road to capitalism and did so with 
ruthless determination. Compromise was still considered an actual necessity with 
both the new businessmen and the directorial elite but they successfully imposed 
themselves as the only force with the capacity, and with the determination, 
consistently to pursue the restoration of capitalism in Russia. Their clear ideological 
, . 
stance gained, the favour of leading academics and politicians, especially in the U.S., 
I 
which provided them with the resources and the international political support to 
strike the balance of power in their favour. At that point the discourse, if not the 
reality, of the struggle over the economy turned into a crusade to set the country on 
the road to capitalism. This ideological overtone has almost entirely characterised 
mainstream discourse on both sides of the former iron curtain, until the general 
collapse of the financial system in 1998 opened the way for criticism to gain ground 
and respectability. Needless to say, it was the market, the firm and economic man, 
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which featured in the "myth of the market economy", the cornerstone of the reform 
ideologues and practitioners.2s For radical reformers, it was only after private 
property had been secured in the hands of genuine entrepreneurs that an effective 
check of property over management would have been possible, permitting thorough 
restructuring. They therefore concentrated their expectations and efforts on carrying 
out a rapid privatisation process rather than restructuring enterprises26 or 
reorganising the regulatory framework of the economy. 
The Privatised Enterprise in Post-soviet Russia 
Privatisation of state enterprises. was a pillar of the 'transition' designed by 
reformers; it was also an utmost necessity once the gradual liberalisation of 
economic organisation under Gorbachev, on the one hand, and the collapse of the 
ministerial system, on the other, had left no option but to set enterprises free. But 
while for reformers this was a means to prevent or reverse managerial bailouts, a de 
facto privatisation in favour of .old management, for the latter it was a way to 
consolidate their autonomous existence. As for the specific scheme that should have 
been adopted for privatisation, the idea of open auctions allowing direct entry from 
, 
outside/international investors was discarded in favour of "people's" privatisation. 
This was a variant of the Czech privatisation program based on the issuing of 
I 
25 The ideological stance of 'westerners' is well presented in Lester (1995, p. 84-96). 
'Without doubt the dominant .theme that lies at the core of the Westerners' hegemonic 
strategy is the emphasis on ... the notion of possessive individualism ... The cash nexus and 
private ownership, of course, are the ultimate rewards and the ultimate driving forces of the 
newly engendered acquisitive instincts' (Ibid. p. 92). 
26 A summary of the 'popular' arguments in favour of immediate mass privatisation and its 
alleged accomplishments can be found in the Economist surveys 'A silent revolution' 
(08/04/1995) and 'In search of a spring' (1211211997). The latter is much less triumphalist in 
tone but no less ideological in the arguments. 
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vouchers to the population with a certain nominal value to be used for share purchase 
at open auctions. It was expected that vouchers would mostly have been traded on 
the secondary market and pooled in management funds so as to allow the 
concentration of stocks in the hands of block-holders. The major divide between the 
reformers and the directorial elite concentrated on whether the labour collective was 
to be conceded majority ownership, since in the second case, it was argued, insiders' 
control would have persisted through collusion between workers and management. In 
the programme designed by the government, the first option 'allocated 25% of the 
shares to the workers free in the form of non-voting stocks with the right to buy a 
further 10% with a 30% rebate' (S. Clarke 1994; p.6). The second option, strongly 
advocated by the Industrial Union of A. Vol'skii, represented the interests of 
industrial management. This 'allowed the workers to purchase a controlling interest 
in the enterprise directly, instead of having to bid at auctions ( ... ), under the second 
option a full 51 % of the shares were available (to the employees) at a purely nominal 
price.' (S. Clarke 1994; p.6) 
As observed by K. Hendley In her study of early managerial privatisation, the 
support for employee ownership (EO) by management should be taken more 
seriously thah a short-sighted attempt to grab state property to continue pursuing 
rent-seeking strategies. While designing a suitable form of corporate governance, top 
management linked privatisation in the form of employee ownership to a strategy 
aimed at enhancing productivity and workers' loyalty. EO had been pursued since 
spontaneous privatisation and then became the main argument of the industrial lobby 
when the formal mass privatisation scheme was designed. The motives brought 
forward in favour of its adoption focused precisely on promoting 'the harmonisation 
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of the interests of various social groups at the same time as ( ... ) a rather high degree 
of economic effectiveness.' (K. Hendley, 1998, p.189). 
According to S. Clarke, a managerial strategy aimed at maintaining and 
strengthening the "partnership" with the labour collective developed at different 
stages of the privatisation process and almost independently of the form it assumed. 
It was embedded in the paternalistic-authoritarian methods of rule typical of the 
soviet system, which were accentuated by the circumstances of transition. In a 
situation where control was not substantiated by clear property rights, workers' 
support and subordination was essential for preventing threats from outsiders which 
might use corporate bodies for hostile take-overs. To the contrary, the reformers 
were giving voice to the growing anti-worker feelings of the political and intellectual 
elite and urged the reforms to 'put those who work and those who rule back in place' 
(R. di Leo, 1993). . 
An objective analysis of the situation was to reveal that there was little room for 
alternatives, if privatisation was to be implemented. As observed later by Frydman, 
though outsid,e ownership is' the standard in Western experience of corporate 
governance' and was the invariable outcome of a successful transition programme, 
• 
this was hardly attainable with the first stage of privatisation (Frydman, R., Gray, 
, 
C.W. and Rapaczynski, A., 1996). In the first place it was largely recognised that the 
magnitude of the nominal shares' value far exceeded the then available level of 
market capitalisation. Secondly, massive entry of foreign capital was discouraged by 
the "externalities" related to the high social costs of restructuring (Frydman et al., 
ibid., p.23). Given the, priority of introducing hard budget constraints into the 
economic system and the low desirability of continued state ownership, the only 
feasible option was allowing employee ownership. 
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Not surprisingly, the second wave of the privatisation process, 1992-1994, 'marked 
an almost total capitulation to the demands of the industrial nomenklatura' (S. Clarke 
1994; p.6). The implementation of the programme proceeded consistently with their 
requests. As many as 74% of the privatised enterprises chose the second option (1. 
Gurkov 1998) and later surveys estimated that at least 65% presented all insiders' 
shareholding (Blasi et aI., 1997). To stress even further the balance in this direction, 
it has been noted that the other option was favoured by managers when they feared 
that the workers' stake may end up in outsiders' hands. Managers furthermore 
pursued different strategies aimed at consolidating their position, from the purchase 
of shares from workers and on the secondary market to pooling and freezing the 
remaining shares under the direct control of the board (see S. Clarke, 1994). 
The above referred surveys confirm that the real working of the corporate institutions 
of privati sed companies provides more reason to believe that managers remained 
firmly in control with little possibility for them to evolve into outsider-owned 
companies. (Blasi et aI., 1997, p. 49). This has been sufficient for advocates of 
reforms to bla!"e on management the setback of the Russian transition programme, 
the lack of restructuring and the frailty of Russian recovery at the end of the 
decade.27 Th~ir main argument initially was that Russian managers were inherently 
, 
incapable of understanding and practising western management, then as the crisis 
deepened, that it was their irrational strategies that produced the distorti ve effects, 
27 The liberal politician Yavlinsky, at a public speech in Washington, noted how' ... 82% of 
all enterprises in the Russian Federation no longer belong to the State. But he suggested that 
few of them were actually publicly owned. Instead, their owners are in fact the old 
communist-era managers. And these people view their new possessions more like the 
collective fanns of the past than the private enterprises of the market economy' (Goble, 
1997). 
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causing the derailment of an otherwise certain path to capitalism and prosperity. It is 
the task of our study to prove otherwise. We can briefly recall the literature which 
has countered these arguments on theoretical grounds as well as undertaking 
empirical research . 
. 'As for the essential nature of the capitalist system that is actually being 
constructed in reality ... according to Michael Burawoy and Pavel Krotov, 
the optimists of the western orientation have grossly exaggerated... the 
depth of economic transition in post-communist Russia. [Because] what 
certainly has not changed is the old type of relations in production ... where 
"monopolies retain their grip on the supply of crucial commodities, and 
workers continue to retain their hold on production". A similar line of 
argument has been taken by Simon Clarke' (Lester, 1995, p. 118-119). 
In order to understand why managers continued to rely on traditional institutional 
arrangements and practices we have to look into their strategies and the factors which 
influenced their formulation and implementation. Grancelli (1995) categorises the 
enterprise position and the corresponding strategies according to three types of 
approaches: rent-seeking, short-term profit-oriented, market-oriented. While many 
mainstream a?alysts (see Gurkov, Ibid.; Polonsky and Edwards, 1998) place a high 
I 
value on managers' culture and capabilities to explain the hazardous behaviour 
. contained in the two earlier lines of action, empirical findings also refer to the 
difficulties managers have to face and the possible rationality of their choices 
(Hendley, 1998; again Polonsky and Edwards, Ibid.). It is with the systematic case-
study based programme directed by Simon Clarke that the aims, objectives and 
rationale of Russian enterprise management come to the fore. 
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His main findings about the strategy of Russian management in the early stages of 
the reform can be summarised in the following points: 
These three elements [rent-seeking. market-oriented strategy, paternalism. 
C. M.l are by no means mutually exclusive, differences between one 
enterprise and another relate to the balance between them ... Moreover, in 
conditions of extreme economic and political instability a conservative 
strategy may be the best way of securing the long-term profitability of the 
enterprise ... However the substantive differences in strategy are often far 
less than the contrasting rhetorics might indicate, because the enterprise is 
severely constrained by both its internal relationships and external 
circumstances in what it can do ... Therefore privatisation provides very 
little incentive to investment or even significant reorganisation (S. Clarke, 
1994. p.13) 
The case study will unveil in what these external and internal constraints consist, 
how management responded to them and to what extent outside ownership could 
modify a substantially managerial approach. 
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PART TWO 
CASE STUDY: 
Restructuring the Upper Volga Textile Combine 
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4. Case Study Background: A World of Textiles 
In this section I introduce my case-study research with background information about 
the latest developments in the industry and the markets both at world level and in 
Russia.28 This will help us locate the position of the case study enterprise and the 
region in the economic geography of world textiles. This framework provides the set 
of threats and opportunities which constrain the industry and the enterprise. For 
however far Russian management practices and problems might differ, as we shall 
see, from world standards, all the major actors encountered in our research will set 
their strategies in relation to this wider context. Transition and restructuring in fact 
has meant for Russian management not only the requirement in theory to confront 
Western models but also to face the reality of international competition. At the end of 
the section a background to the case study enterprise provides the key co-ordinates in 
terms of production, organisation and corporate history. 
Market and industry in textiles: the global context 
The textile sector represents a mature industry with a relatively low level of 
investment artd technological innovation and with low economies of scale. This 
industry exists in most developed and developing countries and the growth in output 
and export from the former has fuelled fierce competition in the past thirty years. Its 
28 For sources about world and EU textiles see C. Morrison, 1999, Case Study on Textile & 
Apparel Sector: Globalisation and Social Exclusion, Centre for the Study of Globalisation and 
RegionalisationlEU Project-"Globalisation and Social Exclusion"IEC contract SOE2-CT98-3062. 
(main sources: ILO. EIU. OETH, OECD. and EC). For Russia and the Ivanovo region data and 
information has been found in Gain reports. FAS/uSDA (Foreign Agricultural Service! US 
Department of Agriculture). annual and update issues from 1998 to 2002. 
130 
Claudio Morrison: Soviet Management and Transition PhD thesis June 2004 
importance for employment in most countries has prompted the introduction of a 
protectionist regime, the Multi-Fibre Agreement, which has not hampered trade 
growth but distorted it. Both developed and newly industrialised (NICs) countries 
have heavily restructured, introducing newer technologies, and have shifted to niche 
markets or delocalised production. This has created a new world division of labour, 
penal ising the new entrants in developing countries (Russia among them). Workers 
have paid for it almost everywhere with the threat of unemployment, worsening 
working conditions and downward pressure on wages. 
Basic features of the industry 
It might be useful to commence by reporting some features of the industry, which 
represent at the same time the common traits it has assumed in its historical evolution 
and the bases of its latest developments and contemporary problems (see Singleton 
1997). The textile industry, generally in association with clothing (TCI), is usually 
referred to in historical and economic contexts as one of the lesser or light industries. 
This is to imply one or more of the following characteristics: 
a) The TCI represented the leading sector in the first industrial revolution and has set 
itself in the first stages of industrial development in second-comer and developing 
countries. 
b) The industry rapidly became 'mature'; i.e. it presents a lower rate of investment, 
technological progress and rate of profitability relative to other industries. It also 
means that it lost its strategic character as soon as countries developed a robust 
industrial and service sector. 
c) The lower intensity of capital also means that: 1) TCI retained to various degrees 
labour-intensive stages of production. This has lent the industry a new strategic 
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significance in employment policies; 2) in terms of enterprise structure, TCI firms 
are smaller in size and limited in scope. 
d) These features combine with a high percentage of low-paid, unskilled (often 
harshly exploited) female workforce. ILO statistics place female employment at 
around 40/50% in textiles and 70/80% in clothing production (see ILO Reports, 
1995, 1996). 
e) TCI is also a basic industry in the sense that it provides essential consumer goods 
and exists in almost all countries. 
Trade and production in the Tel: major post-WWII trends 
The combination of these historical factors (accessibility of mature technology, 
labour cost advantages, availability of local skills, demand for basic goods) has made 
TCI into a major source of income and employment for most Developing Countries 
(DC). This has been raising concerns among Industrialised Countries (IC) interested 
in retaining their dominant market position and employment levels. Since the Second 
World War there has been considerable growth in trading of TCI goods, 
characterised by fierce competition between the two blocs and among DCs. This has 
induced, in the last thirty years, substantial modifications in the world division of 
• 
labour in the ~ector, in market quota distribution and in the structure of production. 
These changes can be summarised in the following points: 
The EU (and USA) as a whole is still a world-leading exporter of textiles and 
clothing, second only to PR China; extra-EU trade accounts for 14.6% of world 
textile exports and 9% 'of world clothing exports. All major European producers 
figure in the top ten of world exporters. EU countries are also major importers and 
the EU as a whole is a net importer of textiles and Clothing, despite a positive trade 
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balance in textiles. The deficits in trade balance have been deteriorating over time to 
the advantage of developing countries, Asian and lately OPT29 partners (see 
Spinanger, 1999). 
A process of regional integration with neighbouring countries rapidly developed at 
the turn of the last decade, only partly captured by data on OPT. It complements 
sourcing policies in the Far East and has set the industry on the way to internalisation 
of production. Mediterranean countries and ECE and former-USSR countries provide 
21.4% and 20% respectively of EU imports. Both areas show a surplus in total T &C 
trade with the EU but OPT partners are in deficit for textiles and they register stable 
import growth of clothing as well (see OETH, 1999). 
The growing role of DCs in production and the competition by NICs, now 
principally from PR China, have induced a) the establishment of considerable 
customs barriers (the MFA agreement imposing quotas on DCs); b) the restructuring 
of the industry in IC countries. The 1970s have seen a peek in imports as well as the 
heaviest losses in employment with closures of the largest production outlets. The 
response has; been a combination of technological innovation to cut costs and 
specialisation in technical and high-quality goods. Clothing and most low-costllow-
• 
quality commodities were outsourced or relocated abroad, boosting OPT trade in 
I 
textiles .. Later in the 1990s, textiles for clothing are being threatened with being 
gradually outsourced too. 
29 Outward Processing Trade, a form of outsourcing consisting in the enterprise exporting 
temporarily a semi-finished good for processing abroad in order to save labour costs by 
taking the more labour-intensive stages of production abroad. OPT specifically referred to 
EU agreements with neighbouring countries, regulating these practices.· While the OPT 
regime is being phased out, outsourcing trade similar in practice to OPT is growing. 
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The fundamental changes that trade and restructuring have promoted in the lCs can 
be summarised in the following points: 
• Despite data that might indicate the emergence of an autonomous competitive 
edge by DCs, specific research on industry structures indicates that imports 
do not come as a result of aggressive export policies of Developing Countries 
but 80% originate from EU-based manufacturers, distributors and designers. 
• Distributors are assuming an increasing role in dealing with these functions, 
bypassing traditional manufacturers. They are responsible for the increasing 
contraction of manufacturing in the sector. 
• There is an ongoing shift from production to service activities. These 
businesses focus on the last and most profitable part of the production-
distribution chain, retaining logistics, marketing, design and finishing 
functions. All the rest is outsourced. 
• Conversely DCs, while playing a growing role in production and export, 
suffer greatly from a) the procrastination of the quota system and anti-
dumping policies by lCs; b) an unfavourable division of labour which 
relegates them to providers of low-cost commodities or commission-based 
o 
orders'; c) an extreme competition, both political and economic, to gain a 
gateway in lCs markets, which depresses revenues with heavy effect on 
salaries and working conditions in Developing Countries. 
Market and Industry in textiles: Russia and the Ivanovo Region 
The Russian TC sector was badly equipped to confront integration into the 
international market. Apart from the typical distortions of a soviet-type industry it 
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suffered from the marginality of consumer goods production under planning and a 
historical prevalence of textile commodities in its product assortment. Trade 
liberalisation and the disruption of the command chain have resulted in the collapse 
of production with ensuing social dislocation and the absolute dominance of imports 
in the internal market. The Ivanovo region, dominated by the TC sector, has suffered 
badly by the slump in production and the loss of the traditional ties with soviet 
cotton-producing countries. It has survived in the 1990s thanks to state support and is 
now undergoing restructuring under the lead of Central-Asian and Moscow trade 
companies. The dominant activity has remained the processing and export of low-
value cotton fabrics, light cloth for state procurement and other inexpensive low-
quality commodities. 
The industry structure 
In 1995-7 the 'Cast management consultants' conducted a thorough examination of 
the state of the TCI in Russia; the analysis focusing on enterprises in the Ivanovo 
region. The local industry output amounted to over the 60% of the Russian output of 
cotton fabrics: up to 50% of linen output, while wool-made goods were only 5% of 
total Russian output (GosKomStat data). The analysis outlines their main features, 
, 
highlighting ,their organisational and operational dysfunctions as considered in 
I 
comparison with standards of their western and Asian competitors. 
Their main features are a) dominant role of production among business areas; b) 
functional organisational structures, notwithstanding the scale of production and the 
product range; c) integrated production chain within individual enterprises; d) highly 
specialised dedicated machinery; e) prominent role of the welfare system. 
The internal organisation was set consistently with no alteration of the previous. 
soviet establishment. It is described along these points: 
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1) Corporate management was bureaucratic; 
2) There was no relation between formally appointed positions and real jobs; 
3) Last but not least, sales and accounting functions were little taken- into 
consideration. 
4) Marketing was weak or non-existent and commercial functions were tied to 
barter deals rather than busy with market sales, pricing and competitors' 
analysis. 
At the all-ind~stry level, the lack of co-operation among individual enterprises was 
remarked on, especially where there was a significantly high geographical 
specialisation, as in this area. Enterprises did not show· any interest in or ability to 
develop a division of labour and persisted in manufacturing the same kind of goods, 
resulting in destructive competition. Still, they have not been able to set a common 
standing towards suppliers and final customers in order to strength their position in 
terms of price and quality. As a result their contractual power was low and many of 
them had virtually become a mere productive unit under large financial-industrial 
groups or ambiguous intermediaries. 
The Market structure 
It was admitted that the current enterprise organisation and its management were 
consistent with the situation in the industry and the "market" in Russia. In fact, the 
collapse of the command economy has not delivered anything close to competitive 
open markets. On the supply side, the "retreat" by the State had meant partly a mere 
change of the legal status under which former state agencies operated, partly the 
entry of new subjects like banks, investment funds and trade intermediaries. The lack 
of funds limits the choice of suppliers, strengthening the position of these subjects. 
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These companies pursued a rent-seeking strategy aimed at maintaining their 
monopolistic position instead of fostering investments and business-oriented 
res tructuri n g. 
On the demand side, the positioning of the enterprises was equally weak. With 
shrinking orders from the State, textile industries were supposed, as any other 
consumer-oriented industry, to be led by mass consumption. Again like the other 
consumer goods manufacturers, they found themselves overtaken by foreign 
competitors. Many industries were forced to look at exports of cheap commodities as 
the vital source of revenues, while their market share at home was at stake. As a 
result these enterprises were operated in survival mode with no chances to survive in 
the long term. _ 
The 1998 crisis and latest developments 
Production trends partly reflect this difficult situation. By 1996 fabric output had 
fallen to 1,401 million square meters, down from around 2000 million in 19943°. A 
further slump was suffered in 1998 under the effect of the economic crisis. Since 
then, though, production has recovered and stabilised at levels above those of 1994. 
Partly this is the result of the buoyant trend guaranteed by the cheap rouble cutting 
down imports, and boosting exports and local consumption. Partly these results have 
to be ascribed to changes in production characteristics and industry structure not 
always of a positive nature. 
In terms of output assortment, recent years have seen a growth in the share of cotton 
fabrics amounting to almost 78% of the whole fabric output in 2001 (Goskomstat 
30 Data source: Gain Report #RS2013, 2002; 
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data). These goods were of declining quality, i.e. 'getting thinner', and within this 
category gauze-type fabrics are still prevalent. 
The Ivanovo region with its 1235 million square meters produced already in 2000 is 
'only' 34% below the 1990 annual output total and has acquired a share of 67.8% of 
the total Russian output. Reports indicate that most mills in the region, around 80%, 
are still unprofitable, burdened with social costs and equipped with outdated 
machinery.31 A major obstacle to restructuring is the dominance of traders and 
intermediaries. It is calculated that 90% of textile output is produced under 'tolling' 
or 'processing-only,32 agreements, which stifles manufacturers' revenues and 
decision-making powers. 
The future of the Region is clouded also by the fact that its low level of economic 
diversification offers little prospective for alternative development paths (see Keune, 
1996). 
The social and political situation offers an equally bleak picture. High levels of real 
unemployment, the lowest income in European Russia and high levels of criminal 
activity are jus,t indicators of a generalised social decline. 
31 Data source: Gain Report #RS0026, 2000, p. 4; 
32 The termination of barter arrangements with Uzbekistan, which lasted into the late 1990's, 
resulted in the domination of "for processing only" or "tolling" imports, an arrangement 
where the raw cotton and the finished products remain the property of the raw material 
suppliers and mills are merely paid for processing ... Although tolling lowers costs by 
allowing imports to enter free of duty and value-added tax and removes the need for Russian 
mills to buy cotton with hard currency, it also removes a mill's decision-making power over 
production and marketing and blocks the development of a recovery strategy which could 
attract investment (Gain Report #RS0026, 2000, p. 3-4). 
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Case Study Background: The Upper Volga Textile Combine 
The Upper Volga Textile Combine is an integrated cotton-processing enterprise. It is 
located in a company town in the crisis-ridden Ivanovo region that is dominated by 
the textile ind~stry. The enterprise is the only employer in the locality.33 The 
factory's main products include gauze and cotton fabrics for kitchen and bed linen 
production. The company has developed a profitable export business since the late 
1980s, amounting to 5-10% of its output. The bulk of production was used for barter 
with suppliers. The enterprise used to run the bulk of the company town's social 
services. Although this responsibility has been downsized, it remains a heavy 
financial burden. 
The organisational chart of the enterprise corresponds to a simple functional model 
(Lipsic', 2000).34 The director, the chief engineer, and the main functional officers at 
the top constitute the administration (AKhO). Directly subordinated to the chief 
engineer, production is divided into four units: spinning, weaving, finishing, and a 
large maintenance section. Each production department maintains its accounting, 
wages, and labour offices. Departments are headed by a chief production manager, 
below whom are the shop managers. Equally important are cadre workers (foremen 
33 The Expert Institute selected' the company town as representative of industrial decline in 
Russian company towns. The town is characterised by shrinking population. high 
unemployment, low economic diversification. and underdevelopment of the service sector. 
Together. these conditions have resulted in social pessimism and overall economic 
depression (Lipsic' • 2000). 
34 Data and analyses pertaining to the organisation of the enterprise were found in the reports 
of consulting firms which advised the enterprise; these were the Italian CAST (Milan) and 
the Russian Expert Institute (Ekspertnyj Institut, Moscow). 
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and brigade leaders), who have disciplinary and organisational powers.3S Although 
formally the organisation is highly centralised, in practice it is decentralised and 
there is little standardisation of procedures. Power remains strongly personalised. 
At the top, the executive director and the chief engineer hold decision-making 
powers on all strategic issues. They also have the last word on most petty questions -
including individual cases of hiring, firing, holidays, and so on. The functional 
departments (in particular the personnel, and the labour and wage departments) are 
understaffed and under-qualified. They serve as mere transmission belts along the 
hierarchy. The chiefs of production are in charge of overall production planning and 
budgeting for their units. However, it is in the shops, and between shop chiefs and 
cadre workers, that decisions relevant to workers are made. Hiring and firing 
decisions, disciplinary matters, and performance assessments are first made at this 
level, which are then moved upward for approval. Production managers are the 
backbone of the managerial structure. They form a parochial defence of their units' 
interests against the demands of the administration. Privatisation has not substantially 
modified this organisational hierarchy and decision-making process. 
Currently, the workforce stands at 3,000, down from the 5,000 employees of a 
decade ago.36'.Two-thirds of the workforce is concentrated in the main shops and is 
I 
predominantly female (e.g. Bowers, 1996; Rossman, 1997)?7 The main shops are 
3S Shop managers and cadre workers will here be collectively referred to as line managers, 
the direct representatives of managerial authority in the shops. 
36 The town population was 12,400 in 1997, and declining. Working age population was 
6,400, with official unemployment standing at 508 (Lipsic', 2000). 
37 The position of machine operator in manufacturing is generally a well-paid male 
profession in Russia. In textiles, though, the operation of looms is left to women workers. 
This probably draws on traditional gender segregation, but also reflects the (allegedly) 
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staffed by female machine operators, and male mechanics and auxiliary workers.38 
The Soviet-time wage system has hardly been touched. Workers are paid by piece-
rate plus bonus, while ITR and auxiliaries are paid by time-rate plus bonus (Kirsch, 
1972). Wages vary considerably between, and within, work categories and (covertly) 
by gender. Shop chiefs manage the pay system in a discretionary manner so as to 
augment their leverage on workers, though lamenting the overall abysmally low level 
of pay (Morrison, 2003). 
The company was formally privatised in 1993, but remained in the hands of its 
Soviet-time Director and his close aides. Declining revenues and growing costs were 
countered by stressing output volume. While maintaining enterprise paternalism, the 
management tried to tighten diSCipline and increase workloads. Mounting economic 
and social difficulties presented a window of opportunity in 1998-1999 for a hostile 
take-over by an industrial-financial group pursuing an aggressive acquisition policy 
in the region.39 These new owners have worked hard to foster tighter production and 
feminine skills matching the job requirements, such as manual dexterity. Jobs which require 
greater acquaintance with machinery and involve heavy or dangerous working conditions are 
assigned to men. Similarly, managers and specialists are invariably male, while women fill 
clerical and low status positions (see Bowers, 1996; Rossman, 1997). 
38 The Soviets had a liking for meticulous worker classifications. This was originally 
justified on the basis of adhering to the Taylor system of scientific organisation. Later it was 
used to fragment and divide workers. White-collar personnel were sub-classified as ITR, 
engineering, and technical personnel (including managers, but excluding clerks). Blue-collar 
personnel were classified between main production workers, who operate core business 
technology, and auxiliaries (such as loaders, cleaners, and maintenance workers). 
39 The outside company, TMS - itself a subsidiary of a financiaVindustrial group - entered 
into business with the case-study enterprise as its supplier. In 1998-1999, TMS managed to 
acquire considerable influence over its operation through the so-called daval'cheskaya 
skhema arrangement (commission-based production scheme), which entails a well-known 
Russian strategy of acquiring a company. It consists of business interests imposing high 
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financial discipline, but they have been cautious not to undermine the basis of shop 
managers' informal control. 
input prices and low revenues on a target enterprise by means of the monopolistic control of 
the enterprise's sales and supply channels .. TMS forced the case-study enterprise into 
bankruptcy and, though still under a temporary administrator (konkursnyi zaveduyuschii), 
installed its people and dictated its policy. Currently, the enterprise is waiting to be auctioned 
off, but TMS prefers to prolong bankruptcy procedures for fiscal advantages and as a means 
to intimidate the workforce. 
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5. Structures and Strategies in Transition: A decade 
of Management and Managers at the case-study 
enterprise 
In this chapter we introduce our analysis of the case study with an overview of the 
firm's structure and strategies in the 1990s. The enterprise has been subjected to 
detailed reviews by business analysts who have highlighted the shortcomings of its 
organisational features and presented recommendations on how better to meet 
forthcoming challenges. The main point resulting from these reports was the 
anachronistic permanence of most soviet-time features in its structures and its 
passive adaptation to changes in the external environment. In the theoretical chapter 
we argued that the enterprise can be analysed as a complex economic, technical and 
social institution, which struggles to survive by matching internal resources with 
external chall~nges. This approach is put to work through the analysis of the real 
power structure and its interaction with the market and institutions in order to find a 
, 
rationale beh:ind managerial behaviour. The overview of the corporate and 
organisational structur~ is aimed at presenting the relative weight of the various 
layers and functions of management, in particular the overwhelming role of the 
director and production managers in relation to functional organs and of social 
concerns over financial soundness. Following Fligstein' s example, this permits us to 
understand the constraints that this over-centralised organisation, with its production-
oriented and populist managerial culture, poses to change in general and to market-
oriented change in particular. 
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From privatisation in 1993 to bankruptcy in 1998, the enterprise tried different 
strategies to settle in to the market, from soviet-style expansion to downsizing and 
from barter to export deals. The exploration of these actions demonstrates that the 
slow pace of change and the ultimate failure to sustain an autonomous existence were 
not simply due to managerial conservatism or entrenchment. The interaction with an 
external economic and institutional environment appears actually to have nurtured 
the most cautious attitudes while acting as· a powerful restraint on managers 
themselves in the pursuit of alternatives. Eventually, the position of the enterprise 
under temporary administration is analysed in order to ascertain the opportunities and 
limitations offered by outside ownership in fostering the effective reorganisation of 
management and the business. With outside ownership, transition as a struggle for 
survival comes to an end, as the parent company insulates the combine from the 
immediacy of external threats. Problems are now internalised into the conflictual 
dynamics between the new owner and combine management. The outsiders' 
restructuring strategy reveals ambiguities and contradictions as they attempt to 
subordinate enterprise management without modifying its key features from 
bureaucratic. centralism, and actual decentralisation, to paternalistic industrial 
relations: Thi;; leads to the detection of, yet unexplored, powerful internal constraints, 
, 
introducing the analysis of production management and labour relations on the shop 
floor as the major determining factor in the settlement of restructuring issues, which 
is the object of the next two chapters. 
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Organisation, Ownership and Control: formal structures and real 
powers 
The corporate and organisational structure of a firm can be analysed in order to 
provide an understanding of the relative efficiency of these arrangements. The 
analyses of the organisational structures and forms of ownership prevailing in Russia 
during transition, which have been made available by mainstream transition 
literature, have mainly focused on indicating their shortcomings by measuring their 
departure from established western models. In the next sections, an attempt is made 
to understand the internal logic, stemming both from historical and contextual 
elements, of these arrangements and, hence, the reason for (limited) change and 
(overwhelming) continuity. The ownership issue and the governance structure are 
treated first, followed by a detailed account of the organisational structure. The 
conclusion will try to grasp the major characteristics and changes in the 
organisational features of the enterprise until bankruptcy. 
Ownership and control: an employee-owned managerially controlled enterprise 
In 1993 the enterprise was transformed into a joint stock company. The privatisation 
was carried o~t according to the second option, which allowed employees to hold an 
I 
absolute majority stake in the new company. Procedures and ownership structure, 
including behind-the-scenes dealings, were confided to us by a key informant: 
Privatisation started with the establishment of the "people's" (narodnogo) 
enterprise. The labour collective is granted around 50% of stocks. From such 
a stake no individual could hold more than 2.5% of the stocks. The 
remaining shares were divided up among physical and legal holders by 
respectively 26% and 24%. 
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The former consists of pensioners and citizens of the company town while 
among the latter figure the largest stakeholders. The largest individual stake 
of 10% was left, according to the law, in state hands. The second largest 
stakeholder, 8% of shares, was (formally) another enterprise, a major 
supplier of the combine. In fact it was controlled by the general director by 
means of a behind-the-scenes interlocking agreement among the directors 
[of the two enterprises]. Considering that state property played no active role 
in decision-making, its part of the shares was controlled by the director too. 
(Interview with the Head of the weaving department, December 2000) 
Table 5.1 Share Distribution 
Typology of shareholders Number of shareholders % 
Labour Collecti ve 2955 49,87 
Physical Persons 2023 26,05 
Legal Persons 5 24,08 
Further episodic evidence suggests that top management increased its stake in the 
company by', acquiring shares in the secondary market. In particular, the Chief 
I 
engineer claimed to have devoted a then-substantial sum to the purchase of enterprise 
stocks. 
The way privatisation was carried out meant that top management in" general, and the 
director in particular, had, both formally and practically, absolute control over the 
new decision-making body of the enterprise. The coincidence between corporate and 
managerial structures meant that ownership became a function of managerial control 
and its organs conducted a shadowy existence, mirroring the dynamics in the 
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enterprise managerial power structure. The enterprise survived as an independent 
company for a relatively short period of time;. with bankruptcy in 1998 a new 
administration and a new owner came forward. During this time managers maintain 
that the role of corporate institutions added little to the running of the enterprise. The 
director as a result of the above-referred settlements dominated the board. As for the 
representation of. rank-and-file shareholders, the elections brought about mostly 
production cadres, supportive of the director, as representatives of the mass of 
workers and clerks. Therefore, meetings and reports to the board turned into empty 
rituals, something of a repetition of the sort of manipulation observed directly on 
similar occasions, such as the trade union congress or labour collective conferences. 
Reactions to privatisation and the establishment of an independent company differed 
Significantly between managers and workers. The Head of weaving, who later sat on 
the board, recalled how 'privatisation produced at first an euphoric sentiment of 
freedom [euforia svobody] and a sense of proprietorship in the labour collective' 
(Ibid.). For workers though, the whole affair, the constitution of the company, the 
distribution of stocks, the proceedings of the board and so on, was just 'a matter of 
managers', something from which they expected results but felt at the same time 
excluded. This reaction was sparked by a perceived sense of continuity with the past, 
the idea that nothing fundamental had changed for employees. There was also 
widespread uncertainty about the real long-term intentions of those in Moscow. For 
several years myths proliferated about the possibility of a complete reversal of the 
reforms. Later, in the mid-1990s, the steady deterioration of living standards, 
contrary to the expectations raised by democratic propaganda, fuelled doubts and 
suspicions about reforms among the rank-and-file, nurturing dismissive attitudes 
toward the rights and obligations of shareholders and private property in general. For 
147 
Claudio Morrison: Soviet Management and Transition PhD thesis June 2004 
top management, independence meant the widening of the areas where decision-
making at enterprise level were not constrained. From their point of view, 
privatisation appeared less a watershed change than a good point struck in a long-
tenn struggle for independence. In fact, they felt that the increasing autonomy gained 
during perestroika was still challenged by political attempts at petty tutelage, 
questioning the fonnal acceptance of free entrepreneurship and private property. 
Moreover, powerful threats were posed by the growing power of suppliers and 
intennediaries, which made the market appear nothing else than a new battleground 
for the power struggle of this provincial company town with the "Muscovites". 
Therefore, to fully understand the emergence of such a fonn of corporate governance 
requires turning attention to managerial structures and strategies analysed in the 
following sections. 
Organisational structure and managerial power in the 1990s: a business analysis 
The organisational structure of the enterprise saw a relentless reshuffling of 
positions, departments and sub-units over the decade, without any significant change 
of its main features. When it was thoroughly scrutinised by management consultants 
, 
in 1997 and 2000, both. concluded that soviet features had largely survived and 
• 
advised substantial 'market-oriented' revisions. Findings from fieldwork allow us to 
supplement these business analyses with greater knowledge about the role and the 
functioning of individual departments and to achieve an understanding of the internal 
power structure. The fonnal analysis is presented first, highlighting the main features 
of a soviet-type organisation as opposed to western standards. Another section will 
follow, trying to present and explain its internal dynamics and unveiling some of the 
constraints to the changes advocated by consultants. 
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Looking at the organisational chart, as it was in 1997, we can see that the enterprise 
presents a structure of a functional type with some significant variations. The 
organisation is highly centralised, with a large number of units and individual 
positions directly subordinated to the general director (GO) and the chief engineer 
(CE). According to soviet nomenclature, the structure can be divided into two 
different functional elements. The superior part of the structure, containing top 
management and central offices (glavnye kontory) was referred to as AKhO, the 
administrative-economic section (administrativno-kholJlajstvennyi otdel). This was 
intended as a service structure of a bureaucratic type, performing control functions 
and handling the information flow between the planning organs and the director, on 
the one side, and production, on the other. Subordinated to the CE, there are three 
separate production departments (proizvodstva), spinning, weaving and finishing, 
plus a large maintenance and repair unit. Other operative departments like 
construction and transport, agriculture and social services are all assigned to 
director's deputies. Work among departments is divided alongside stages of the 
production process; shops are organised as sections of the production process, each 
of them containing a stage of the chain, irrespective of product lines or market 
destination. J?roduction management is distributed on three layers: the Head of 
, 
production with budgeting and planning responsibilities, the shop chief and the 
foreman. Production and maintenance have their own administrative and technical 
offices subordinated to the head of department but operating in accordance with 
specifications of their respective functional main department. 
The first consultant studying the enterprise internal organisation found that this was 
set consistently with no alteration of the previous soviet establishment. Their 
criticism and subsequent recommendations focused on two points. Firstly, they 
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argued, the functional model was inadequate given the scale of production and the 
large range of products dealt with by the enterprise. At the same time, managerial 
organisation was bureaucratic and there was no relation between formally appointed 
positions and real jobs. Furthermore, sales and accounting functions were little taken 
into consideration. Marketing and design functions were non-existent and 
commercial activities concentrated on barter rather than developing market sales, 
pricing and competitors' analysis. 
As for the Accounting Department, the western understanding of this function is, 
generally speaking, one of careful analysis of costs and margins in order to determine 
the contribution of each production line and service to overall costs and profits of the 
enterprise. It allows the assessment of resources and the potential of productive 
assets and determining which are the areas deserving development and which are 
those to restructure or close down. The staff in place in the Accounting Dept. was not 
meant to perform these tasks, hence was in no condition to do so. They were mere 
bookkeepers, registering data provided from other departments. As a result, the 
enterprise, which faced bleak financial conditions, was unable to implement a 
thoughtful cost-cutting policy . 
• The lack of a,proper sales and marketing department was identified as another major 
. 
obstacle to successfully operating in a market economy. The existing commercial 
department was peripheral to the command chain and had no authority on price 
policy, design and development activities. Again none of these functions was 
performed by, nor was in the capacity of, the present staff of the commercial 
department at the Combine. 
Consequently, the enterprise was advised to decentralise and divisionalise its core 
business organisation. In order to shift the focus from production to customer and, 
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therefore, the managers' ultimate goal from physical to economic targets, it was 
recommended to establish and improve the operations of the above-referred 
departments and to strictly co-ordinate manufacturing operations with marketing. 
The general response of the enterprise to western recommendations will be treated as 
part of the overall restructuring strategy in the next section. Here it will suffice to 
consider the fate of the new marketing and design offices, whose establishment was 
the only one of the consultants' proposals that enterprise management seemed to 
meet with enthusiasm. 
The appointment of a designer, in itself a sign of willingness to change, was 
obviously not meant to produce a great change on its own. Unfortunately, like 
marketing, it was simply added to the existing structure and did not represent a first 
step toward thorough organisational reform. The problems that arose from its 
functioning are in any case a good indicator of the difficulty of moving away from 
production-oriented management. Design, as part of product development, appeared 
to be a function of the CE, to whom the office was subordinated. The enterprise had 
been assigned a design advisor as a member of the foreign consulting team; her 
arguments with the CE provide a clear picture of the problem. All the time the issue 
of new prod~cts was discussed it seemed that they failed to reach an agreement 
I 
because the main concern of the production manager was with technical feasibility 
rather than consumer appeal. In fact, the advisor used to lament that these engineers, 
as consumers, were quite ready to appreciate imported textiles but not equally prone 
to manufacture similar cloths as producers. In this latter case, their choice was driven 
by the desire to put technologies available to good use, irrespective of the end result. 
As for the marketing department, it had a good start but was never allowed to make 
its own policy, let alone interfere with production plans. Several young graduates 
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were recruited, headed by a young and ambitious economist. They initially dedicated 
themselves to market research, participation in fairs and experimenting with new 
technologies. Soon, though, it became clear that this new department was not to 
assume a strategic role and its chief preferred to move to the more traditional but also 
more advantageous procurement office where, it was alleged, he managed to satisfy 
the needs of production much less than his own. A private report to the new owners 
by our key informant so described the situation with marketing in 2001: 
A few words about marketing. Currently, at our enterprise, the marketing 
department performs essentially sales functions. Timid attempts to realise 
marketing activities are carried out without considering production 
requirements, volumes or competitiveness. Such an approach was typical of 
marketing [as it used to be in the West, C. M.J at the beginning of the 1980s. 
In reality, we began to do marketing from the basics and we should get in 
touch with the latest trends in the business: production analysis, costs and 
production volume, study of the difference between earnings and variable 
costs (profit margin), costs, prices, [competitive, C. M.J advantage. [ ... J. 
These a,nalyses are not carried out at all. (Nikolaj A. Internal Report to TMS, 
2001) 
, 
In 2000 a Russian research institute conducted another comprehensive investigation 
at the Combine (Lipsic', 2000, p. 75-79). While praising management for its attempts 
to renovate production and find new markets, they found that the situation with 
organisation and personnel qualifications revealed widespread inefficiencies. In 
particular, they pointed out that internal organisation and decision-making processes 
were unreformed and the strategic marketing and finance departments were 'weak'. 
Management suffered from excessive centralisation and bureaucracy. There had been 
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no transfer of powers to lower managerial layers, which forced senior management to 
deal with petty issues and waste their time on purely administrative tasks. Decisions 
required the approval of all units, which meant that decision-making was slow and 
production burdened with bureaucratic controls. They drew the following picture of 
the way financial issues were handled almost a decade after privatisation: 
Financial accounts were predisposed essentially for fiscal and administrative 
control purposes; data processing was developing very slowly; management 
lacked a timely and useful flow of information; qualification of employees 
was very deficient ... financial documentation was still hand-written ... there 
was no satisfactory financial planning. The organisational structure of 
financial services was inefficient. All enterprises presented the following 
units: planning, finance and accounting. The activity of these units was 
uncoordinated and often they did very much the same things. (Ibid., pp. 75-
76) 
The picture, here roughly detailed, delivered by business analyses, which inspires a 
great part of the literature on restructuring and transition, highlights the evident 
. 
continuity with the past displayed by the enterprise and the consequent inability of 
the latter to face the allegedly emerging market. This outcome might lead us to 
, 
I 
consider this case as the end-result of managerial conservatism and Russian lingering 
backwardness. 
Yet, research experience in the field has proved that a conventional analysis can 
provide only a partial account of organisational issues. This literature, in fact, 
invariably retains the assumption of the full comparability of managerial positions 
and structures relying on the assumption that superficial similarities might account 
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for identity of functions and aims and therefore regards Russian enterprise 
organisation as simply a backward duplicate of its western equivalents. 
To highlight the peculiar configuration of a post-soviet organisation and to unveil the 
constraints which led restructuring on an unexpected path requires an account of 
managerial practices and informal relations within the factory and with the 
surrounding environment, which are the object of the next two sections. 
Organisational structure and managerial power in the 1990s: a still-soviet 
enterprise 
In this section some general features of the enterprise organisation are presented, 
representing a substantive difference between western and soviet management. 
Despite the inevitable similarities with already well-documented· soviet-time 
practices, these have been elaborated by drawing on the experience of both Russian 
managers and foreign consultants involved in post-privatisation restructuring. They 
were generally understood and referred to as the main causes of misinterpretation of 
enterprise problems as well as barriers to the introduction of western managerial 
techniques. 
First, the system is deeply imbued with a strong hierarchical sense, which means that 
• 
those higher ih the hierarchy, starting with the director and the chief engineer down 
to lesser production managers, count more than could be expected from just looking 
at the organisational chart. The uncertain scenario opened by privatisation reinforced 
the attitude of passive reliance on higher-standing figures. 
Verticalisation is strictly interwoven with personalisation. Managerial jobs cannot be 
understood just in terms of abstract functional roles but should be referred to 
considering the role of individuals and their power in the hierarchy. This is why, as 
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emerged during the drafting of the organisational chart, there are not departments to 
which individual positions are attached but, on the contrary, individual posts 
presiding over functions. 
The focus on individuals also means that managers suffer from high exposure in case 
of failure and are therefore reluctant to take on new functions without guarantees of 
additional resources. Since access to resources in the enterprise is made dependent on 
bargaining powers and status, previously marginal departments are the less prone to 
accept new responsibilities. This is even more the case in a situation in which 
growing scarcity is making inter-departmental co-operation less stable and harder to . 
achieve. 
High centralisation in decision-making is compensated by a de Jacto decentralisation 
of real management, due precisely to natural limits of the personalised forms of 
exertion of power and to weak informational support by. functional departments. 
Consequently, a "large gap exists between formal and informal practices and roles. 
Technological decay, uneven production pace and normative uncertainties widened 
. this di vide by forcing managers to look for easy fixes and compromises, which 
, 
reinforced the lack of initiative referred to above, at least in the conventional 
, 
understanding of the term. 
, 
Furthermore, managers themselves have to rely greatly on workers' co-operation and 
support. The continued drive for higher output volume and the use of the piece-rate 
incentive system reflect and strengthen this situation, preventing any attempt to 
standardise and regularise the production process. 
Eventually, we should keep in mind that a soviet enterprise was, first and foremost, a 
productive unit and its privatised successor has retained this feature. In fact, the 
downfall of the command economy, rather than boosting new market-related 
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functions, has even increased difficulties in the shops, making technically skilled 
managers with responsibilities in production the backbone of the managerial power 
structure. 
This early analysis provides some evidence in favour of the relevance of the soviet 
legacy on enterprise behaviour, suggesting that such features make this organisation 
qualitatively very different from its western equivalents. Further investigation of the 
functioning of the command chain and the characteristics of managerial work right 
after transition help substantiate this argument and unveil its consequences for 
restructuring. 
Management in transition: managerialfunctions and hierarchical power 
The organisational structure of the enterprise appears as a pyramid hinged on the 
person of the Director. Looking at this figure is the best starting point for an in-depth 
analysis of its character and mode of operation. Literature on 'red directors' has long 
made clear that the nature and extension of their authority went beyond the formal 
attributes assigned to this institution. The Director was not simply the all-powerful 
head of an organisation but also the leader of a community, the 'little father' to 
whom any of its members could tum, expecting a fair and benign intervention. Direct 
observation of the exercise of directorial powers confirms that the autocratic and 
paternalistic character of the organisation had remained intact at least until 1998-
1999. On this issue a foreign senior management consultant during an interview 
commented thus: 
The structure was certainly very hierarchical, whatever the question at issue 
it was the General Director who had the last word. We can define it as a 
managerial firm with centralisation of decision-making - one of the kind 
that could be found in a Southern European family business as opposed to 
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the impersonal management of the Anglo-Saxon model - and decentralised 
running of daily business. The "lsI of May", for instance, is more of an 
entrepreneurial firm with all the powers wielded by its director-businessman 
(Interview with L. F., management consultant; 1999) 
In functional terms the OD was the only decision-maker in all strategic issues. There 
was no aspect of enterprise activity that he would not concern himself with and 
decide personally (Schelkov and Antonov, 1998). During numerous meetings held in 
1997 in which I took part or I had direct notice of, his presence was constantly 
required when a decision had to be taken, whether it was about the terms and 
conditions of a sales contract, the discussion of investment plans or bargaining with 
local authorities concerning the transfer of social assets. Conversely, functional 
managers, particularly from the commercial department, were more often than not 
absent. A cross-analysis with interviews of top management executives proves that 
there were no staff personnel who could collectively or individually possess the 
knowledge and the skills to contribute significantly to the decision-making process at 
this level. The CE instead played a significant support role, partly because he was in 
. 
charge of the daily management of the production complex, partly because technical 
aspects were still the decisive parameters in every enterprise venture. It is indicative 
of their marginality that neither staff executives nor the CE have posed particular 
problems to the newcomers and none of them has been targeted for demotion or 
dismissal. 
In the bureaucratic code of the enterprise the director was in .almost all cases the only 
subject who could validate an internal order. Furthermore, he was the ultimate 
authority who could settle a dispute or meet a claim in the final instance. Normally, 
in cases of hiring and firing or disciplinary issues involving workers as well as in 
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cases of conflict among managers, it was the role of the second line in the 
hierarchical scale to intervene and to provide all the elements for a decision.· Then 
again, obtaining the signature of the director was always advisable, as my 
'gatekeeper' taught me as soon as I started my fieldwork;4o 
Once again running into the snow from the factory to the administration 
building, Nikita and I, papers in hand to get a Director's stamp. And I cannot 
restrain myself from asking him again what's so important about it. He 
replies - to have a signature from the Director is a guarantee that no one will 
challenge us. Anybody else's is just paper but with the Director's it is 
different, they have to take it seriously. This is the way you do things here. 
Significantly, when a complaint came to him he used to deal with it personally, there 
was no secretarial staff or representative in between him and the other party, as one 
would normally expect of top executives in western business enterprises. This 
function, though secondary as compared with real decision-making powers, was a 
fundamental source of prestige and authority. Operating through direct and personal 
contact without mediation was practically inefficient, as it overloaded management 
with dealing with petty issues, but symbolically was of enormous potential. The 
director's aut~ority was also a source of legitimacy for lower managerial layers and, 
I 
while it obviously limited their autonomy, it relieved them from taking full 
responsibility for their decisions. 
A third and consequential aspect of the director's role was the strictly interrelated 
function of le<),der of the labour collective and benefactor of its larger working 
40 A detailed record of my first encounter with the Director, representing a significant 
example of the form in which he exercised his power, is presented in the methodology 
section. 
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community. The analysis of this aspect will be carried out in the following section on 
strategies for its significant policy implications. Here it suffices to report how he 
liked to be presented to the public in official publications: 
Interviewer: 'You won't find anyone more popular than Ivan Ivanov [the 
General Director, C. M] in town ... everyone from workers to pensioners, 
from single mothers to the young have words of gratitude for Him. ... The 
town is sincerely grateful to Ivan Ivanov for, in the most difficult years for 
his enterprise, he did not leave the town to stand on its own - says the Head 
of the city administration.' (Schelkov and Antonov, 1998, pp. 57-69) 
Management in transition: scale and scope of managerial work 
In the previous sections it has been strongly underlined that one of the main 
shortcomings of the enterprise organisation was the excessive centralisation of 
decision-making. This refers implicitly to the scale of managerial powers 
(polnomochie) or the amount and relevance of issues decided by the highest 
enterprise authorities. 
Managerial . powers, though, presented another dimension, namely its scope 
(krugozor) , no less rich in implications. The scope of managerial authority is to be 
, 
understood as: the horizontal extension of their powers, within the sphere of action of 
enterprise activities. So, the GD's influence could legitimately extend within the 
region and beyond, stretching down to Moscow. The CE was allowed to operate at 
enterprise level with the right to intervene on issues concerning clients/competitors. 
The Heads of production departments were constrained within the section of the 
production process assigned to them and so it was for lower managerial layers. This 
information, provided by a production manager, the key informant N. A., confirms 
that non-production executives were not considered part of the command chain, 
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suggesting that the problem with their work is less one of competence and 
qualifications than a more serious one of status and authority. Relevant implications 
were also raised by the informant about the general efficiency of this form of 
organisation, particularly in relation to the co-operation among departments. 
In fact, as he explained, organisational reforms specific to the enterprise had already 
been attempted without success far before privatisation. In 1985 the enterprise 
experimented with the introduction of production control (dispetcherizatsiya), aimed 
at achieving greater co-operation among subsections of the production line. A new 
managerial position was appointed, the dispatcher, who was supposed to guarantee 
horizontal co-ordination of activities, and therefore achieve a regular flow of 
production between shops working under different production chiefs. The idea had 
been drawn from Italian counterparts and was inspired by the Japanese kamban 
system of lean production. The reform failed to achieve the expected results and the 
position was scrapped a year later. This happened, in the opinion of the informant, 
for a twofold set of reasons. First, the rigidly compartmentalised hierarchical 
structure was left unchanged. The dispatcher, placed in the shops, was in permanent 
, 
conflict with higher-ranking managers who paralysed his action beyond shop and 
departmental' boundaries. Secondly, these people did not receive 'managerial 
education' and had no 'managerial culture'; i.e. 'they did not take decisions'. 
Therefore the profound gulf between responsible and pro-active management and the 
reality of the limited scale and scope of the job with which managers of intermediate 
layers had to confront represents another, more serious than expected, barrier to 
change. 
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Management in transition: assessing and rewarding managerial work 
The permanence of a highly hierarchical and compartmentalised structure well after 
privatisation did not stimulate a rethinking of managerial work and therefore a 
reform of the job profiles and incentive system. At the same time, the new problems 
produced by privatisation led enterprise top management to intervene in the control 
system so as to regain efficiency. This resulted in a somewhat contradictory outcome 
where lower managerial layers felt oppressed by a cumbersome organisation while 
top management complained of continuous attempts by subordinates to avoid 
responsibilities and conceal failure. The continuous remoulding of the control 
mechanisms (organizatsiya upravleniya) was so described by our major key 
informant: 
For the last decade, a great number of managerial organisational models 
have been experimented with: repressive with ritual subordination to the 
leader [s podchineniem komanduyuschemu paradom]; bureaucratic 
[byurokraticheskaya] with lots of stamps, papers and signatures; imitative 
[ucheni,cheskaya] with duplication of alien models; informal [smazochnaya] 
with the cancellation of reciprocal claims. Presently, all of these models' can 
be fouhd to a certain degree at the enterprise. The managerial structure in my 
, 
I 
view is cumbersome and unmanageable. There is no trust of subordinates 
toward superiors. (N. A. Internal Report to TMS, 2001) 
The analysis of findings from observation and interviews with production managers 
reveals the inadequacies of the mechanism of evaluation and stimulation of 
managerial work and the increased gap between formal requirements and actual 
practices it produced. 
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The enterprise has retained, for the entire period considered in this study, all the key 
features of the payment and incentive system existing in soviet times.41 Under such a 
system, managers, specialists and white-collar workers are entitled to a monthly 
wage consisting of an hourly pay plus a considerable bonus, which could amount to 
up t~ 100% of the basic wage. The bonus is granted on the assumption that all tasks 
assigned to the manager have been successfully fulfilled. For as much as a wage 
system can be held responsible for results in managerial work, a system based on 
bonuses for individual task fulfilment, in an environment leaving little room for 
horizontal co-operation, would rather foster the insurgence of parochial interest~ and 
the pursuit of the bonus at every cost. This had been very much the case in soviet 
times, especially with production managers, whose only real goal was output quotas 
in physical terms. 
The enterprise kept output volumes as the only target for managers until the year 
2000. The setting of targets by top management and the provision of resources 
available to managers in the shops had been changing, especially in the second half 
of the 1990s, making it difficult for the latter to achieve results and for the former to 
ascertain responsibilities. Managers first voiced to me their arguments about the 
dysfunctions 'of the managerial system during a routine meeting, held in December 
2000, between the Head of the weaving factory and one of his shop chiefs. My 
fieldwork notes report: 
41 The payment system is treated comprehensively, for all employees, in a separate chapter. 
Firstly, because, retaining the soviet-time framework, managers were formally considered 
simply another category of employee. Secondly. the administration maintained a unitary 
approach to wage issues. Thirdly, differentials in money wages were not altered and, despite 
preferential treatment, cadres with managerial functions did not gain the status of a superior, 
autonomous and well-defined category of employee. 
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(Head of factory) In relation to the incentive system, it is still based on 
bonuses, which are in any case considered part of the regular wage. There's 
been no change in the managerial system; i.e. no western-like model has 
been introduced. Managers (nachalniki) are judged on the basis of results -
output by metreage and index of plan fulfilment - there is some 
consideration of production costs and quality, the latter only for export. 
Assessment of results is the sole responsibility of superiors. Soviet-time 
practices have not changed, problems are not solved openly, rather it is 
common practice to resort to trickery. In this respect there's been some 
change. In the past, production peaks were met by the use of extra 
machinery. 
(Shop Chief) We had lots of looms working in an efficient state and spare 
parts were available in large quantities. Now most of these machines lie idle 
because of lack of spare parts and shortage of personnel produced by 
layoffs. Higher productivity is now achieved at the expense of quality and 
by extensive use of extra work because the labour cost is low. Consider that 
the relative weight of wage expenditures in production costs amounts to only 
5% of the total against 80% of raw materials and 15% of energy costs. The 
probleJll is that while production plans vary according to demand, output 
, 
volume is constrained into a narrow range by objective causes. 
(Head of factory) The only way to avoid reprimands by top management is 
to study and carefully report all information about capacity, costs and 
production trends. It is more difficult to attract criticism when you can prove 
what kind of problems you are facing. 
Top management has therefore continued to employ what was known in soviet-times 
as taut planning, the use of high, above capacity, targets in order to achieve the 
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maximum levei of utilisation of productive resources. Only now management could 
no longer rely on buffers between nominal capacity and assigned targets. Information 
on the state of the art in production continues to be the object of controversy as 
managers manipulate data in order to justify failures, while top management 
deliberately ignores the difficulties faced by subordinates. This makes it impossible 
to achieve trust and build the common knowledge necessary for careful planning and 
swift problem-solving. The aleatory character of planning and assessment and the 
dramatic shortage of resources mean that top management has to intervene with 
individual managers in a personal and discretionary manner in order to keep pressure 
high for results. This produces, though, competition for resources and intersectional 
conflicts among managers of intermediate layers and hinders the smooth operation of 
production and the efficient allocation of resources among 'factories'. The Head of 
the weaving department referred to this' in a written questionnaire concerning 
relations with top management, i.e. mainly the CE, and complementary departments: 
Particular attention has to be devoted to the securing of production supplies 
and to lobbying with the Director on behalf of the department.. .[Our main 
problems, C. M.J are among others: the acceptance of yam (claims for 
quality, type. weight and humidity of yam) [from the spinning department, 
, 
I 
C. M.J. Solutions are the following: filing claims; checking the adherence of 
claims to GOST [public legal standards, C.M.]; soliciting the Chief Engineer 
to punish spinning technicians for non-observance of quality standards. The 
same happens in dealing with the finishing department: just here our task 
consists in defending our department from the claims on the side of finishing 
(observance of quality standards and typology of fabrics). 
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Control and incentive systems were the object of continuous intervention by soviet 
planners in the struggle to achieve greater managerial initiative, and specifically 
higher attention to quality and costs. They usually proceeded with the introduction of . 
new targets tied to monetary incentives, relying on bureaucratic mechanisms for 
assessment. The conventional criticism of this approach held that the substantial 
inability to foster efficient management was due, among other things, to the absence 
of truly economic, i.e. financial, targets, which could provide subordinates with the 
only clear indicator for prioritising. targets and controllers with an equally 
manageable tool for evaluation. Under the old Director, there was no sign that staff 
management had acquired a greater role in providing an objective and impersonal 
control mechanism. On the other side, the urgencies of production led, in any case, 
personal relations between line managers along the hierarchy to prevail, transforming 
any new form of control into a ground for informal bargaining. The Head of the 
weaving department provides a comprehensive picture of the degradation of control 
mechanisms that occurred over the transition period: 
Since the end of Socialism there was no plan as such - rather it was merely 
contingent because lack of resources imposed flexibility. In three years I 
never 10st my bonus for failing to meet planned targets. We used a fine-
based system [sistema strafovaniya], i.e. bonus quotas were deducted from 
the wage for failing to carry out tasks. How is assessment carried out? 
Bargaining [torgovliya] , i.e. there are neither objective elements of 
evaluation nor an impartial function in charge of assessment It is up to the 
hierarchy to decide, with the last word in the hands of top management 
[vysshoe rukovodstvo]. It is therefore under these circumstances that, by 
means of relying on seniority and connections or using blackmail 
[shantazh] , one acquires protection from top managers. Every month we 
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work to fabricate justifications for the non-observance of some kind of 
instruction. Those rewarded are not the ones who produced more and better 
but those who manage to throw on someone else the responsibility for one's 
own failures. 
Management in transition: wage system, wage differentials and managerial status 
Retaining the soviet-time wage and incentive system implies also the preservation of 
soviet categories, which do not differentiate among white-collar employees in the 
same way that their western counterparts do. The Soviets recognised the role of 
officers with managerial functions, the cadres, which also included, though, blue-
collar workers such as foremen, supervisors and leaders. Yet, on the one side, there 
were executive posts, primarily among staff managers, which did not enjoy the 
powers and functions generally understood for senior management. On the other 
side, payroll categorisation was based on qualification rather than function so that 
managers (rukovoditeli) where included into a much larger group, ITR, comprising 
all qualified office personnel. The fact that no intervention has been attempted in this 
area has serious implications. A key informant so commented on this point in an 
internal report: 
It is impossible to decide personnel issues without a well-thought-out 
payment system. A year ago [2000, C. M.l different systems were 
considered, reforms started and from the beginning, in my view, we allowed 
a big mistake. For all activities, employees' categories, a single system for 
work assessment has been adopted. (N. A. Internal Report to TMS, 2001) 
If all white-collar employees operate formally under the same system, differences in 
status and actual power and responsibilities are reflected in significant wage 
differentials. So, as exemplified by a list of wages for top executives, managers 
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continue to be paid very differently. In particular, the low wages for many specialists 
and staff managers has fed the low consideration for these functions, diminishing 
their own self-esteem while preventing new recruits from entering these professions. 
Top management seems particularly preoccupied with keeping wage differentials 
unaltered. This policy, as we will see further on in greater detail, is inspired by the 
need to maintain the higher status of production managers and, more generally, the 
delicate social balance within the labour collective as a whole. The most significant 
fact that in any case inhibited an active wage policy since privatisation was the 
downward trend of the real value of take-home pay, which demoralised the entire 
managerial personnel and was responsible for a dramatic outflow of qualified 
. personnel, particularly from 1998 onwards. 
Managers staff and line: what do we need ITRfor? 
In the previous sections we have learned that the enterprise was governed almost 
single-handedly by the Director and his aides, that a thin line of production managers 
administered operations on his behalf, while staff management was quite marginal to 
decision-maki~g. Above-referred enterprise-level studies tell us at length about how 
bureaucratic the administrative machinery is at the enterprise and how badly 
equipped its Jl>ersonnel is in carrying out new, strategic, market-related activities. It 
remains to understand what these people are actually doing and why they have been 
left untouched for so long by the axe of restructuring. Some basic figures about their 
staffing levels, location within departments and relative wage costs, might help 
identify the consistency, role, status and problems posed by enterprise white-collar 
employees. 
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Table 5.2 Distribution of employees 
'·'·'·M . 
,,'. '. '"",' anagers .' " 
",1,." ':'/.. ,'q" . 
ITR,' ". i 
, . 
.,. " 
Auxiliaries " Total, '" 
. ',:' 
AKhO 59 145 15 219 
Production 
51 III 14 176 
Departments 
Tot. 110 256 29 395 
Number of non-productive employees at the Combine, 1997;42 
At the enterprise the number of "non-productive" forces amounted to around four 
hundred people, including managers (rukovoditeli), specialists (spetsialisty) and 
office workers (sluzhaschiya). Their absolute number might seem impressive, still if 
we consider their proportion43 relative to the overall workforce it is a mere 10% of 
the 3882 people officially employed by the enterprise in January 1997. 
Another noticeable fact is the high number of office and department chiefs, ranked 
managers in the table, while office workers as such were almost non-existent. This is 
42 These figure; are my own calculations from official enterprise data made available to me 
on behaif of the Consulting Firm operating an EU-sponsored restructuring program. The 
information was collected more or less formally at shop and office level with the help of N. 
A., who had be~n entrusted with providing support to the foreign consultants. 
43 Granick (1960, pp. 167-171), in a pioneering work on soviet management, noted that 'not 
only Russian plants have a lower proportion of administrative and clerical personnel than do 
Americans ... but the trend since 1940 has been downward'. The data shown in his work. in 
between 15 and 20%, indicate that. if this proportion remained unchanged, our enterprise 
fared quite well in saving on white-collar staff. On the other side, Russian plants were 
normally operating on a much larger. often below efficiency, scale which means that the 
lower proportion of white collar employees stands against an inflated workforce. This is 
more evident in the case of the textile sector where in capitalist economies. since the 1970s, 
large establishments were washed away by a tide of downsizing and outsourcing to smaller 
productive and service units. 
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because there were plenty of technical and planning offices monitoring every aspect 
of enterprise activity or piece of equipment. This also explains why, despite 
centralisation, there were almost as many bureaucrats in production as featured in 
central offices. 
The almost consensual anxiety that ITR was an· unbearable bureaucratic burden 
raised among managerial and workers' ranks alike can be better understood if we 
look at the wage costs that come with it. While accounting for only 10% of the 
workforce, the white-collar employees' wage fund44 amounted to one third of the 
manual workers' one; this is an exceptional figure in the view of the average soviet 
man and woman and certainly a huge financial burden for the enterprise. 
In order to understand the role and the fate of these people it should be noticed that 
their functions and earnings45 are quite diverse indeed. Managers proper, i.e. 
decision-makers, amount to a handful of deputy directors in the AKhO and around 
one-third of the white collar employees in production. The large mass of non-
productive forces are therefore staff managers, divided more or less equally between 
engineers and ;other science specialists, working in monitoring or maintenance and 
44 Wage costS in roubles per month for non-productive forces were 616,311,150 Rb 
o 
according to official enterprise data provided by the Labour and Wage office in May 1997. 
The wage fund of manual workers amounted to 1,880,819,799 Rb per month. The 
commercial exchange rate in the course of the year fluctuated in between 5000/6000 roubles 
for 1 $US (in June a Moscow branch of MostBank paid to non-residents 5750 Rb for 1 $US). 
4S A quick look at wage costs among departments yields the impression that production-
related services, and therefore technical specialists, fared much better than trade and 
financial units. In the AKhO, for example, the 32 strong staff of the Chief Engineer earned 
collectively about 50 million roubles while the same number in S&M totalled only around 32 
million. The engineering department, featuring mostly maintenance and repair works. 
achieved an even more substantial 78 million with 48 employees. Not surprisingly these are 
the shops and offices which experienced redundancies later in the 1990s. 
169 
Claudio Morrison: Soviet Management and Transition PhD thesis June 2004 
repair, and economics graduates employed as planners, accountants, trade specialists 
et cetera, but fundamentally controlling the conduct of production managers. 
As for technical specialists, there seems to be a consensus at least among production 
managers that they are essential to the good functioning of the enterprise as a 
complex technological system. As Anatolii Borisovich, then the chief mechanic of 
the weaving department, put it: 
You should understand that we need a large engineering department because 
unlike western enterprises we have to do most of the repair and 
reconstruction ourselves. I perfectly understand how people work in the 
West; if, let us say, a piece of equipment breaks down you pack it up and 
send it to the producer. But then again everything works smoothly up there, 
repair is not an everyday business, and in any case you have to make 
arrangements for this service and they do not come cheap. The printing 
machine we got from England was bought without guarantees and hardly 
any instruction. We had to adjust it to our systems and now it is only us who 
can deal with it. 
The autarchy imposed by the planned economy remains a necessity as scarcity 
continues to p,lague production, this time because of economic constraints. The point 
. 
was clearly made by the toolmaker of the carding shop regarding the need to repair 
damaged spare parts: 
In order to save money, they purchase sub-standard materials that then we 
have to rectify and so we lose in terms of quality. I will give you some 
examples: there is a spindle made of plastic, it breaks when it falls. We had 
to manufacture one of wood ourselves. This valve, the original is a metal 
cast; they say it is too expensive so we have to make it ourselves in plastic. 
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Still, while it was hard to find, the price was one and a half roubles, while 
our own one costs fifty roubles. 
This judgement might not be intended for all specialists and would not prevent 
extensive criticism by line managers of opportunism and amateurism in the work of 
auxiliary services. Shop-level managers and technicians often pointed out that 
because of 'not working for the plan' and 'being autonomous units', auxiliary 
services were less than diligent and reliable in carrying out their job. Yet, admittedly, 
unsatisfactory pay and lack of personnel did contribute to undermining the quality of 
their work. 
Here the problem is 'double subordination' (dvojnoe podchinenie), one of the basic 
arrangements of soviet economic organisation. It had been designed in soviet times 
to prevent line managers from spoiling resources to achieve the short-term goals of 
the plan and concealing information to avoid the blame of superiors. While 
presenting itself as a nuisance to production managers, and an anachronistic one after 
transition, this was and still is indeed a key . function of staff management.46 This 
system contin~es to operate insofar as the work of production managers has been left 
very much unchanged.47 Its contradictions though, at least within production, became 
46 The distinctive feature of soviet staff management as a control system and some of the 
problems related to the behaviour of its members are clearly delineated in Gregory (1989). 
The soviet economic. bureaucracy can be classified into two distinct categories: 
, Khozyaistvenniki (persons who do the actual resource allocation and are held responsible for 
results) and apparatchiki (persons who issue instructions and rules)' (p. 511). 
47 This might seem a typical vicious circle, where the unaccountability of the staff manager is 
paramount to his/her reliability as information broker and norm-setter, but permits the former 
to be inefficient (see Gregory, 1989, pp. 514, 523). The reform should have put an end to this 
dilemma by precisely subordinating both staff and line managers to the discipline of profit. 
The description of the control and incentive system shows how soviet inter-managerial 
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particularly pressing only after bankruptcy, when the combined effect of tighter plans 
and outflow of cadres sparked a bitter conflict over resources and responsibilities 
between production and auxiliary services. 
The staff-line divide, institutionalised by professional, organisational and wage 
discrimination, with the ensuing perennial conflict between categories, contributes to 
organisational stability also at another level. The victimisation of auxiliaries, 
reaffirming shared values about the nature of productive work, the corresponding 
status of different groups of employees and the legitimacy of the hierarchy as a 
whole, in fact provides enterprise administration with an important ideological tool 
for social control. There are, therefore, solid arguments militating in favour of 
retaining a large apparatus of staff management. Then again, considering the costs it 
entails, the functional role played by staff management has to be understood within 
the context of the economy of scarcity to which the financial hardships produced by 
'hard budget' external constraints now make a significant contribution. This will 
become more evident when treating the case of administrative and clerical personnel. 
Managers stafl and line: the apparatchik in transition 
Clerical and administrative personnel were the apparatchiki par excellence; it was 
t 
they whom enterprise employees generally had in mind when voicing criticism of 
ITR. The low consideration for these workers certainly owes a lot to the traditional 
soviet-time disregard for non-manual and non-technical professions. It was a clerical 
employee, a senior accountant, who provided me with the most straightforward 
dynamics have sharpened rather than been subdued but it is the analysis of the manager-
worker relationship forthcoming in the next chapters that will attempt to provide a rationale 
for such a case. 
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formulation of this ideological conception. In a quite emotional speech she argued 
that: 
One hundred people in the AKhO earn as much as the whole enterprise. 
They do nothing, especially the personnel and the marketing department. It 
is a scandal that white collar employees earn more than workers; in the end 
these are the ones who produce. We simply live out of their work. 
To be sure you would not find many managers supporting this 'communi sf view in 
such terms and most people in the AKhO might be quite cynical about enjoying a 
privileged position. Yet, our experience of discourses at the enterprise indicates that 
prejudices against ITR were widespread and universal. In the tense atmosphere 
dominated by bitter competition arid a perennial search for. scapegoats, which 
established itself in the crisis-ridden transitional period, they were the common and 
easy targets of character assassination. So, when I approached the new Director to 
secure formal permission for them to be interviewed he stigmatised with derisive 
remarks their early unwillingness to concede interviews: 'Ha! They do not want to 
talk; I do not ,understand what they might be afraid of, they know nothing!' In the 
opinion of most production managers too, planners and accountants were 'mere 
clerks who kpow nothing'; a fact confirmed by their heavy reliance on precisely 
those production managers they were meant to control. Not surprisingly our main 
informant denounced how these uneven relationships in the shops brought about the 
systematic forging of data. 
Workers, and in particular cadre workers, were more rather then less critical towards 
ITR, whom they described as being a parasitic group serving the interests of senior 
management. The main points in these arguments were the fact that white-collar 
employees regularly 'escape blame for failures' and therefore 'do not risk losing 
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their bonus', that 'they enjoy protection from senior management" as 'they always 
support the administration', often by staffing the trade union committees. 
Accusations of involvement in corruption and theft in relation to procurement deals 
or in cases of disappearance of large amounts of output were also quite common.48 
The aleatory character of their jobs, the low level of qualification and the poor credit 
enjoyed in the collective make administrative workers a vulnerable category 
amenable to manipulation by senior management (see Clarke, 1993). The eminently 
'political' role played by ITR in the enterprise represents a clear sign of continuity 
with the soviet organisational and social framework and is fully understandable 
within that context. Yet it tells us more about what they do than about why they 
continue to operate in such conditions. To understand it requires looking into their 
specific functions, seeking for their contribution to enterprise activities and the 
constraints to significant change in their jobs. One point we would like to stress is 
that the transition from plan to market did not make ipso Jacto the skills of these 
employees obsolete or their jobs anachronistic. Whether this was the case depended 
very much on the effective changes to the normative, organisational and relational 
contexts rehitive to their sphere of activity. 
48 Workers did not point necessarily at ITR only; general reference to senior management or 
simply management made a rare appearance. Since most interviewees were cadre workers, 
close to shop managers, and in any case interviews were often held in their offices, one may 
suspect a strong incentive to show compliance, however genuine it could be, to the argument 
of sustaining the common interests of the shop. The most sceptical among managers, though, 
were quite adamant in directing their blame at higher levels, as workers did when reckoning 
the whole of management (nachal'stvo) in their condemnation. One may conclude that, 
whatever the level of consciousness of these actors, they might find it more convenient to 
safely address their claims at ITR rather than risking direct confrontation with the Director 
and his aides. 
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At the level of central offices there were, for example, two departments, Labour and 
Wages and Accounting (i.e. Finance) offices, which displayed a remarkable ability to 
survive changes and layoffs. Their Chiefs not only managed to avoid relocation or 
replacement but also got promoted, despite the fact that these were the strategic 
economic departments where westerners would expect a high turnover. In the case of 
the former, the fact that no changes either at legislative or at enterprise level 
intervened on labour issues meant that norm-setting and wage calculations required 
only partial and gradual interventions within the limits of pre-reform rules. 
Furthermore, the sensitivity of such an issue as wages advised for extreme caution 
and a good deal of dissimulation at the top, which these bureaucrats are quite good 
at, leaving all the rest to the skilful manoeuvring of production managers themselves. 
Even when changes were relevant, like in fiscal or trade areas, they were neither 
consistent nor univocal and more importantly what remained very much the same 
was the attitude of the counterparts, such as state officials, banks and partly trade 
partners. To fend off the stubborn determination of the taxmen, the intrusiveness of 
creditors and local politicians required the manager primarily to circumvent rules and 
, 
conceal data, a job similar to the tactics employed in soviet times against ministerial 
petty tutelage. On the other side, the lack of investment funds and complex 
partnership or sales deals made the call for up-to-date financial and planning services 
nothing more than a literary exercise. Another key issue was instead to guarantee 
secrecy. When I questioned my main informant as to why a proper financial 
department had not been established before and the fifty or so handwriting 
accountants replaced by computers, he confided in me that: 
After the advice of foreign consultants we began to think about establishing 
a finance office but we did nothing about it because the terrible state of our 
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finances put us in a very delicate position. The Director thought that a move 
in this direction might bring sensitive information into the open, 
endangering the enterprise's position vis-a.-vis intrusive creditors and 
suppliers. 
Significantly little information leaked as to how the enterprise managed its funds and 
arranged its export deals, even when foreign consultants attempted a thorough 
scrutiny of the enterprise's situation.49 This leads us to remember that trust is among 
the scarcest currencies in Russia and the heads of administrative offices, traditional 
stalwarts of senior management, continue within certain limits to be rewarded for 
their loyalty and support. 
What has been said above does not mean that the situation with main departments 
was simply frozen, as changes in Sales indicate. Apart from the short-lived attempt to 
launch a marketing activity, the former commercial department had to adjust to the 
new position of the enterprise in the market. With the exception of an economically 
significant but quantitatively limited export activity, the enterprise was forced into 
processing-only agreements to access vital cotton supplies; what was left from it was 
, . 
for the most part sold on a barter basis for general supply purposes. Procurement 
rather than s~les or marketing became the key office in the area, while the strategic 
hard-currency deals and cotton-based agreements remained in the hands of the 
49 The round of interviews with the Heads of administrative offices, which I conducted in 
200012001, encountered an equally high level of resistance at releasing information. All of 
the deputy directors, unlike production managers. required written permission to concede 
interviews. Even so. 'heavy' units such as accounting and procurement gave an outright 
refusal to co-operate while others, such as sales. marketing and personnel, proved to be very 
little informed about their own affairs. In the mean, all displayed uneasiness at touching on 
sensitive issues. such as redundancies, conflicts with production management and 
bankruptcy. 
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Director. This last development suggests two lines of argument. One could at first 
regret the fact that functional departments were not allowed to take charge and 
develop skills and experience and certainly speculate on how the imbalance of power 
worked as a hindrance to this end. Then again it is difficult to overlook the powerful 
constraints that external relations imposed on the enterprise. 
Managerial strategies: the enterprise versus the market and the state 
Enterprise management had reportedly acquired substantial autonomy in investments 
and export in the perestroika period; from 1993, once the enterprise was transformed 
into a joint-stock company, they were set free to decide about organisation, output 
and staffing levels, while conversely being forced to find customers and suppliers 
autonomously. Therefore, management was expected to elaborate its own strategy 
and operate in a supposedly free market, constrained only by the resources internally 
available and by external regulatory and economic constraints. What were the vision 
and the operative conduct of the combine's management, on the one side, and the 
limits and obstacles they encountered in practice in the external environment, on the 
other, is the object of analysis in the following sections. 
The history ~.f the enterprise during the 1990s presents most of the elements of what 
I 
has been defined in the literature as a 'survival strategy' .50 Senior management was 
50 Survival, i.e. the struggle to stay afloat against adverse and uncertain conditions, was for 
most enterprises, especially in the immediate aftermath of transition, the only option 
available (Clarke, 1994; Hendley, 1998). More importantly, here survival stands for the 
ideological approach of management that und~rstands 'the survival of the enterprise· .. .in 
terms of its survival as a productive unit. and above all as a labour collective.' (Clarke, ibid., 
p. 12). Clarke also maintains that the three main strategic options available to management, 
the others being the market-oriented approach and rent-seeking (Clarke. 1994; Grancelli. 
1995), should not be intended as mutually exclusive. It should be pointed out that, in this 
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admittedly committed to retain 'what has been built in the past', referring to both 
productive and social assets. Despite this ideological commitment, there was, since 
privatisation began, the understanding that radical changes were necessary, in 
particular technological innovation and productivity growth to catch up with Western 
efficiency standards. Tangible measures were in fact carried out in this direction, 
such as investments, cost-saving innovations, changes in labour organisation and 
redundancy of unproductive personnel and units. The determination of enterprise 
leadership to pursue change grew toward the end of the 1990s,. when high 
indebtedness, fading state support and dependency on suppliers convinced 
management that the current configuration of the enterprise was unsustainable. As 
suggested by manager-respondents themselves, it is possible to distinguish a period 
of gradual adjustment, from privatisation to 1997, and a second up to 199912000, 
shorter in time but abundant in fast-developing changes, when dismissals and lay-
offs were precipitated. In both cases, managerial strategies fell short of restructuring 
and the bankruptcy procedures initiated in those years apparently make the case for 
such a conclusion. 
It would be unwise, though, to consider strategy only in terms of managerial agency 
and its dired, consequences, bringing onto management alone the full responsibility 
, 
for the event. If strategy is intended instead as the ex.-post reconstruction of the 
enterprise path of development, then external relations come to the fore as major 
determinants of the managerial course of action. The 'market' and the 'State' will 
appear to have had a much more ambiguous role than ex.pected, undermining in fact 
the bases for any serious attempt to restructure. 
particular case study, evidence seems to suggest that profit-seeking rather than rent-seeking 
was another key ingredient of enterprise strategy. 
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Managerial strategy in the 1990s: from expansion plans to the struggle for 
survival. 
In the late soviet period, the Combine was in every respect a successful enterprise, at 
least by soviet standards. As many managers reported, often with nostalgia but not 
without a sense of disillusion, 'output was counted by millions of metres' and 
'profits were high'. The factory was proud of the state of its technology too. In the 
1980s, I was told, the Director had managed to obtain a large consignment of 
machinery originally planned for another destination, a fact that also spoke for his 
political influence and business consciousness. What really made the pride of the 
enterprise and its Director, and boosted managerial self-confidence, was the 
'visionary' decision to install the STB 330 weaving loomsS1 for export production. 
The enterprise managed to export to Italy, triangulating with a Yugoslavian partner 
in order to circumvent the EC quota system. In 1991, thanks to this partnership, it 
was able to purchase ten second-hand Italian looms, the newest machinery still 
available to them, expanding their export capabilities. The same year the enterprise 
carried out another major investment, the purchase of an English yam dyeing system. 
51 In 1997 there were at the factory 7 weaving production lines counting 1195 looms of 
, 
which 80 only', the STB 330, achieved the minimum width in fabric output that makes it 
qualified for export (official enterprise data gathered during my 1997 internship). The 
standard nominal width of the looms that western contractors were interested in was three 
metres. The fabric obtained therefrom could be used for bed linen manufacturing. In case 
shorter width might be necessary. the use of a cutting edge could tum those looms into a 
double head. saving considerably as opposed to shorter single looms. At the enterprise. 
excluding the 650 looms employed in gauze production. all the remaining ones produced 
cloth 100 or 180 ems in width and their output was too narrow for any use against the 
standards prevailing in the Western bloc. The above-referred observations emerged from 
trade talks with foreign clients. which I participated in. having accompanied the enterprise 
delegation on its trip abroad. 
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This, reported our informant, was the last major investment carried out at the 
enterprise for since then liberalisation, privatisation and economic crisis had 
jeopardised initial managerial plans. These events in fact resulted in a series of 
shocks for the enterprise. Firstly, there were the financial difficulties produced by 
price liberalisation and hyperinflation. My notes on the main facts that occurred at 
the enterprise in the decade, as reported by my key informant, record that: 
In 1992 the enterprise obtained a loan from a State bank at a yearly rate of 
80%, to be returned by 1995. The loan was granted only to a few among the 
most solid enterprises. The enterprise was forced to take it since working 
capital was lost following the monetary reform by Prime Minister Pavlov 
and the enterprise experienced difficulties in cotton purchase. To make it 
worse, at the end of the year interest rates jumped up to 440% and payments 
and fees rose accordingly. It came as a result of Gaidar's statement that there 
was no need for Russian textiles. The loan allowed for keeping on with 
production but threw the enterprise into financial quandaries. The Director 
expected growing debts eventually to be written off by the state/regional 
budget~ according to previous soviet practices, to compensate for 
maintenance by the Combine of employment levels and the social sphere (an 
expectation which was to prove groundless). 
\ 
Problems, though, were not limited to the availability of funds. The collapse of State 
procurement led to the break up of inter-enterprise supply chains and produced 
physical shortages. Cotton supplies, which were key to the survival of this industry, 
came to a halt just after the collapse of the Soviet Union and continued to be a 
troublesome issue thereafter. As the Director himself declared, 'what creates 
problems is the embargo imposed by the Uzbek government... even in these 
circumstances we have found our own way to acquire cotton from our old friends ... 
180 
Claudio Morrison: Soviet Management and Transition PhD thesis June 2004 
It is precisely these connections that help our production stay afloat' (Schelkov and 
Antonov, 1998). Shortages of raw materials had immediate repercussions on 
technical and human conditions of production. The Director on this point noted that: 
Serious complications have arisen with raw materials, which means 
degradation of technology, nervousness, fall in output and financial 
complications. Only because of acute shortage of cotton, the enterprise in 
1992 has worked quite worse than in the previous years 1990-91. But if we 
compare this fall with [the situation in, C. M.l other factories then it will 
appear one of the most moderate. Every enterprise has stayed idle on 
average for two months while we did for two weeks all in all. During the 
year, the wage has been raised by l3.8 times and reached no less than 18000 
roubles, second place in the Trust. Then in order to economise we did not 
resort to closures of educational institutions like similar' enterprises in the 
region. We did not stop housing construction [but went on with building 
programs, C. M.l. There is much talk about privatisation of individual flats, 
[but, C. M.l we keep running the waiting list. Substantial resources are 
devoteq to subsidiary departments, in particular agriculture. Some time ago 
we bought up part of the sovkhoz and now activity is directed to 
reconStruction and re-equipment. (Schelkov and Antonov, 1998) 
Lack of funds for restructuring and the above-referred problems in production 
prevented managers from reaping the advantages offered by privatisation. N. A. 
points out that in 1993, out of the free-hands 'euphoria' produced by privatisation, 
'top management expected to rapidly proceed with massive lay offs so as to catch up 
with western standards with little consideration of the state-of-art in production. The 
labour market turned out unfavourably, buying out the best workers and leaving the 
enterprise in constant need of skilled personnel'. 
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The enterprise therefore was able to weather the initial post-privatisation shock by 
relying basically on its long-established connections with the local Party and 
suppliers. This did not come without a price. Politics required employment, and 
therefore capacity, to be maintained at high levels. The unsophisticated and unstable 
market-oriented production was marked by quantity rather than quality. Expansion 
plans were downscaled and the soviet principles of management prevailed in 
inspiring decision-making. The Director stated in such a way 'the goals for the 
current time': 'survive in the approaching market; avoid loss of cadres so as to hold 
on to the present position and also to preserve our [output, C. M.l volumes capacity.' 
The period from 1993-1994 up to 1996-1997 was characterised, according to our 
manager-informers, by the attempt 'to make the enterprise profitable by increasing 
output volumes'. The approach was for most managers a taken-far-granted of their 
"socialist" education. As our key informant confessed: 
Investments continued to be considered only in view of increasing 
production volumes and modernising equipment. Decisions were made on 
the bas,is of availability of financial resources rather than on expectation of 
orders or profitability. We had been taught at the lnstitut that the more solid 
enterp~ises were the largest and the well-being of the enterprise was ensured 
by the continuous growth of equipment and production. 
In any case there was more than an ideological pledge or cultural backwardness to 
account for this choice. This strategy responded, firstly, to the objectives already 
stated for capacity and employment and to the more general political understanding 
that in so far as the enterprise remained large its social visibility would attract special 
consideration by the authorities. On the other hand, growth of. output became the 
only means of surviving in a market dominated by barter. Once again the 
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confidences of my key informant help clarify what elements led the situation in this 
direction. Reading from my notes: 
After the collapse of the centralised supply system the enterprise adapted to 
trade autonomously, mainly by barter. Since 1994 the 'Mafia' has entered 
the textile market. In fact, notwithstanding its low profitability, the short 
cycle made it attractive for those seeking short-term returns against small-
scale investments. Gauze entered the top ten for most barter-trade goods -
fuelled by exaggerated expectations of State support and a renewed wave of 
orders due to the conflict. Problems with cotton supply at national level led 
to the establishment of RosKontrakt [state agency in charge of the 
reactivation of the supply lIne from central Asia, offering financial support 
to agents, C. M.l, yet funds ended up stolen or diverted. The Combine 
decided to solve its cotton hunger by working on a processing-only basis. 
The agreement consisted in receiving cotton supplies on terms of 
processing-for-a-share-of-output. The raw material left available went to 
feed other production lines, which could be sold on the market for a return. 
The Combine decided to boost processing-only goods production with the 
gradual introduction of the ItalJanskyi grafi!C2 so as to increase cotton 
52 The Soviet t~xtile sector had long worked under a three-shift rotation system referred to as 
lvanovoskyi Grafik, i.e. Ivanovo's timetable, because of the historical concentration of the 
industry in this region. The system was one of the hardest in USSR industry. It consisted in 
alternating 6 days of morning shifts, including a single night shift, and 5 days of afternoon 
shifts. There were two rest days at the end of each period but no end-of-week full-scale 
interruptions (white collar employees though have always had a regular working week and 
so do most managers and auxiliaries). Rotation of workers' gangs allowed for continuous 
production, with limited stoppages for maintenance and re-equipment. The new system 
features 6 working days - two for each shift (day, afternoon, night) - increasing the monthly 
load of hours worked on the four shifts from 538 to 713, with the increase resting mostly on 
the night shift which grows from 14 to 49156 hours per month. Output and revenues grew 
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supply for the whole enterprise. No change of any sort took place at shop 
floor level. 
As a result the enterprise, unlike other neighbouring combines, kept production going 
and survived, but accumulated a debt burden unsustainable in the long term and saw 
a deterioration of its working conditions. Public records confirm that 'still in 1995 
the enterprise was putting out the highest volume of production in the region, 
totalling 134 billion roubles. The whole sum though was ending up in expenses' 
(Schelkov and Antonov, 1998). In fact, barter negatively affected enterprise business 
in many ways. As it did not permit the ascertaining of the real value of the goods 
exchanged, it tended to depress the virtual return from sales. While the enterprise 
was eager to get rid of its goods for badly needed spare-parts, raw materials, such as 
fuel, gas and cotton, were bought at above-average prices. The end result was a 
constant weakening of the enterprise trade balance. 
As far as barter was performed to catch supplies and deal with intermediaries rather 
than final customers it made it impossible for the enterprise to develop commercial 
skills, favouril)g the transfer of commercial activities from the Director to a dedicated 
department. It also prevented market signals from reaching the enterprise and making 
marketing anq product development the leading functions. Leo, the senior consultant 
leading the restructuring project in the field, during an interview observed that: 
The key problem is the absence of retailing, there are no shops, an 
enterprising trade sector that could operate as a medium with customers and 
allow producers to establish the market value of their goods. The 
accordingly and so did the pace of production. Yet, because workers had less time to rest and 
worked longer time with limited supervision, output quality and labour productivity 
decreased (See Table 5.3 at the end of this chapter). 
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manufacturers offer their goods to clients as it is, without considering that 
for each kind of good there is a wide range of offers from specialised flrms. 
These are the outcomes of barter, which makes it impossible to ascertain the 
relative value of commodities. Barter in itself would not be a problem as far 
as it is performed by operators directly in the market. 
Instead, as a manager put it, procurement-oriented trade consisted in 'exchanging our 
rubbish for theirs'. 
Furthermore, since barter trade could hardly guarantee regularity of consignment and 
certainty about the characteristics and quality of goods purchased, scarcity continued 
to plague production. Therefore, increases in output and barter trade created more 
problems than they were· meant to solve. Other than financial difficulties and 
marketing problems they allowed, or forced, the continuation of soviet-time practices 
in the shops. 
The 1996-1999 period: from foreign-led restructuring to insolvency 
In the second half of the 1990s, the Director and his aides made a last attempt to save 
themselves and the Labour Collective by employing a more drastic strategy of cuts. 
In the meantime they tried to take seriously the offers and suggestions that foreign 
. . 
consultants, sent to the region under a joint EC-Russian restructuring programme,S3 
were putting forward. 
53 The project fell into the framework of a broader co-operation agreement between The 
Russian Federation and the Ee (Tacis) to provide support for the transition towards a market 
economy. This specific project was aimed at rescuing this sole-industry area, badly affected 
by the ongoing slump in production, which was a cause of major political concern for the 
high level of unemployment and pauperisation. The Management Consulting Firm, in 
collaboration with other leading flrms with expertise in the fleld of machinery and cotton, 
successfully bid for the project tender. Their job consisted in: a) the delivery of a market 
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Consultants produced an analysis of the state of the enterprise and presented a 
business plan with recommendations for restructuring. I was able to examine these 
materials and participate in their presentation to Russian senior management in 1997. 
The analysis presents elements that confirm managerial concerns for the situation in 
the market and set the most problematic tasks related to restructuring. The business 
overview consists basically of a traditional market analysis, placing the Russian 
textile industry and enterprise individual business in the context of the world and 
domestic market in order to sort out their most valuable business opportunities and 
feasible perspective of development. The analysis refers to structure, strategies and 
operational mode: since the first topic has already been treated at length before, here 
the argument is limited to the remaining two areas of concern. 
According to the consultants, the enterprise current activity was characterised by 
chronic scarcity in cash flow, huge rates of idle productive capacity, low profitability 
of current output and lack of direct and/or long-standing relationships with 
partners/suppliers. 
The Combine .continued to operate large shops where relatively new machinery lay 
. 
alongside "archaeological" equipment, which wastes raw materials and requires 
• 
steady maint~nance work. Since a great deal of output was given in barter in 
exchange for supplies it seemed that these productions were justified solely by the 
analysis; b) the assessment of the situation of individual enterprises in the area; c) the 
selection of the most promising; d) Eventually, the preparation of business plans and 
recommendations to the selected enterprises and support in seeking suitable partners abroad. 
A more detailed description of the organisation and work of foreign consultants at the case-
study enterprise can be found in C. Morrison, 1999, The Restructuring of a Russian Textile 
Combine: a case study of the failure of Transition, Warwick University (unpublished). 
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ability to catch supplies, which was still far from self-financing, let alone allowing 
profit margins. 
It was admitted that the current enterprise organisation and its management were 
consistent with the situation in the industry and the "market" in Russia. 
At an all-industry level, the lack of co-operation among individual enterprises was 
remarked on. Enterprises did not show any interest or ability to develop a division of 
labour and persisted in manufacturing the same kind of goods, resulting in 
destructive competition. They had not been able to set a common stand towards 
suppliers and final customers in order to strengthen their position in terms of price 
and quality. As a result their contractual power was low and many of them had 
virtually become a mere productive unit under large financial-industrial groups or 
ambiguous intermediaries. 
In fact, the collapse of the command economy had not delivered anything close to 
competitive open markets. On the supply side, the "retreat" of the State had meant 
partly a mere change of the legal status under which former state agencies operated, 
partly the entry of new subjects like banks, investment funds and trade 
intermediaries. The lack of funding, limiting the choice of suppliers, strengthens the 
• 
position of these subjects. These companies pursue a rent-seeking strategy aimed at 
ensuring their monopolistic position instead of fostering investments and business-
oriented restructuring. On the demand side, the positioning of the enterprises was 
equally weak. With shrinking orders from the State, the textile industry was 
supposed, as any other consumer-oriented industry, to be led by mass consumption. 
Again like other consumer-goods manufacturers, they found themselves overtaken 
by foreign competitors. Many enterprises were forced to look at exports of cheap 
commodities as the vital source of revenues, while their market share at home was at 
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stake. As a result, it was argued, these enterprises were operating in survival mode 
with no chances to survive in the long tenn. 
In order to haul themselves out of the present dire conditions and retrieve their 
position as viable business makers the selected companies were assigned a business 
plan. The plan consisted of three parts: The restructuring of the organisational 
structure; the implementation of immediate actions to regain efficiency; the 
development of a comprehensive strategy. 
The measures to regain efficiency in the short tenn were all urged by the aim of 
cutting running costs and increasing productivity. They usually included energy 
conservation, waste reduction, lay-off of unnecessary workers and dismissal of 
auxiliary activities, first of all the welfare system. 
The strategic proposal included the following medium-tenn actions: upgrading of the 
productive capacity of the factory to raise the standards of its output up to the 
requirements of the world market; reshaping the product range to focus on the most 
marketable articles; improving the enterprise outward profile to deal directly with 
customers and suppliers; dismantling the welfare system. Given the serious shortage 
of internal financial resources and the already high level of indebtedness, argued the 
consultants, the only way to plan investments rested on partnership with foreign 
manufacturers. On the contrary, the domestic market was regarded as too insidious 
. and lacking expertise for partnership or financing. Expectations were placed instead 
on the local authorities to cope with the unemployment resulting from factory lay-
offs and the dismantling of the welfare system. It was their duty to elaborate a 
retraining scheme and plans to foster the development of business activities other 
than textiles, to absorb redundancies and to accept having the enterprise welfare 
system switched onto their budget. 
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Among the many measures contemplated by restructuring, cutting jobs and closing 
unproductive outlets was certainly the most needed but was also a quite difficult and 
painful one to carry out. Other than the fear of discrediting management and the 
Director, there were the complications already pointed out in relation to white-collar 
employees. Without changing the overall labour and production organisation, any 
redundancy would create holes in the staff, making the work of those remaining 
harder. For these reasons production managers resisted and utterly refused the layoff 
of cadres and workers. For this very reason it was difficult in the first place to 
determine which were unnecessary workers, as staffing was decided at lower 
managerial levels where informality and approximation reigned.54 Senior 
management adopted a three-pronged strategy:55 a) they favoured the natural loss of 
cadres due to the low level of wages; b) transferred administrative staff into 
production jobs; c) resorted to outright layoff for peripheral outlets and socially 
marginal categories. 
Already in the first half of the 1990s, the enterprise got rid of the worst among its 
employees, first of all alcoholics. Furthermore, in the 1992-1994 period there were 
no new recruits. The closure of schools, nurseries and shops brought the enterprise 
working population down to around 4000 from the initial 5000. Another thousand 
, 
, 
were to be lost In the period under consideration. Beginning with the redundancy of 
400 pensioners, more redundancies were achieved with 'the merging of the 
54 I had a taste of it in 1997 when collecting data for the foreign consultants in the shops 
about the manning of production lines. There was a tangible tension with managers over 
decisions to classify workers' jobs, whether direct producers or auxiliaries, as they felt 
clearly that in the latter case they could qualify for dismissal. 
55 Information provided by the Chief of the DtiZ (Department of Labour and Wages) in a 
written interview. 
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construction and transport department into the economic-transport unit (KhTO),. 
Factory canteens were also either shut down or made into private businesses, as was 
the health resort. Housing was eventually transferred to the local authorities, though 
maintenance of flats continued to rest on factory resources. As for labour 
productivity, the whole operation was a failure as the natural loss of cadres more than 
compensated targeted cuts, forcing the enterprise to recruit the very same people, 
unskilled and underqualified, they had been trying to get rid of. My key informant 
pointed out that 'when I entered the factory as assistant foreman I was replacing the 
last cadre without formal qualification, now the process has reversed'. In any case 
the problem was that the structure of costs did not change. Firstly, because 
unprofitable shops were not shut down, awaiting for investments and technological 
reconstruction; secondly, as the bulk of the social and town-maintenance services 
continued to burden the enterprise budget. 
The failure to carry out investments was the outcome of a combination of factors, but 
managers pointed at the disappointing relationship with potential foreign partners 
and, secondari,ly, to state intervention in identifying those to blame for the bad fate of 
the operation. Together with the foreign consultants, a plan for investments was 
drafted to be', used for gaining a credit line from banks; having their own money, 
, 
senior management decided in any case to send a delegation to Western Europe to 
shop for equipment and look for contracts.56 Their objectives were ambitious: a new 
. set of second-hand weaving machines had to be purchased, together with a new 
sizing machine (shlikhtoval'naya mashina), a new automatic spinning line was to be 
acquired with a barter deal; contracts for export of fabrics were also discussed and 
56 I took part in this business trip, sponsored by the EC project, as a translator and a guide to 
the Russians. 
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the hypothesis to procure cotton in European markets emerged. Despite 
disagreements which emerged during talks, from financing to technical details, 
unveiling serious differences in trade behaviour and techniques, it was a stunning 
surprise to hear that talks had collapsed without results at the end of 1997. With the 
help of my informants I attempted to produce an explanation; my notes tell it as such: 
With the Italians in 1997 we attended a course of business strategy which 
allowed us to focus on cost accounting and profitability assessment when 
deciding over production matters. The business plan we elaborated at that 
time did not incorporate these elements and in fact was rejected by banks. 
Italians were also meant to help with export and investments. The Director 
eventually decided to reject their offer for sales of fabrics when he 
discovered that their real value on the Italian market was three/four times 
higher than our selling price, while they were asking for a few cents 
discount. As for investments, we planned the purchase of weaving machines 
and were considering an offer on a barter deal for spinning. The former 
failed when our funds were frozen in 1997 as a result of restrictive monetary 
policy ,and the latter talks failed as we insisted on purchase rather than 
barter. We did not like the fact that Italians were trying to buy cheap from us 
and i~pose unfavourable deals, trying to compensate with promises of 
handouts to those managers participating in talks. 
The role of public authorities was no less detrimental, as it was referenced in both 
periods in several complaints by enterprise managers. The Director in 1998, when 
the situation had become desperate, expressed all his disillusion in this outburst: 
The first sign of the forthcoming disaster appeared in the years 1996-97. The 
collective "lost itself' when they borrowed at an 80% annual rate to buy raw 
materials. [ ... ] 'Then our problems with sales also began - remembers [the 
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Director, C. M.l with sorrow - which we never had before .. .interest 
mounted up and ... our bank account was frozen for two years. Immediately 
afterwards several social setbacks also appeared: non-payment of wages, 
stoppages, lay offs and so on. The situation became untenable: non-payment 
of wages ran up to nine months'. [Interviewer, C. M.l 'Will it continue for 
long?' [Director, C. M.] 'It will while the government pursues its truly 
genocidal policy toward the textile sector [ ... ]. Paradoxically in our times it 
has simply become unprofitable to run a good business! Where is our own 
state leading us, to full disruption, to misery, to social break up? (Schelkov 
and Antonov, 1998) 
One could find disagreement over the wording, but the substance of this argument 
was unquestionable. As suggested by Leo, the senior consultant leading the 
restructuring project in the field, the absolute lack of industrial policy was striking. In 
his own words: 
The enterprise has to face harsh competition in the market as a result of wild 
liberalisation of foreign trade. Personally I find this latter decision quite 
countetproductive. Under such conditions you do not favour competition, 
you simply wipe out the whole industry. Russian industry is now in a 
• 
situation comparable only to that of some countries in the immediate 
aftermath ofWWII. But post-war liberalisation in those cases was conducted 
much more cautiously in order to allow for adaptation and gradual 
restructuring. 
The role of the state, at the level of central authorities in Moscow, was indeed mostly 
remarkable for its absence. There was no selective liberalisation of import-export, 
which could stimulate competitio~ while fostering foreign investments; neither 
financial nor fiscal support to national exports or credits for the purchase of 
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machinery and raw materials. It took years to stabilise trade relationships with 
cotton-producing CIS countries and when this happened it was to the advantage of a 
new lobby of intermediaries. They channelled low-quality cotton to Russian 
producers while selling the best of their harvest abroad and this with public money 
supposedly destined to guarantee supplies to local producers. 'Foreign' cotton 
remained instead out of reach because of high import duties and lack of hard 
currency. 
Another very unusual issue relates to the situation of the nearby military installations. 
Formally the base did not exist, so fuel and gas bills as well as infrastructure, 
including a railway terminal, were a further financial burden for the enterprise. 
According to managers, it was a matter of political expediency not to raise the issue 
with the authorities; this explains their anger and disbelief when political support 
failed to materialise in a situation of desperate need. 
The role of the local administration was more ambiguous. They in fact channelled 
funds to the enterprise as long as they could, as confirmed by the director of the local 
association o( textile manufacturers. Then again, this fostered confusion as to the 
di vision of roles and responsibilities between the economic and the political sphere. 
Leo, who witpessed talks between the enterprise senior managers and the Governor, 
inferred that: 
The regional administration has greater powers than its western 
counterparts. Enterprises are held under tutelage. The administration has 
agreed to channel credits to the enterprise to cover its debts but has refused 
to take on the costs of the company town welfare system; it maintains that 
this is a step that can be made only after reassurances from Moscow. The 
administration has also refused to liberalise trade, lifting a heavy fiscal and 
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administrative burden and a high levy of 10% to 15% on profits. The 
administration justifies its fiscal policy with the need to subsidise loss-
making enterprises. 
Left without allies, short of funds, including working capital, 'the enterprise fell on 
speculators, basically cotton traders, taking advantage of these troubles' (Schelkov 
and Antonov, 1998). What ensued was, at factual level, a short-lived struggle for 
control between outsiders and the Director that ended up with a declaration of 
insolvency and consequently his ousting. The dramatic ending of this crisis meant 
also, and more significantly, the failure of this last attempt at restructuring as part of 
the long struggle of the enterprise to operate independently in the post-reform 
economic environment. It now appears clearly that the enterprise, its structures, 
strategies and mode of operation maintained most of the pre-reform features, or at 
least continued to respond to soviet managerial principles. Nevertheless it is equally 
evident that: a) management was neither unaware nor ideologically opposed to 
adaptation;S7 b) restructuring was in fact pursued within the limits set by knowledge 
and availability of resources; c) the enterprise, due to demonetization and scarcity, 
was in fact very much constrained in its strategic choices. Therefore, it was rather the 
case that maryagerial behaviour was a rational response to external inputs and that 
I 
57 Despite the many, not always unbiased, claims that the management did not understand 
market economy and wanted to live 'under socialism', evidence and observation have 
convinced me of the rightness of Leo's view: 
'The discussion around the business plan has given me these impressions: the 
Russians fully understand at conceptual level the technological and 
qualitative requirements of market competition but are prevented from 
putting them into practice. From this results also a profound frustration. 
Plunged into the day-by-day running of the factory, managers are forced to 
shelve their plans for modernisation.' 
194 
Claudio Morrison: Soviet Management and Transition PhD thesis June 2004 
such a continuity with the soviet past should not be interpreted as managerial 
resistance to market competitive forces but as an adaptation to the modus operandi of 
those very forces. 
Outsiders' take-over and outsiders' control: consequences and 
questions 
In 1998 the Volga Textile Company was filed for bankruptcy i.e. declared insolvent, 
put under tutdage by authorities and became totally dependent on creditors. A year 
later all its economic indicators had appreciably worsened, the Director was forced to 
leave office and its leading creditor, the 'tolling' contractor TMS, obtained full 
decision-making powers over the management of the company. The employee-
owned company was disbanded, replaced by a temporary administration regime with 
the official task of restructuring the enterprise to full recovery so as to avoid proper 
bankruptcy. By the beginning of 2000 the old Director had lost hope of recovering 
his position, his supporters at the enterprise were removed or forced to quit, 
meanwhile local politicians achieved a deal with TMS as for its responsibility in 
running the company town. Who are the outsiders, how did they manage to take over· 
the company' and what is their strategy are the issues outlined in this section. This 
, 
I 
will recast the problem of restructuring and introduce our analysis of outsiders' 
polices carried out extensively in the next chapters. 
In order to understand the take-over, two points should be kept in mind. First, this 
event fits into a general trend, not limited to the industry and the region, which saw 
industry-led groups, based on soviet-time personal· ties and supply chains, being 
supplanted by financial-industrial groups, operating as intermediaries and therefore 
195 
Claudio Morrison: Soviet Management and Transition PhD thesis June 2004 
in control of access to markets and credit (Johnson J., 1997). Secondly, the take-over 
was a multistage and multifaceted process: 
a) It required not only economic superiority but also political clout; 
b) it was not limited to the assertion of legal rights of outsiders but entailed direct 
actions, including the 'physical' assertion of authority, aimed at asserting the full 
subordination of the old enterprise employees to the new owners. The change was 
therefore ambiguous in terms of its efficiency outcomes and uncertain as to the 
conflictual nature of its evolution, not only at the top but also at the bottom of the 
enterprise hierarchy. 
The outsider company: structures and strategy 
The structure and scope of operations of TMS and its parent company, the "Home 
Trading Company", were outlined by the President and leader of the latter, Anatolii 
Zaryanovich, in an interview given to the factory paper. 
The Trust has operated in the textile market for more than seven years. 
There are more than fifty enterprises in our sphere of influence, from 
, 
different industrial sectors and in different provinces and republics of the 
Federation. The main task of the TMS company, as part of the Trust, is the 
, 
production of textile goods, competitive in the local as well as in foreign and 
near-abroad markets, the processing of cotton, the production of yarn, grey 
cotton and mixed fabrics, the production of apparel and also the 
development of new products. We process up to 1500 tons of cotton a 
. month. The supply of cotton, on the basis of direct contractual relationships 
with cotton-producing republics, is performed by the company ITR, which is· 
part of the Trust too. Sales, marketing and participation in fairs at home and 
abroad are all managed by another associated firm, ITOT. The Trust also 
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includes enterprises working with linen and manufacturing linen fabrics but 
even ones operating in other industrial sectors. (Smimov E., 2000) 
The origins of such a successful business are much less clear and according to 
confidences from insiders they have to be sought in the "dark economy" that sprang 
up in the late Gorbachev period.58 Our key informant, after a stage at the Trust 
headquarters in 2002-2003, reported at length about its history and later 
developments, which I summarised as such in my notes: 
The founding party of the business was a group of friends, who started as 
videocassette retailers in the late 80s. They managed to become dominant in 
the cotton trade in the region through connections in the criminal 
underworld. The Trust is now well-organised and staffed with young, 
qualified professionals but they have not changed their way of doing 
business. They deal with partners on the basis of half-legaUhalf-criminal 
(blatnoi) relations. They aim at achieving virtual monopoly over every 
aspect of the business regardless of costs. A remarkable example of their 
aggressive policie.s is given by the very circumstances of Nikita's 
recruitment. After having being forced out of his place at the combine he 
was called back by TMS to work on a restructuring project at another 
• 
enterpnse formally owned by a 'vassal' firm. When the latter offered for 
S8 One of the few interviewees that I managed to contact on this issue was an engineer, once 
an independent entrepreneur, who was working as a TMS controller at the Combine. He 
confirmed that the Trust had a three-pronged structure (cotton procurement, handling of 
processing contracts, sales of finished goods). He specified that its mode of operation in 
relation to manufacturing enterprises was one of provision of services and continued 
intervention whenever technical problems or conflicts arose. In the latter case the Trust 
sought the unofficial support of Moscow and oblast' level authorities to foster its case. He 
eventually added that it might have been difficult to extract information from them, in fact he 
advised not to, as they 'run a dirty business'. 
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him to stay, TMS imposed its veto and pressed for him to move to a 
different site. Presently he has been allowed to regroup his old managerial 
team at the Combine. When I asked: 'what's all this for', he replied: 'this is 
the wrong question, the issue is not 'what for' but 'against whom'. They 
want experienced cadres and do not care about overstaffing; they pursue this 
strategy for no purpose other than stripping qualified personnel out of the 
market, against potential competitors, their nominal allies included. 
The hegemonic plans of the Trust extended beyond the bilateral relationship with 
individual plants to encompass the reorganisation of the regional industry under the 
auspices of its own textile manufacturers' association. In fact, after privatisation, the 
soviet-time associations grouping the forty-two textile enterprises in the region 
reunited into a single joint-stock company, Ivanotextil, but then centripetal 
tendencies prevailed reducing it to an empty shell. The new association,59 25 
members strong, has now taken a leading role in co-ordinating the activities of its 
constituent members in order to stabilise the market and foster recovery through co-
operation; Organisational features, achievements and goals of the association and its 
founding members, the merchant houses, are well expressed by its Director: 
The in'dustry has suffered heavily from a decade of crisis but is recovering. 
The regional framework is playing an important role and is a guarantee for 
59 The association I refer to in this case is one of three currently existing and the strongest in 
number of associates. There is enough evidence to suspect that the association is a creature 
of the Trust. Until the year 2000, Anatolii Zaryanovich served as its president. The Director 
of the association, who volunteered this information in 2000, showed himself during the 
interview to be on good terms and in fact to be quite familiar with TMS operations and the 
specific case of the Combine. He spoke passionately in favour of TMS's restructuring 
'mission'. He had a quite different opinion of previous industry leaders, the 'red governor' 
and the competing Ivanotextil, which the combine's previous Director had been very fond of. 
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the future. The lead has now been taken by the merchant houses, which are 
gradually taking over the factories/enterprises. The current strategy of 
merchant houses is to constitute micro holdings so as to bring enterprises 
once again under a single roof. Holdings will manage finance and trade, 
leaving production and personnel management at enterprise/factory level. 
The association is actively supporting this strategy, for example, we 
managed to obtain an oblast' law which formally recognises these trusts. 
The association is also working hard to foster co-operation so as to 
overcome the structural problems existing in this market. In the first place, 
we managed to put an end to price fluctuations (up to 20%) due to the 
seasonal character of the industry which forced enterprises to work at a loss 
(or stay idle) during summer. The management system under the soviets was 
not entirely wrong. In my opinion a great mistake was made when 
enterprises were allowed to manage their businesses independently. They 
never dealt with buying and selling and failed badly. These functions, i.e. 
trade and finance, have to be returned to specialists, the holdings. 
Furthermore, when I questioned him hard about the responsibilities and intentions of 
traders towards enterprises he admitted that: 'Traders have accumulated high profits 
[at the expense of enterprises, C. M.l', though he added 'but now they are rea~y to 
take responsibility'. 
Therefore, the Trust had so far operated as a mere intermediary but was gaining 
greater involvement in production even when this did not formally appear in terms of 
direct ownership. Enterprise management was quite sceptical about the prospective 
contribution of outsiders, claiming it was a mere speculative, and dubious, business, 
which was simply tightening its grip on enterprises better to squeeze them. Then 
again, the hostility between the two groups (the soviet managerial elite and the new 
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Russians) could be better interpreted as a conflict over resources, neither of them 
having a greater legitimacy in managing the industry on the basis of past 
performance. In any case, the hostility of enterprise management explains the 
difficulties faced by the newcomers to enter the industry and their efforts to 
legitimise their role, partly depicting themselves as modernisers, partly by making 
reference to best soviet practices. On the other side, the purely commercial, and 
speculative, nature, of their activities so far raises the question as to whether they 
. possess the ability and determination to carry out restructuring. Their involvement 
with the Combine presents an opportunity to investigate this issue. 
Zakhvat or the take-over 
TMS was one Of the Combine's suppliers and rapidly became a major creditor, in 
this quality it sided with the bankruptcy public authorities in overseeing enterprise 
activities after insolvency. The circumstances surrounding these events became 
inevitably the object of claims and counterclaims from both sides (Schelkov and 
Antonov, 1998; Smirnov E., 2000).60 
In the first place, enterprise management objected to the very legitimacy of the 
declaration of insolvency. As reported earlier, in fact, a substantial amount of 
enterprise dept burden could well be attributed to costs arising from the non-
60 Without reaching the climax of other Russian cases of hostile take-overs publicised in the 
press (see the interview with A. Isaev, deputy chairman of the Russian parliamentary 
committee on workers' rights, in Dakli's article), this conflict did not lack the vocal 
bitterness and the dramatic consequences proper to them. The Director and the representative 
of outsiders accused each other in the press of responsibility for the bankruptcy. The 
positions of the opposing factions were then voiced in interviews and conversations held at 
the factory during my fieldwork. 
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productive sphere, social and even military installations. It was therefore a political 
decision to proceed with bankruptcy. 
Another disputed issue was the rightfulness of TMS intervention. Its leaders claimed 
that it was the enterprise management's fault, not having observed the clauses of 
their agreement, preferring to payout other creditors, therefore allowing for TMS 
credits to run high. Our key informant, though, had an entirely different story to tell 
on this point. Until then, he explains, the Combine Director had taken care to 
distribute liabilities evenly among partners/suppliers in order to avoid precisely this 
kind of situation. Once, though, a State administrator was dispatched to the enterprise 
to put things right, he began to accept offers by TMS to contribute to expenses or 
financial obligations61 which in principle should really have been postponed, given 
the state of enterprise finances. In this way, enterprise managers maintain, TMS 
bought out the company. This controversy calls for several considerations: 
a) First, the fact that the fate of the enterprise was decided with the help of political 
clout comes rather as a confirmation than a surprise, as it commonly found in 
literature (Clarke S., 1994; Johnson J., 1997). This stands in favour of managerial 
arguments; 
b) On the otber hand, it is equally evident that, once the enterprise plunged into 
crisis, the authorities, whatever personal interest they might have in interfering with 
it, were still called on to solve the situation. Being themselves short of funds, they 
had to.rely on those investors, namely the Trust,who were very able and willing to 
intervene. 
61 Namely, purchase of materials and machinery and payments to the wage, social and 
pension funds which had been so far postponed (the former), or frozen (the latter). 
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Yet, the main argument raised by management was that the very financial situation in 
which the enterprise lay and its inability to restructure and recover was due to its 
unequal relationship with suppliers. The contractual regime under which the 
enterprise and outsiders co-operated is known as dava['cheskaya schema.62 The 
Director claimed that this system deprived the enterprise of decision-making powers 
and, with the outsiders dictating enterprise policies to their own advantage, it was 
impossible for the enterprise to recover. To the contrary, outside contractors claimed 
that they had little say in enterprise affairs as it swallowed resources, which they 
provided in order to recoup the original debt. It would not be immoderate to maintain 
that both sides were perfectly right in their own respect. The problems with this kind 
of agreement, in principle not unique to Russia, are the ones proper to barter for 
supplies. It cuts off the enterprise from the market and leaves it working as a mere 
production unit. The system is particularly pernicious in view of the need to 
restructure. This can be explained by comparing the present relationship with the one 
the enterprise entertained with higher bodies under the planning system. Under the 
current agreement the enterprise receives a minimum plan, which is the output 
agreed for delivery, but it is responsible for saving on resources provided by 
outsiders in order to cover its expenses and make a profit. As a senior production 
. 
manager noted, the enterprise was never in a condition to produce much more than 
the quota due to the outsiders as traditional inefficiencies prevented them from 
'making the plan'. From this perspective it can be said that market reforms did 
62 Literally commission-based production, a kind of agreement similar to a processing-only 
contract which had become very popular among textile producers in the region after the 1998 
monetary crisis. As we said before, it consisted in the enterprise processing raw materials 
provided by the outside contractor, agreeing to deliver a certain volume of output in 
exchange for a quota of cotton. 
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achieve their goal, i.e. to subordinate the enterprise to hard budget constraints. The 
enterprise was made responsible, i.e. financially liable, for its failures, which is 
where insolvency came from. But it did not go any further than this, rather making 
more acute than relieving soviet-time problems. 
Therefore, whether outsiders intentionally used the scheme to strengthen their grip 
over the enterprise or they simply viewed it as an easy way to raise profits, it was 
clear that once brought into direct management of the enterprise they had to modify 
their approach and carry out reforms. Which is what, at least formally, they were set 
to do, as from the above-mentioned declaration of intentions. 
Okupatsiya or the second stage of the take over 
From 1999 to summer 2003, TMS, directly or indirectly, intervened systematically 
into enterprise affairs, bringing changes to almost every aspect of its organisation and 
procedures. The organisational chart was constantly revised; managers received new 
instructions on quality standards, rewards, wages and penalties. Changes were not 
limited to procedures but affected people too: the enterprise saw a new Director 
almost every ¥ear and key production managers were replaced. Here I provide an 
outline of the changes that affected the managerial layout of the enterprise, leaving 
more substantial issues of labour and work organisation, the overall change in the 
social constitution of the organisation, to the next chapters. 
The 'new' philosophy inspiring the actual restructuring of the enterprise moved from 
the above-mentioned idea that the enterprise should once again focus on production. 
As an immediate consequence, quite visible in the new organisational charts, was the 
slimming down and regrouping of the main departments. In particular, the 
commercial department disappeared altogether and marketing was filed for 
disbandment. 
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The president of the HTC further specified the measures and tasks to regain 
efficiency. First, the number of ITR had to be reduced, he judged intolerable that 
one-third of enterprise employees were still out of main production jobs. Secondly, 
both managers and workers should plan and carry out their work more carefully, 
putting an end to squandering of materials, waste of resources and delivering of 
defecti ve products. 
To these ends, over a period of two years several actions have been brought forward, 
featuring forms of indirect and direct control as well as incentive mechanisms. 
Beginning with layoff, already in 2000 the Chief of the OTiZ had to declare that 
'layoff and transfer of staff into production' ,were ongoing and 'further reductions in 
staffing levels' were expected. This was achieved with the reduction of Planning and 
Sales into pocket offices and the abandonment of the objects in the social sphere. 
More general cuts to auxiliary and maintenance jobs, visibly in the Chief Engineer's 
Department and in Production, were also lamented by production managers. Natural 
wastage and transfer into other units helped to make the process socially less 
painful63 and blurred the impact and the visibility to the observer in terms of 
employment decline . 
• 
A different issue was the cut of manual jobs in the shops. Notwithstanding traditional 
, 
western views on this point, the Director of the Association reassured me that no 
63 The social impact of displacement for office workers varied greatly. Certainly accepting 
the offer of a job in production (which was due by law, if available) was generally traumatic, 
if accepted for lack of alternatives. Many regretted the loss of benefits such as shorter and 
more regular shifts (especially for women who staffed the lower ranks in offices), better 
working places and the status of 'intellectual workers'. It seems that opting for the private 
sector or relocation in the factory was mainly conditional on availability of connections in 
one or the other area while age and education or 'entrepreneurial spirits' might favour 
success at a subsequent stage. 
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such thing as a 'massive layoff' was going to happen. First because 'we do not look 
at the western option, the automated factory, [secondly, because] ... our problem is to 
keep high output volumes'. 
If the new owners did not mean to get rid of their new employees in great numbers, 
for sure not in the initial period at least, to gain their consent and please politicians, 
they were much at odds with the way people worked. If production has to be the· 
focus of enterprise management, then 'the rouble' should become 'the main criterion 
for good or bad' (Smirnov E., 2000), warned the President of HTC from the columns 
of the factory paper. The appointment of the Chief Accountant as managing director,. 
a mature woman with no prestige, breaking a long-standing tradition that the Chief 
Engineer should take the vacancy, was the clearest materialisation of this precept. So 
managers very soon saw their wage made dependent on additional elements rather 
than just volumes, such as quality, costs, and level of waste. All managers 
interviewed in this period indicated that their responsibilities had grown, direction 
was more authoritarian and there was less room for compromise. 
It is not that changes were simply entrusted to individual initiative, controls were 
. 
also introduced. The two last organisational charts show how the Security 
• 
Department grew into a diversified body fighting embezzlement, waste and theft of 
. 
funds and materials through physical and bureaucratic routine checks. The Quality 
Control unit was also revitalised, with the appointment of a prestigious and skilled 
chief, previously head of spinning, and the assignment of more personnel, deployed 
both in factories and in the laboratory. Last but not least, TMS began to send its own 
people into the factory; controllers appeared in the shop chiefs' offices checking on 
the state of production and the correct implementation of orders. Weekly and 
monthly briefings were also scheduled at the offices of factory managers to review 
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the implementation of the plan. These initiatives no less than the previously 
mentioned controls, produced traumatic effects on managers who felt unjustly 
harassed or simply pointlessly disturbed. As a result, for at least a year, production 
management fell into a complete state of confusion as fear spread among managers 
and their subordinates of punishment by demotion. It seemed quite clear that the 
newcClmers played on personal jealousies and factional rivalries in order to secure 
control over the labour collective and defeat those still on the side of the old 
Director.64 
TMS therefore, not without costs and contradictions, installed itself into the 
enterprise organisation and began to integrate (subordinate) it into its system. The 
question arises how these events were survived and perceived by managers and what 
real changes they brought to their daily work routine. An interview with the newly 
appointed Chief of Quality yields the first impressions about lights and shadows in 
the new administration's plans. On her appointment and its general meaning in the 
new course she maintains: 
I have ;been transferred to this position because of my determination; the 
previous chief has been demoted for lack of character ... In the past, until 
• 
perestr,oika, we had a strong department for technological control, which 
\ 
64 The main target of these 'punitive expeditions' turned out to be precisely my key 
informant Nikita, then working as Head of the weaving factory, and his closest associates. 
When he eventually left the enterprise in February 2001, the domino effect drove out of the 
factory many valuable specialists while breeding disillusion and anger among those workers 
who felt personally loyal to him. It is quite an irony that in early 2003 TMS rethought its 
decision, giving him the job of Chief Engineer. As a result he managed to get rid of all those 
'incompetent careerists' who had previously taken advantage of his ousting. The moral here 
seems to be that the newcomers could not easily dispense with the ideas and experience of 
the old cadres. 
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oversaw the qualitative aspects of production. This was put aside and 
abandoned after perestroika. Now, TMS pay a lot of attention to quality, 
there is competition and they are ready to spend money on it. Now we keep 
count of every kopeek, they have taught us to value money. The budget is 
fixed centrally and if you need more you have to provide justifications for 
extra expenses, though usually they let you go with it. (Interview with the 
. Head of the Quality Control Department, 200 1) 
Nonetheless, neither her work nor the general state of production management 
seemed to be perfected and faultless, both in practice and conception. In fact, as she 
put it: 
The main problem lies in the laboratories, they are subordinated to 
production and their judgement can be influenced. When possible I try to 
have a word with them, I am on good terms with the senior managers 
there ... Well, there is bargaining - between production and the 
administration. I am afraid there is no planning, centralised management. 
Our working conditions do not allow us to have an unquestionable plan. 
Production departments cannot foresee what is going to happen. Weare still 
in transition. In the end, they are the owners, they want to decide how to 
spend their money and want to see results. (Interview with the Head of the 
Quality Control Department, 2001) 
Summary and Conclusions 
For the following two years TMS struggled to impose an even production pace and 
responsible behaviour on managers and workers and then again transition and its 
problems and practices continued. Nikita suggests that, despite much criticism, the 
new owners know and tolerate these practices very much for the same reasons the 
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previous authorities did. He calls it obman, cheating, the bargaining game in the 
managerial structure between an 'absent' centre and the 'irresponsible' managers. It 
consists in the administration providing fewer resources than required for achieving 
the targets they have themselves planned. The efficient combination of factors 
remains the sole responsibility of production and lower managers, who are constantly 
kept under pressure,65 The disproportion between the planned results and the 
resources available, which results from taut planning, is an insuperable instrument to 
achieve good results at low costs but also a formidable barrier to planning and 
modernisation and the introduction of western managerial techniques. So far it has 
been taken for granted that the only way to make the enterprise into an efficient firm 
is no less than thorough restructuring and that conversely to prevent it means the 
continuation of soviet-time practices, To understand why marketisation, hard budget 
constraints and even outside ownership could not achieve this goal and what it means 
for the enterprise to reproduce these practices in an entirely new economic and 
institutional context requires us to walk down into the shops and open the box of 
social relations in production, As for the outsiders, it will help to explain how they 
confronted themselves with the unresolved contradictions from which they had so far 
profited. Their strategy and the conditions for restructuring can only be analysed in 
, 
relation to the constraints imposed by these relations, 
65 Th'ls' d h h I' practice correspon s to w at t e Iterature on soviet management called 'taut 
planning', 
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Table 5.3 Reasons for Trallsferring to the Ital'yallskyi graftk 
Ivanovsk~i grafik hours 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1112 13 14 15 16'17 18 19202122 23 24 25 26 27 2829 30 31 m e n total 
Immmmmn 0 0 e e e e e 0 0 m m m m m n 0 0 e e e e e 0 0 m 88 80 14 182 
2e e e 0 0 mmmmmn 0 0 e e e e e 0 0 m m m m m n 0 0 e e e 80 88 14 182 
3n 0 0 e e e e e 0 0 m m m m m n 0 0 e e e e e 0 0 m m m m m 0 80 80 14 174 
538 
Itat' iansk~i grafik 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 men 
1 m m e e n n 0 0 m m e e n n 0 0 m m e e n n 0 0 m m e e n n 0 64 64 56 184 
2 e e n n 0 0 m m e e n n 0 0 m m e e n n 0 0 m m e e n n 0 0 m 56 64 56 176 
3 n n 0 0 m m e e n n 0 0 m m e e n n 0 0 m m e e n n 0 0 m m e 64 56 56 176 
4 0 0 m m e e n n 0 0 m m e e n n 0 0 m m e e n n 0 0 m m e e n 64 64 49 177 
m = morning shift e = evening shift 
Hourly output of woven fabric ' 
Output volume with Ivanovskyi grafik 
Output volume with Jtal'janskyi grafik . 
Average cost per metre 
Output value with Ivanovskyi grafik 
Output value with Jtal'janskyi grafik 
n = night shift 
12.61 Thousand metres 
6783 Thousand metres 
8990 Thousand metres 
9 Roubles 
61051.3 Thousand roubles 
80910 Thousand roubles 
Increase in time 
Increase in volume 
Increase in value 
713 
175 
2206.52 
19858.7 
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Table 5.4: The CWTent Company Organisational Structure 
Vice Mechanic 
Sewage System 
Chief 
Steam-driven 
Sytems Chief 
Heating System 
Chief 
Compressor 
Foreman 
Chief of Power 
Principal 
Timekeeper 
Electricity Shop 
Chief 
*Vice Directorfor Economic Security and the Protection of Propel1y {complete job title, C. M.I 
Enterprise Internal Document [translation from the original Russian version, C. M.] 
Principal of Tech. 
School 
Mechanic 
Foreman 
SMR Foreman 
Joinery Shop 
Foreman 
Timekeeper 
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6. Controlling Workers: the Policy of Productivity in 
Transition 
In this chapter an analysis of the functioning and change in the reward and incentive 
system will be carried out. This is made on the understanding that this was, and still 
represents, a key managerial function and therefore is crucial to understand what sort 
of adjustment, if any, is taking place in post-soviet management. Payment systems 
are usually defined as being aimed . at providing employees with reward and 
motivation, which we will rather translate in the sense that they simplify the function 
of controlling labour. This is obviously by far not the only means by which 
employers can regulate, and increase, the productivity of their subordinates. 
In between the two world wars, then on a larger scale in post-war years, 
manufacturing industries in the West have seen the emergence of always more 
sophisticated managerial and technological devices, which if not eliminating 
certainly put in second order the combination of the piece-rate and the "watchdog". 
In Soviet enterprises, as explained in the historical section, the form assumed by the 
labour proce~s meant that incentive pay remained the predominant form for 
. 
controlling labour and increasing productivity. What we have in mind for change is 
therefore not simply the introduction of a more "rational" incentive system but a 
relative change of its weight in carrying out managerial functions. 
Observation of managerial behaviour, carried out now for several years in the case 
study environment, convinced us that, not surprisingly, this is still a crucial area in 
managerial work. Enterprise administrations have found that the old payment system 
was, under the new circumstances, less effective and almost unmanageable. 
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Nevertheless they have been extremely reluctant to change it precisely because their 
reliance on the workforce has increased rather than decreased relative to the soviet 
period. On deeper scrutiny, it has been noted that it is the more aggressive managers 
from production who are liable to propose and sustain change as they are the ones 
who have to buffer the inadequacies of administration policy in the face of growing 
workers' discontent. At the same time, their proposals, even when put in place, 
demonstrate the limits of a conception of labour organisation still relying on the idea 
of incentives as a key command lever. 
Between 1999 and 2001, a wave of take-overs in the local industry radically 
modified the property framework, prefiguring also a change in strategy. Nevertheless 
the idea that outsiders might undertake what old managers were, as the mainstream 
literature claimed, unwilling to do or incapable of doing does not meet with 
comforting evidence. It is certainly true that the new, widely adopted, wage systems, 
with their stress on performance and other "quality" indicators, their attentive 
differentiation for professional figures, describe formally a move from pay-by-results 
to performanc~-related pay. Still the enormo~s social and cultural change that stands 
in between the two is not visible or not consistent. 
, 
Managerial c,ircles continue to be very fond of incentives and rely heavily on 
workers' motivation, sustained and nurtured by enterprise paternalism. This choice, it 
is candidly admitted, is not devoid of problems and contradictions. Yet the efforts are 
concentrated at striking a balance which would retain, rather than reverse, the old 
order. In this vision the payment system is viewed as a crucial device for social 
control, including its discretionary informal use by managers, and the 
factory/enterprise as a mere production unit, founded, socially and organisationally, 
on the exertion of this control. 
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This chapter consists of four sections. In the first I will outline the characteristics of 
formal and informal mechanism of the soviet wage system. In the second and third I 
will present and analyse the evolution and change the system undergo under the 
effect of transition and the action of the old and new management of the Combine. 
Eventually, I will report on the implementation and response by line managers and 
workers as to understand the limitations of reforms, the rationale of retaining the old 
system and some important modifications it has undergone under transition. 
The 'socialist' .wage system and its post-reform legacy: formal and 
informal practices .. 
This section is devoted to the description and analysis of the formal and informal 
institutions of the payment system established under socialism and maintained by the 
enterprise well after privatisation. The wage system and the highly articulated system 
of benefits and incentives functioning under the soviet system was highly centralised. 
Wage structure, pay scales, grading and incentives were drafted and defined in 
Moscow, at ministry level, and were substantially uniform across industries, 
reflecting Party policies in the field. Liberalisation and factual decentralisation in the 
early 1990s: then the severing of formal ties following privatisation, set the 
enterprise free to make its policy decisions. In practice it left enterprise managers in 
charge of administering the system without the resources and the guidance once 
provided from the centre. Until 1998, the wage system did not undergo any formal 
review at the enterprise. The institutions and practices referred to here are therefore 
the ones which managers inherited as official policy from the 80s and continued to 
operate until the late 90s. 
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The formal settings 
The payment system at the enterprise featured two basic forms, piecework, which 
comprises most manual professions, and hourly pay, applied to white collar workers 
or ITR. Both categories received a bonus that, for direct manual workers and 
production managers, was tied to the fulfilment of the production plan. The analysis 
will focus on the piece-rate wage, given the strategic importance of its earners and 
the centrality of its administration in managerial work. 
In the factory the two major production departments are spinning and weaving, with 
a quite similar professional structure and pay scale. Piece-rate workers in their shops 
comprise. machine operators, weavers and spinners, mostly female, and foremen 
assistants, in charge of light repair and maintenance work, a male-only category. 
Highly paid but scarce in numbers are the fitters, dealing with more complex 
technological services. 
The regular wage of these categories consisted of a basic wage and a bonus. The 
former was made up of two components: the flat-rate pay, amounting to around 30% 
of the basic w.age, and the piece-rate, which occupied the remaining 70%. The bonus 
(premja) for plan fulfilment was calculated at 75% of the basic wage. 
, 
The incentive mechanism hinged on the piece-rate. This was calculated on the basis 
of production norms, a statistical average of output per machine per hour, and the 
price. or tariff. Norms could differ, as a manager put it: 'It is well known that [piece-
rate] computation is made according to a formula and depends on the tariff, the 
normative capacity and the production norm. But if the tariff is the same for all 
spinning workers, yet capacity is dependent on the sort of yarn produced, therefore 
production norms cannot be the same' (Ivanova N., 2001, p. 1) 
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The standard tariff varied among categories and could be corrected upward or 
downward by coefficients. A higher tariff was paid for extra-work, first-quality 
output and nights or Sunday shifts while lower tariffs applied to second-quality 
output and cases of idleness, or Prostoi. 
Prostoi is an indicator of idle time due to stoppages. Idle time was accounted for 
separately and. in cases where workers were not held responsible for halting 
production; it was paid for compensation at a lower rate. In practice this system 
allowed workers to get away with the corresponding loss of output. Prostoi was 
reported by foremen and was an important component of shop floor bargaining. 
How did it work: informal practices 
It is well known that the soviet wage system was much less motivating than it might 
appear at a formal analysis; managerial attempts to buy workers' co-operation led to 
manipulation of incentives and proliferation of extra wage payments, which in turn 
undermined the financial rationality of the system. The study of the actual 
functioning of the system in the case study offers supportive evidence, providing 
greater insight and some industry-specific peculiarities. 
In order to e,xplain wage formation we should first identify the responsibilities of 
, 
different man'agerial bodies in assessing and rewarding workers. In this, like other' 
areas of decision-making, powers were concentrated in the hands of the Director and 
a few other senior managers. Middle managers formally had no powers nor did wage 
offices, present at central and departmental level. On this point our key respondents 
were quite clear-cut: 
The wage or time and methods officials are only in charge of statistics. they 
are mere "clerks". The administration is the only one in charge to solve these 
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questions but managers can influence their decisions because they assess 
workers' performance and they provide all the necessary information. 
(Interview with the Head of Wea ving department, 2001) 
Observation of daily managerial work reveals that: wage officials were fully 
dependent on managers to make their calculations; managers were constantly dealing 
with workers' grievances; they were actually able to mediate with the administration 
and tended to find individual solutions within the limits of the system and its 
resources. The way line managers describe how wages were paid unveils the 
centrality of their role as well as revealing some frustrating limits posed to the 
exertion of their discretion. 
Our key respondent has been working now for a decade at the enterprise, occupying 
the positions of shop chief in spinning and chief of production in weaving. He had 
been in charge of calculating the wage fund and was active in proposing and 
implementing its reform; he is therefore particularly qualified in explaining the real 
functioning of the system. He explains that the "piece-rate and premium wage", as 
managers called it, was generally paid in full to all workers. In his argument this was 
. 
not due to a well-tuned system but to lack of incenti ve and bad design. 
He justifies his argument on the ground that the piece-rate had in reality a much 
lower weight in the wage than it could appear at first sight. In fact, 'if we consider 
the three components of the wage, the hourly pay, the piecework and the bonus and 
we calculate their per cent contribution to the total wage, we obtain respectively the 
following: 17% for flat rate, 26.9% for piece-rate, 56.1 % for the bonus' (ibid.). Since 
'the hourly pay and the bonus can be both considered fixed components, then 
piecework in practice makes up less than 30% of the actual wage' (ibid.). 
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, 
Technological constraints also have their part. He observes that 'nobody could fail to 
meet the norm [Le. they were set very low, C. M.l and even so only the hooligans 
were penalised with the loss of bonus'. In his opinion the specific character of textile 
production does not allow output to vary significantly. He explains that in weaving 
and spinning 'all you have to do is do up the threads when they finish or break to 
avoid machine idleness, if any other factor is excluded. It is a routine task and given 
a certain number of machines it cannot yield substantial variations in output.' In fact, 
he argues that piece-rate does not add anything to the performance of textile machine 
operators. He even wondered why the Bolsheviks in the first place opted for this 
system in his industry. In his experience, the practice of storming, stimulated by this 
incentive, demonstrated its harmfulness as workers try to overcome bottlenecks by 
violating technological discipline and safety rules. Though, elsewhere, he gave 
plenty of evidence that managers must tolerate it in so far as they are pressed for 
output targets. 
Technology alone, though, does not tell the whole story. The rigidity of the system, 
as it emerges, clearly from the statements reported above, was at least equally 
dependent on established conventions between workers and managers. He himself 
openly stated'that 'the bonus must be paid' and line managers, interviewed on this 
, 
. 
matter, were all convinced that the bonus was an integral part of the wage. This also 
implies that plan-fulfilment was guaranteed. In fact production norms had not been 
revised for years. 
This is not to say that the large majority of workers were not concerned with meeting 
managerial expectations for plan-fulfilment nor that it was indeed an easy task. 
Workers considered making the norm a paramount task and they had to put a lot of 
effort into making sure that they accomplished it. 
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Yet the piece-rate and the related bonus were not considered in themselves as an 
incentive, that is a flexible means in the hands of managers to discipline workers. As 
a manager noted: 'in the last years of perestroika we had probably the highest wage 
in the manufacturing sector but this had no effect on productivity and morale.' 
(Interview with the Shop Chief of the weaving shop n. 1,2000) 
The limits of the formal incentive system based on scientific assessment' of results 
were overcome by personal bargaining between workers' and managers. Managers 
were admittedly urged to use a stick and carrot tactic to discipline workers and elicit 
their co-operation. 
'At the Institute', our key respondent reminds us 'we were taught that the job of 
managers consisted in exercising authority by using both the carrot and the stiCk.66• 
To make sure that subordinates do fulfil their tasks, the manager has to educate them 
by paying by results.' (Interview with the Head of the weaving department, 2000). 
The wage system, tied to individual performance and offering a wide range of means 
to differentiate earnings, is used by the experienced manager as a tool to graduate 
rewards and ~unishments among subordinates. The character of this relationship is 
strictly personal: it can manifest itself in a simple one-to-one relationship or be 
, 
extended to a collective whose leader, a good mechanic, brigade leader, foreman, 
. 
shop chief, demonstrated managerial abilities. 
Managers had several means to achieve workers' co-operation in a direct and 
effective way. These ranged from the discretional decision over recruitment, 
relocation and promotion of workers to distribution of bonuses and individual 
rewards. The existence of six levels of grading, numerous professions and piece-rate 
66 Or 'knut i pryanik', as it is known in Russian. 
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differentials provided a wide range of earning differentials. Line managers were 
directly in charge of recruiting, training and promoting workers and they consciously 
used their discretion on these matters to discipline workers. 
We have .observed that, irrespective of their aspirations, background and formal 
education, people working at the enterprise entered their working place at a lower 
step on the ladder. They progressed over time under the guidance of their direct 
superior combining experience, further education and evidence of law-abiding 
behaviour. Access to better jobs generally implied further education, which the 
enterprise offered on its premises, including special training courses and the more . 
formal schooling at the branch of the technical Institute. Managers usually selected 
candidates, offered tuition, advised and even instructed their candidates before 
exams. 
Workers who had no aspirations or skills to become cadres and enter positions of 
authority could still improve their condition and earning opportunities by moving to 
a different production shop or working station. It was in the manager's hands that a 
worker be trained to work on a certain machine or be judged sufficiently skilled and 
, 
conscious to be allowed in his shop. In principle the system allowed also for reverse 
. 
measures, though social and political conditions made it more difficult for a manager 
I 
to punish, demote or relocate workers to lower positions. Our key respondent found 
that 'these measures are unpopular'. 
The most simple and immediate way to implement the pay-by-results policy was, and 
still is to a certain extent, to literally agree with individual workers or brigades to pay 
a lump sum, usually under the guise of a bonus, for the accomplishment of a specific 
task. As a manager put it: 'you have to pay [i.e. bribe, C. M.l a man if you want the 
job to be done' (Interview with the Chief Mechanic of the Weaving Department). 
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This is a quite vast area, which clearly borders on informality while being tied for 
payments to the use of official incentive funds. 
In so far as current practices in the shops may give a hint of how bargaining took 
place also in the past, our observation leads us to conclude that the use of individual 
incentives at the factory strongly resemble practices usually described in the 
literature as informal bargaining. The case suggests two specifications. First, 
managers stressed the centrality of continuous bargaining at individual level to 
literally buyout workers co-operation. This practice was intended as the communist, 
i.e. official, way to deal with workers' grievances and motivational problems. 
Secondly, a clear pattern was observed which differentiates between professions as 
for the frequency and consistency of bargaining. Skilled workers, the technicians in 
charge of repair and maintenance services, were more likely to deal directly with the 
shop chief to schedule their work plan and settle their payments. The quote reported 
above regarding the need for extra payments, referred in fact to male workers only: 
'women would do their job anyway' he added. Women did actually raise grievances, 
usually conce,rning tariffs, norms and bonus coefficients. Differentials also arose 
thanks to different productivity between individuals or shops. Nevertheless, machine 
operators ha~ less room to exercise control over their work and for them the 
bargaining was confined to minor adjustments within the system. This phenomenon 
can be fully understood only if keeping in mind the fact that male workers and 
managers felt a strong sense of comradeship among themselves· and a higher 
standing over their female colleagues, therefore feeling under lower pressure when 
dealing with them. This is consistent with the fact that the sector scored high 
productivity rates, as the tighter plan targets would suggest, and yielded high 
"profi ts". 
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So far we have discussed the functioning of the payment system with reference to 
monetary pay and incentives. Yet it is well-known how in the soviet system money 
played a much lower role than it does in capitalist societies. In particular, key goods 
and services were made available directly by enterprises and were made dependent 
on workers' status as cadres. This system was tied to the peculiar political and social 
features of the socialist states and has therefore no equal to any incentive scheme in 
the industrial world. In the managers' opinion it was an essential pillar of the social 
structure of the enterprise, playing a greater role than any other monetary incentive. 
We will therefore report it in the following section before making an appraisal of the 
payment system as a whole. 
Non- monetary incentives: the moral and material rewards of cadre status 
Bonuses and other handouts administered more or less informally by shop managers 
all represent forms of monetary reward. However much their consistency, 
denomination and mechanism of distribution might have changed they are still very 
much the same today. Therefore, if analysis would be limited to those aspects of the 
payment syst~m the idea of continuity would certainly be exaggerated. As our key 
respondent put it: 'throwing a five-rouble coin in someone's hands was not the way 
to make, or reward, cadres in soviet times. Every alcoholic could get a bonus for a 
, 
good piece of work.' Under Socialism, alongside monetary rewards there were moral 
(political) ones, which were of incomparably greater importance. Generally they 
consisted in the awarding of an orden (badge of honour) and were administered on 
consideration of both political activism and work professionalism. Their superiority 
over material incentives has to be judged on a twofold argument: an orden raised the 
social status of the holder for life, if he behaved carefully he could be safe that 
his/her opinion would not be challenged both at work and in political bodies. 
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Privileges of a more mundane character were also part of the package and again they 
could not be reduced or suspended. Nikita Aleksandrovich remembers that:· 'When 
the latest consumer goods were assigned to the factory for distribution, he would be 
offered purchase without queuing, if cars were available, he had only to go and get it, 
the same would happen with an apartment.' Therefore, this form of incentive added 
to the sense of security of workers, both socially and economically, in a way 
monetary incentives, as they were designed and have largely been maintained, could 
hardly compare. The end of the socialist institutional framework and the centrality 
assumed by market-like transactions has made these incentives obsolete but has left a 
void that material rewards - inconsistent and episodic - can only struggle to take up. 
The problem here is not simply to elicit workers' effort but to rebuild their 
confidence and consent on a stable and solid base. This necessarily includes restoring 
the moral and material status of cadres, also as an incentive to attract new recruits 
among the young. Our key respondents seem confident that high, stable wages giving 
access to a western-like level of private consumption could be a solution. 
Unfortunately, current trends suggest that, as one of them put it, 'so far no Ford has 
appeared in Russia, who understood that his wealth can' be erected on people's 
welfare.' 
The major characteristics of the payment system can therefore be categorised as 
follows. Piece-rate administered under soviet conditions of production means highly 
differentiated salaries and continuous bargaining. Its more visible negative features 
were: excessive pressure on workers to achieve norms, marginalisation of managerial 
work, distress for managers involved in bargaining and budgets strained by 
unplanned growth of the wage fund. Managers though were still very fond of it and 
more oriented to reform than replacement. We discussed with our respondents 
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whether it was not the piece-rate system in itself that was the problem rather than its 
design or targets. They argued firmly in favour of the virtue of the piece-rate system 
as opposed to flat hourly pay as a means to elicit workers' efforts, asserting that 
'workers won't work otherwise.' 
Bonuses are a relevant component of the wage system. In the first place there was the 
bonus for plan fulfilment, consisting of 75% of base salary, but this was a regular 
part of everyone's earnings at the factory. In soviet times other bonuses were 
administered in relation to specific campaigns, the latest known were related to the 
introduction of the brigade system, the anti-alcohol campaign, quality improvement 
et cetera. Several respondents stressed the importance of COUHaflHCTH'leCKOe 
copeBHoBaHHe, socialist competition. All of them were actually used by line 
managers to provide extra pay to motivate workers. 
Prostoz-67 was extremely important in the calculation of individual wages and had 
relevant effects on labour costs. Each worker, the ones considered here are weavers, 
was assigned a number of machines whose output was used to calculate her wage. It 
was not unusu,al for some of them to lie idle during the shift, or stay out of work even 
longer, because of breakdowns and repairs, lack of parts or yam et cetera. In this case 
, 
the worker ~ould obviously lose the equivalent of lost output, furthermore, she 
would risk failing to fulfil the plan if output losses were considerable. Generally 
workers would raise a claim to have the loss compensated and not considered for 
bonuses depending on plan-fulfilment. It should be underlined that, even before the 
crisis began, this practice fell under scrutiny as a result of increasingly frequent 
stoppages and the need to tighten up financial and organisational discipline. Since the 
67 The output loss, its compensation, and the "virtual" output entering wage calculations are 
all referred to in factory jargon as prostoi. 
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practice was still in use, though restricted, after wage refonn, as we shall see, we can 
also observe that managers tended to attribute stoppages rather to objective causes 
than to conscious negligence of workers and so were inclined to accept workers' 
claims. 
Bonuses and piece-rate differentials, their availability for discretionary and 
discriminatory use by managers, constitute not the only but certainly the most 
important means in the traditional, soviet, way of management. 
In order to comprehend how wages actually worked as a means to elicit workers' 
efforts and maintain managerial authority we have to consider the circumstances 
under which production was carried out and how relations between workers and 
managers were maintained. In soviet times, on everyone's admission, conditions of 
production were optimal, the enterprise output was counted in millions of meters and 
accounts registered high profits. Still results and benefits where not equally 
distributed among shops and employees. Production managers had to fight their daily 
battle against the well-known vagaries of soviet production. The most significant 
recorded here; were lack of co-ordination along the production line, pennanent 
conflict with the central offices which pressed for plan-fulfilment and failed to 
deliver on ker procurement, the poor quality of technology which imposed constant 
concern for maintenance and replacement. All this diverted the manager's attention 
from his main business and constantly threatened the achievement of his or her goals, 
production targets. We have tq add that subordinates varied greatly as to their skills 
and motivation since traditional disciplinary measures, firing in the first place, were 
unavailable. One of the main tasks of production managers, other than overseeing 
technology, consisted in carefully selecting the skilled and reliable people to whom 
they could safely delegate tasks and on whom they could rely in case of difficulties. 
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The system was ingrained and often distorted so as to guarantee that these workers 
would be recruited, rewarded and retained. 
The system was an essential device in the mechanism that structured and reproduced 
the social relations in the enterprise, whose stability was in tum perceived as a 
precondition to the normal organisation of production. Therefore, the old 
management felt no need to significantly modify it till its distortions on the current 
activity of the enterprise were no longer acceptable. In the 1992-1998 period the 
administration was dormant on this issue and the story is more one of retain than 
reform. The nature and effect of the latest reform spurred by outside owners is less 
obvious, appearing both conflictual in its implementation and controversial in its 
conception. We will look at both in the next sections. 
Crisis and reform: the wage system in transition 
During the 1990s the wage and incentive system remained substantially unchanged. 
Still the radical modification of the technical and economic conditions in which the 
enterprise ope~ated made its flaws even more evident, fostering partial modifications. 
A vicious circle established between declining purchasing power of take-home pay 
and low wor~ers' motivation, on the one side, and technological deterioration and 
I 
lower productivity, on the other. Senior management lost control over the growth of 
the wage fund and line managers saw a growing gap between the ability to elicit 
greater efforts and the corresponding results. They responded by using target-related 
bonuses, increases in the incentive component of the wage and finally the 
introduction of collective bonuses. The growing bargaining power of managers did 
not stop productivity decline and put into question the very effectiveness of the 
piece-rate system. 
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1990·1996 Business as usual: the system retained. 
At least until 1997, Combine senior managers did not address openly and decisively 
the issue of productivity policy and more generally worker-manager relations. 
Radical changes to the wage and incentive system did not enter the restructuring 
agenda. This despite the fact that discipline was poor and productivity declining. 
They actually tried to cope with it in other forms, relying on the assumptions that it 
was poor technology, low incentives and the weight of the less able and motivated to 
hinder. productivity and poison an otherwise harmonious atmosphere among 
members of the Labour Collective 
The Director took a position of least resistance, expressing his determination to 
sustain and even extend the productive and social assets of the 'labour collective', 
relying on the efforts and loyalty of its manager and worker cadres (Interview: 
General Director in Shelkov and Antonov, 1998, pp. 57-69). Reviewing productivity 
issues, he focused on introducing new machinery or improving manufacturing 
techniques, clearly avoiding any reference to grand schemes in the field of work 
organisation68;. 
It should be noted that traditionally an increase in production "norms" was usually 
tied to technological renewal, as confirmed by a prescriptive article included in the 
last collective agreement. Yet it does not seem that norms played any role in raising 
productivity, showing in this sense continuity in informal bargaining practices. As 
shop managers confirmed in interviews, norms did not really mean anything, they 
68 In reality, managers were well aware of restructuring options based on 'Western models' 
and harboured plans of deep restructuring and massive lay-off. However, they were forced to 
shelve them as the crisis deepened their reliance on workers, making such plans unpopular 
and economically unsound. 
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had never been raised for decades and their recent adjustment played no influence in 
their efforts to get more work done. 
Nevertheless, since 1990 the plan had been discontinued and both supply and sales 
had to be managed differently with far-reaching effects also on the way work was 
carried out and paid for. On this point our key respondent refers: 
With the supply of cotton uneven and uncertain, it became impossible to 
meet planned targets at prescribed deadlines. we worked· as much as we 
could once we received the material. [Therefore], managers paid the settled 
wage plus bonus pay irrespective of piece-rate calculations ... payment was 
made under considerations of the way they worked. [The way they 
proceeded was] to talk with foremen and see how their shifts were 
performing. (Interview with the Head of the weaving department, 2001) 
From the point of view of a scientific approach aimed at matching rewards with 
results, this occurrence was a further drift away from a rational system of wage 
calculation. In practice, this meant an increase of managerial discretion but also 
greater room for complaints and ensuing bargaining. Managers and foremen might 
, 
now have an upper hand over individual workers or shifts but for the most they were, 
or felt themst'llves to be, compelled to pay full wages despite the deepening negative 
trends in productivity and diSCipline. Enterprise administration, in tum, lost any 
possibility to command over the wage funds and plan a more efficient use of 
resources. 
Transition also required that the enterprise had to pay for supplies and cope with 
rising costs and this meant, according to the strategy then adopted, producing more 
and faster. This prompted the piecemeal introduction of the fourth shift. This 
decision boosted both absolute productivity and wages but also posed problems of 
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manageability. The introduction of the extra shift was subject to approval from the 
production management who had to guarantee the necessary increase in the staffing 
level. This was one reason why line managers resisted or procrastinated. Whatever 
the case, staffing did not seem sufficient at any time, leaving shop managers to cope 
with it by agreeing with existing workers on longer working days and extra work 
(sverkhurochna). It seems as if shock-work was reappearing under a new guise, 
compensating for the high levels of absenteeism and low individual productivity. At 
one time, some shops tried to cope with "understaffing" by introducing twelve-hour 
shifts. This was, though, a temporary solution. The practice continued but as a rule 
longer shifts were bargained at individual level. The other option was to ask 
employees to work on rest days. In all later cases extra work was not made 
compulsory but workers felt a strong pressure to comply. Self-interest, that is the 
need to supplement a meagre wage had its part but so did the pressure of managers 
and fellow workers to fill vacancies and not to let them down. In terms of labour 
costs this solution was effective in the short term. In current managerial discourse it 
meant the achievement of greater flexibility in the use of the workforce, saving on 
the cost of re~ruiting extra workers who tended also to be even less productive. Yet, 
one can only. imagine the consequences for both production and workers' life of a 
, 
twelve-hour l~ng shift. The extensive recourse to extra work indicates at one and the 
same time the reproduction of traditional bargaining practices centred on line 
management and the growth of managerial powers. This confirms how much their 
early idea of transition did not contemplate any structural change to worker-
management relations. They simply imagined to use the free hand gained by 
privatisation in order to strengthen their discretionary power over workers. 
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Yet our judgement on the behaviour of the enterprise management would be partial 
and unfair if we did not mention the gradual emergence of alternative strategies and 
the difficulties encountered in implementing these new options. Managers in fact 
explained that their expectation of productivity gains lay in staff reduction, an idea 
again quite familiar to scholars of the late soviet reforms. What they had in mind was 
a selective cut, addressing the unproductive and "antisocial" elements in the labour 
collective. Looking at experiences from other enterprises, in 1995 the legal advisor 
went as far as advising a guided bankruptcy. Some managers embraced the idea but 
then the Director put it aside. Later, the "unproductive" became all those workers 
who did not directly or indirectly contribute to production, so they proceeded to 
some internal reshuffling or cut of service units. 
As was sadly recognised by the Department of Labour and Wages, all this did not 
produce any significant change in the wage fund balance. Our key respondent 
pointed out that the failure of this strategy was due to the unexpected activation of 
the labour market, which significantly reduced the traditional hold on key sections of 
the work force. 'The enterprise did not recruit in between 1992-1994 .. .' he said, and 
' ... to the contrary of what we expected we lost the good ones and had to keep and 
recruit more bf the bad ones' (Interview with the Head of the weaving department, 
, ' 
, 
2000) 
Reward to retain: wage and personnel policy 
If the wage system was to operate effectively, a new variable had now to be 
considered, namely its ability to retain' and recruit workers. This was an absolute 
novelty to the management, used to a uniform wage scale spread across the industry. 
The initial strategy of the Director to retain all the elements of the past welfare as 
well as the "insularity" of the company town might have stemmed the flood. In the 
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second half of the 1990s though, the outflow of specialists made evident the 
shortcomings of the conservative approach. It became clear that the current level of 
wages could not satisfy the most needed skilled workers and specialists. This might 
at first surprise considering that, as explained before, the socialist system was in 
practice very flexible and already favouring these categories. Still, if one bears in 
mind the relevance of the non-monetary component and the role of incentive funds, 
now curtailed or disappeared altogether, it is immediately understood that 
differentials in the current monetary wage were insufficient to remunerate the 
exceptional work of cadres. 
The more so because inflation was eroding the purchasing power of salaries and 
money was acquiring the highest consideration among the employees .. Therefore a 
decision was made to raise the wages of fitters and mechanics, mostly foremen 
assistants, altering the traditional wage differentials. Managers recount that this 
decision led to a spontaneous uprising of both the other workers and the ITR, forcing 
the administration to retreat. The problem was left in the hands of line management 
who had to jiggle with funds and norms in order to save their specialists. 
The 1997-1999 crisis and attempts at reform: the triumph of the bonus. 
Managers resolved to experiment with changes to the wage and reward system in the 
1997-99 period under the consideration that it did not any more provide a viable 
form of stimulation, indeed labour productivity had fallen' sharply and workers 
seemed no longer to be motivated. Such a decision only came after a profound crisis 
had strained the cohesiveness of the labour collective, heavily compromised 
managerial authority and those regulatory mechanism like the wage and reward 
system, eventually forcing managers themselves to search for new approaches to 
control workers and mana~e production. Crisis was manifested in several forms, we 
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will now look at those which had an immediate impact in production, and the 
responses which they attracted from managers and workers. 
First of all, growing external pressure in the form of higher input costs and narrow 
margins on sales had imposed increasingly harder. financial constraints on 
expenditures. Furthermore, a sky-high debt charge led the authorities to freeze 
enterprise resources. The response by top management was to begin a cost-cutting 
policy, including staff reduction, cuts to current expenditures and obviously a 
postponement of any plan of capital renewal. Coupled with a policy aimed at output 
increases, this series of circumstances produced a deterioration of technical and 
organisational conditions of production in the shops, frustrating managerial attempts· 
to keep production flow under control and depressing workers' earnings and working 
conditions. Yet the consequence with greater and immediate effect on people's lives 
and morale was the non-payment of wages, which led to the accumulation of a full 
year of wage arrears in the 1997-1999 period. Let us see now how workers and 
managers experienced and interpreted these phenomena and how the wage and 
reward system came to be identified as a distorting mechanism and therefore a key 
tool for corrective action. 
The situation in production in 1997 is vividly and thoroughly referred to in an 
I 
interview conceded by the then head of the weaving department to the Labour 
Collective's weekly: 
We work in difficult conditions, first of all production overheats 
continuously because of physical-mechanical conditions of the yam. I am 
sorry, we have not been forced to deal with cotton of such low quality 
before. Breaks have grown sharply and we had to compensate workers for 
two months because they worked with low quality cotton. Secondly, we 
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failed to keep pace with the production schedule because of irregular 
provision of yam from the spinning and preparation shops. As a result, 
prostoi have grown and final output has fallen. In order to increase material 
incentives for workers and managers, daily and monthly output targets have 
been set and rewards are administered for plan-fulfilment. The work 
schedule also has been reinforced, with the first shop now working round-
the-clock on four shifts. Still we cannot meet the expected output targets, 
basically for two reasons. First, as mentioned, because of lack of yam, 
secondly, which is much more complicated, because of the human factor. A 
sudden generation turnover and a sometimes ill-conceived cadre policy have 
led to such a situation that the professionalism of weavers and assistant 
foremen has notably declined. It has to do not with training but rather with 
dedication. They lack the will to learn and work slackly. We cannot deny 
that we are living in hard times, many circumstances affect people's life, 
among them non-payment of wages and the hardships of everyday life. 
Those problems, which should require immediate actions, are first the 
deficiency of spare-parts. The machinery is on average 10-15 years old and 
obviou,Sly machines break quite often. Because of the lack of spare parts we 
may have up to 30 machines idle for a shift. Obviously now their purchase is 
I 
not a problem, it's just that we cannot afford them. This epidemic of thefts 
. 
continues to be equally worrying among our miseries. This is one reason 
why our production lies in much worse condition. All measures taken by the 
administration have turned out to be ineffective. We have installed alarm 
systems in all warehouses. It obviously gives results but until people 
understand that they are robbing themselves, until they stand up to preserve 
enterprise assets, there will be no change. (Svetlakov L., 1997, p. 2) 
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The concern of the production manager focuses on the fall in productivity and the 
lowering of output quality, which directly affects the fulfilment of his targets. As a 
top manager in charge of the whole weaving department he also has concerns for the 
major determinants of this situation. He individuates the interplay of objective, i.e. 
beyond· reach of production managers, and subjective factors, the "human" 
component. The non co-operative attitude of workers appears to him as a justifiable, 
still worrying, phenomenon and an unprecedented one, at least in its scale. Solutions 
though amount to nothing else than the re-introduction of "elements of the, planned 
economy" as the interviewer defined them, i.e. target-related individual rewards. Not 
surprisingly they were short-lived. 
An interview with his successor, made at the end of 2000 but covering the whole 
period, allows a more detailed look at the dynamics of the wage and its interactions 
with relations in production. The new head of production, our key respondent Nikita 
Aleksandrovich, had to face a situation that, while depicted in his own words as very 
similar to his predecessor's, was aggravated on both sides of the hierarchy. On the 
one side, there was the greater determination of the administration to introduce order 
into production to gain efficiency and, on the other, workers' disillusion was 
probably at if,s highest level. In between 1998 and 1999, we should keep in mind, the 
, 
enterprise reached the bottom of its crisis: production halted for the first time, 
leaving workers with food rationing. Then bankruptcy meant a shift in decision-
making power in favour of creditor's hands and in rapid succession the replacement 
of the director himself. Now traditional concerns for output growth were not replaced 
but combined with requirements for higher quality and lower costs and workers were 
made the object of a discipline campaign by the administration. 
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'In 1998-99', our key respondent observed, 'we experienced a worsening of 
technological discipline' (Interview with the Head of the weaving department., 
2000). On the state of manager-worker relations, required to comment, he burst out: 
'We have to force employees to work!' (Ibid.). In his opinion, this had much to do 
with the ill functioning of the wage and reward system. My field notes on the point 
say: 
A look at trends in the structure of the wage reveals its distortive effects. 
The prostoi coefficient has been growing steadily, as a result plan is 
overfulfilled but real output declines. Actually, the piece-rate amounted to 
only 30% of the salary, the rest consisting of bonus (premiya) and prostoi. 
Productivity had fallen to 17 metreslhour. 
As he himself reasoned, the natural deterioration of working conditions, accelerated 
by the introduction of the new shift, augmented stoppages and breakdowns, 
depressing productivity. But the practice to compensate workers in order to preserve 
their earnings meant that lower output did not result in lower wages. As a result, top 
managers la~ented, reward lost any real relation with work. An earlier response, 
under the new Head's mandate, did not differ substantially from previous 
interventions; 
\ 
At the beginning of 1999, a first move was attempted in order to reverse this 
trend with an increase to 100% of the plan fulfilment bonus. Admittedly the 
advantage was that the relative weight of piece-rate theoretically grew and 
so with it the interest of the worker to increase output. The disadvantage was 
that clearly workers were more than ever determined to achieve their 
planned target ... at the cost of actual output. As a result productivity on 
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gauze fell from 23 mlh to 10-12 mlh. (Interview with the Head of the 
weaving department, 2000) 
Before turning to the wage refonn it remains to examine what were the causes of 
workers' discontent, and why traditional interventions did not relieve it, and then see 
how it worked to lower productivity. The shrinking of resources available to 
managers for bargaining with workers against the required upward adjustment in 
productivity meant that the wage and reward system inherited from socialism lost 
any sense. As our familiar respondent put it: 'managers had been left with the whip 
to govern' their subordinates. The chief of the wage and labour department (OTiZ) 
explains: 'The old piece-rate and bonus system basically disintegrated as a result of 
the abysmally low level of wages' (Interview with the Chief of the OTiZ, 2000). 
Such a situation though did not produce generalised and overt conflict but individual 
responses, which further depressed productivity and revenues. The new unfavourable 
circumstances in which the enterprise found itself, coupled with technical and 
organisational flaws of soviet times, combined to produce this effect. 
Workers already strained by higher workloads and longer working hours could not· 
possibly react but with tricks and discipline violations against attempts to elicit 
, 
further efforts. The individualised payment system halted co-operation among shifts 
and between machine operators and maintenance workers, while cementing collusion 
between operators. As many put it: 'why give way to repairs if machines can still 
produce and let someone further on sort it out' (Interview with Assistant foreman, 
2000). The shop chief agreed that any measure to speed up production, though 
unorthodox, was understandable in view of the need for greater output (Interview 
with the Shop Chief of the weaving s. n.1, 2000). 
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The gender divide further complicated 'the situation with female machine operators 
on the one side and technical personnel, generally male, on the other. The first, under 
greater pressure to produce and bring the plan home, the second, more scarce in 
numbers, due to voluntary outflow, and difficult to manage for lack of appropriate 
incentives. 
In March 1999 the decision was taken for a full-scale reform with the introduction of 
a collective system of payment, the brigade system. Brigades were established at 
"zone" level comprising machine operators 'and assistant foremen servicing the 
"zone" over the four shifts. Each brigade was put on self-financing (khozraschet) and 
asked to sign separate contracts. As far as the wage structure was concerned, we had 
the following: 
The individual piece-rate coefficient was integrated with an indicator of the "zone" 
overall output to force workers into greater co-operation. 
Plan fulfilment bonus (premiya) rose up to 200% of the basic salary. 
Furthermore the key question of prostoi was eventually made the object of a cut-
throat decision. First, a ceiling was established to the amount of prostoi eligible for 
compensati0t;l. Secondly, decision-making over this matter was passed over from 
, 
foreman to shop chief. 
Immediate results were visible: shop statistics recorded a stabilisation of productivity 
at the higher pre-crisis level while average salary grew too. Now workers were paid 
according to results, managers maintained; the piece-rate coefficient weight rose to 
35% of the overall take-home pay and wages grew on average by 2.5%. Also 
differentials, at least among brigade members and within shops, were reduced 
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making life easier for shop managers forced to deal with recurrent complaints and 
permanent bargaining. 
Admittedly the new system was only a partial and short-term solution to work 
organisation problems. The major defect was its applicability, since each brigade had 
to sign a separate contract and some could differ significantly from the collective 
one. 
Its introduction, rather than being planned from above, was proposed and designed 
by top production managers and then extended gradually with the collaboration of 
middle managers in order to achieve consent and smooth down technical or 
organisational inconveniences. Like the introduction of the new work schedule, the 
new payment system encountered resistance and suspicion by middle managers. The 
field notes on the situation in the shop report: 
In November 2000, our key respondent occupies the post of Head of the 
weaving department. He has managed to introduce a new payment system, 
the brigade system. The new system has not been extended automatically to 
all shops. As he maintains, change should be introduced with "democratic" 
methods not imposed from above. He is therefore trying to convince his 
friend and subordinate, the shop chief, to adopt it in his shop. The shop chief 
I 
is not convinced about the effectiveness of the new system. In fact, to him it 
does not appear new at all. He asks whether his superior has in mind the 
constitution of "communist" brigades of shock workers. The situation in the 
shop seems to lean in favour of the pro-brigade argument. The shop chief 
asks for his superior to adjust the coefficients for wage calculations of 
several workers: the problems lay in the fact that the piece-rate depends, 
among other things, on the number of machines operated and obviously 
there is not an even number for all workers. The situation is further 
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complicated by the fact that some machines are better than others. so 
workers fight for the best "zone" and then complain with him. The Head of 
the department assents to his request but insists that the new system. by 
equalising wages with the collective coefficient. would smooth down 
differentials and so the complaints. The shop chief did not provide a clear 
explanation for his opposition; a response. though. can be looked for in the 
worker" attitude to differentials. which emerged vividly also in this shop. 
The reform also led to a substantial increase in wages; still it did not help with the 
continuous complaints by workers over wage differentials and discrimination in the 
allocation of resources. Traditional intra- and infra-category differentials were left in 
place. Yet. the deterioration in capital stock and continuous changes in production 
programmes meant that differentials between brigades and shops continued to 
manifest themselves and earnings remain volatile. Stress on quality, cost reduction 
and rationing of raw materials and spare parts were constantly used to justify wage 
cuts and loss of bonuses. On this ground both workers and shop managers felt 
endangered. as the latter were considered ultimately responsible for workers' 
failures. Managers could use their discretionary powers to match the best workers 
with the best-equipped working stations but this inevitably raised jealousies and 
, 
complaints. ' 
I could observe how the situation in the shops had reached an explosive climax when 
a shop chief summoned the chief wage accountant of the weaving department to face 
grievances by workers. From my notes: 
Workers' representatives argue that the wage has remained substantially 
unchanged despite the introduction of the fourth shift. they complain that 
other shops receive better pay without specific justifications and lament 
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bonus losses on excessive strictness of quality control. The shop manager 
confirms the claims, maintaining that his shop has been discriminated 
against in setting the piece-rate price. The wage office employee rejects 
accusations, though remarking that poor quality and high level of prostoi 
were possible causes of differences observed. She is basically unable to face 
the argument and ends up simply defending the authority of the central wage 
department to act according to the data available. 
The argument was probably no novelty to all participants. What appears to be new is 
the determination from above to impose decisions at the expense of managerial 
authority on the shop floor. Managerial support for workers' claims reveals the 
extent to which the new policy was endangering traditional bargaining practices on 
the shop floor. 
We discussed these issues with the head of the department at the time these problems 
emerged and he agreed that the core problem was precisely the retaining of the piece-
rate and bonus system and its underpinning philosophy of voluntaristic mobilisation. 
If technological discipline was to be achieved, workers ~hould be guaranteed a 
reasonable wage for an acceptable work plan. In his opinion, the piece-rate 
component had to grow up to 60%, an homogenisation of production targets 
. 
provided, and piece-rate workers themselves had to be reduced to only 30% of the 
staff total, essentially machine operators and assistant foremen. Quality had to 
become the comer stone of rewards. He was equally adamant that without 
investments and radical restructuring of the managerial structure the traditional 
soviet informal practices were the only control mechanism available, which he 
himself demonstrated to master and practice extensively. A wider shake up in the 
area was therefore expected but it came to coincide with the greater involvement of 
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outsiders in the enterprise management. Its analysis has to include the different 
interventions in the payment issues that they carried out in order to consolidate their 
hold on employees. 
The 2000-2002 outsider control: a new wage policy? 
When outsiders effectively took over the situation at the company, wage policy was 
certainly one of the major areas in which they had to intervene. First, they had to 
decide what to do with wage payments as wage delays and wage arrears had built up 
since 1997 creating an enormous financial and motivational problem. Secondly, they 
had to review wage policy, that is intervening on differentials, if they wanted to . 
counter skilled personnel outflow. Third, they had to inaugurate a new polic~ in line 
with the idea of "western" efficiency and modernisation they constantly spoke of as 
their aim. This included new incentive pay, which will be discussed extensively later, 
and a change to prioritised professional categories, in order to favour managers and 
economists. 
Wage payment and wage arrears 
TMS, the outsiders' company, agreed to repay gradually wage arrears and to restore 
regular paym7nt of wages. The first action was made conditional on the financial 
performance of the enterprise and was clearly linked to workers' increased efforts in 
restoring high productivity levels. We should recall that the enterprise had fallen into 
financial difficulties since 1997, which culminated in 1998 in the paralysis of 
production and complete default on wages. As a result, workers had accumulated 
huge arrears, which were "frozen" and were meant to be paid separately, like other 
consolidated debts. They are therefore referred to here as "historical" arrears, for 
their computation and payment was distinguished from delays in payment of current 
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take-home pay. In mid 2001, looking back at the previous year, official reports69 said 
that "historical" arrears had been substantially reduced from 4630 thousands Rb to 
"only" 606 thousands. The high level of "current" arrears remained instead 
substantial, running at a high 6420 thousands. This last arrangement should not be 
overlooked because delay in current payments meant that workers were now 
receiving deferred wages, for example April wage in July, May wage in August and 
so on, that is devalued ones. 
Workers, several times, went confrontational on these matters in a collective fashion. 
In April 2001, they were refused the right to celebrate Easter holidays, still not on the 
official holiday calendar, with the justification that the enterprise could not afford to 
discontinue the production process even for one day. Workers therefore raised the 
issue of wage arrears and threatened stoppages. The Direction, then, countered with 
the threat to remove bonuses. Eventually an agreement was reached, which 
contemplated payments to production workers only, excluding ITR and auxiliaries. 
The wo~ker7o who reported this story commented angrily about the event, observing 
spontaneousl~ that the administration had been able to head off workers' protest by 
making concessions to a privileged category. This is especially. remarkable for a 
worker, a low-paid female quality controller, who demonstrated herself in other 
I • 
circumstances to be much less confrontational and was often well disposed toward 
69 Data presented by the Chief Engineer at the trade unions conference in May (Srnirnov E., 
200lb). 
70 The woman in question is currently working as a quality controller in the finishing shops. 
She has been one of my key informants particularly for issues regarding women workers. 
She used to be the chief of one of the factory canteens before cuts to ITR positions and social 
services forced her to take a blue-collar job. Like in the cases of others suffering the same 
fate, her demotion was the result of ostracism targeting her as a single mother with serious 
family and personal problems. 
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the newcomers. She previously commented, in fact, that the outsiders were at least 
able to pay salaries while the previous Director had failed to meet his promises. 
Again, later in August, an enterprise trade union meeting offered the occasion to 
present TMS leaders with a request to anticipate arrears repayment on the ground 
that workers were unable to meet education expenses for the approaching school 
year. Workers maintained that their wages were too low to withstand these costs. The 
scornful reply by the TMS president was later reported in an interview given by the 
above mentioned to the factory paper. It can be safely synthesised as follows: 
'1 want you to understand this clearly', he said, ' ... notwithstanding the 
enormous financial efforts in modernisation sustained by our firm, we still 
do not see the expected results'. [Then he continued complaining about] 
' ... faIling productivity, absenteeism, discipline violations .. .' [and so forth. 
He pointed out that] 'in the spinning shops, after the introduction of the new 
wage system, workers can easily earn up to 3000 roubles a month ... ' 
[therefore, concluded that] ... we have the impression that in their majority 
workers simply do not want to earn a good wage.' (Privolzhskyi Rabochii, 
2001d)' 
Another mea~ure contained in the financial adjustment package, of little significance 
, 
in itself, but cause of pernicious consequences, was the reintroduction of cash 
payment for meals consumed in the factory canteens. Prices in the past had been 
heavily subsidised and the collective farm guaranteed a steady supply of fresh 
foodstuff. During the crisis the direction decided to deduct the costs of meals from 
wage dues, recurring in practice to in-kind payment. Workers were obviously 
unhappy with it, as they preferred to see cash instead of increasingly worse food. In 
any case, the decision to restore payment, at much higher prices than in the past, up 
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to 20 roubles for a full menu, resulted in workers deserting the canteens and resorting 
to consume their home-made meals in the shops .. Doctors declared this practice a 
serious health hazard and related it to an increase in registered cases of infections. 
The fact that now many managers and ITR were heading home for their lunch break 
was also detrimental to work-time discipline. Furthermore, the de facto loss of this 
service meant that women had now to take this burden at home .. The economic 
rationality of the decision was doubtful, bearing in mind that deserted canteens had 
now to be run at a loss, but perhaps this move anticipated their definitive closure. 
Workers anyway met this measure with resignation. As one woman commented: 
'women in any case must cook for their family, therefore there is no need for 
canteens' (Interview with female worker, 2001).71 
The ability of management to defuse collective action and the timidity of workers' 
moves were quite apparent. This can only be understood considering that workers 
were neither used nor intended to bring forward their claim at enterprise level, 
through collective bargaining. In reality,as demonstrated by these cases, workers 
raised their grievances in a collective fashion only occasionally, prompted by 
external circumstances. The problem tended rather to be solved on a personal basis in 
the shops. It' was in this context that workers felt in their own right to raise their 
I 
, 
grievances either individually or in small groups,at shift or shop level. 
If workers regularly resorted to managers for any problem related to pay, payments 
of arrears were no exception. In one case a worker turned to the shop chief to discuss 
the problem of delays in wage payments. As said before, workers were paid deferred 
71 Looking at the early soviet banners propagandising the new communal facilities as it way 
to liberate women from the traditional family burdens one could not suppress the feeling that 
their disappearance was also marking the obfuscation of the rights connected with it. 
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wages, the worker quite rightfully explained the point and wondered why people 
should not be paid the "real" current wage. He underlined that it was unfair for them 
to be paid less than they actually earned. I cannot fail to notice that this was in fact 
the first time I myself heard about this problem in these terms. The observation was 
correct but for the case that the worker was posing the problem in terms of a personal 
arrangement with the manager. The manager in that case did not dismiss the request 
but outlined that it was rather the job of the trade unions to sort out these questions. 
More commonly, workers appealed to the manager to request advances on the arrears 
due. Once having a walk with the shop chief's family we came by a worker who 
warmly greeted and thanked the manager. The former explained later to me and to 
his wife that he had successfully applied, at the worker's request, to the 
administration for the receipt of his wage arrears. The worker, he told us as a 
justification, was in urgent need of cash to buy a new flat. He was meant to pay for 
the flat by selling a room in the communal house, where he used to live. Yet, he was 
not allowed to sell without a signed contract for the new house and, at the same time, 
he could not sign the contract without a prior cash deposit. Obviously he had no . 
money of his own to sort out this bureaucratic jam. 
Several conclusions can already be drawn. The new administration proved to be 
I 
extremely attentive in making the most out of the economic and financial difficulties 
of the enterprise. At the same time, they proved equally cautious in building up their 
legitimacy as new owners, avoiding direct confrontation with the labour force as a 
whole. Restoration of regular payments was in fact important to restore a minimum 
of confidence and facilitate the outsiders in breaking through managerial resistance. 
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Malignantly, the outsiders' adversaries commented that the move was a 
propagandistic carrot thrown at the workers, nothing less than a poisoned chalice for 
the enterprise, now skying up its indebtedness, and its dependence, on the outsiders. 
In order to defuse conflict they continued to rely on traditional practices. As far as 
they were forced to take general measures, they managed to transform them into 
sectional problems, reinforcing conflicts and divisions among the workforce. This 
will be shown more clearly in the next section about differentials. By doing this they 
were transforming what could appear as a right, regarding each and everyone 
indistinctly, into a privilege that could be granted only to those who deserved ii. In 
this way they confirmed and reinforced the paternalistic and hierarchical nature of 
social relations in the factory. This was only possible by allowing, in fact forcing 
indirectly, middle management to deal personally with wage-related claims as results 
vividly from the analysis of the implementation of the wage-system. 
Pay scale and wage differentials 
. The new administration also came under pressure to review its wage policy in order 
to retain and recruit specialists and skilled workers. This called for a review, altering 
wage differentials between occupations as to favour specific categories and, 
• 
secondly, for',the definition of a wage level sufficient to shelter the enterprise from 
trends in the labour market. The conflict arisen around· differentials shows, 
nevertheless, that the search for consent among the workforce had to remain the main 
drive in this area of wage policy. 
Being located on the border with the much richer Moscow economic area, the local 
labour market suffered a constant drain of cadres. The situation was made acute by 
the practice of individual enterprises to retain workers from scarce professions with 
an aggressive wage policy. Despite all the official calls for unitary action among 
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industrialists and the condemnation of unfair competition, this practice did not seem 
to come to an end. This problem was strictly intertwined with difficulties in 
attracting and training young professionals, making old cadres a more crucial 
resource. The result, as a manager underlined, was that 'in the past there did not exist 
any difference in pay for the same profession in the same industry when now 
differentials are proliferating' (Interview with the Head of the weaving department, 
. 2001). 
Already under the previous administration the wage drift in the labour market had 
made unsustainable the policy of retaining historical differentials among categories. 
Yet a generalised increase in salaries in favour of fitters and mechanics led to an 
uprising of both operators and ITR, heading off the attempt. 
The same fate was to meet the outsiders' plans to shake up the entire pay scale, 
pri vileging managers over workers and economists among them. As our key 
respondent commented: 'ITR and workers reacted with obstructionism, making the 
newcomers think better of it' (ibid.). The respondent further commented that: 
A European policy aimed at planning wage scales consistently with skills 
and professions needed at the factory was bound to fail as it requires too 
, 
many r.esources and a strong bargaining power of the employers. The lack of 
appeal of industrial jobs in the province seriously undermines the threat of 
dismissal and to the contrary reinforces the bargaining power of selected 
categories. Therefore, the newcomers, in an opportunistic move to 
consolidate their grip over the enterprise, are forced to adopt traditional 
soviet tactics. (Ibid.) 
As already seen above, they accepted making partial concessions to this or that group 
of workers in order to silence them and avoid a direct generalised clash with labour 
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or managers. Some data on the wage level of selected professions and groups of 
workers provide evidence about the structure of differentials and its evolution. 
Table 6.1 Average wages 
A verage wag~ 1,'- { '; ". ", -';. "" " ", " ?' ....... ,;,,: Averagewage2 (weavers) > "i 
',,;,,',', ,,», '", '," , :', "'2 '., '.!f, 
1998 850 
1999 585 
958 
2000 1---------------1 1800'" 
20M 1359 2200'" 
IData provided by the Chief Eng. at the trade union conference. 25/05/2001; 2Data provided by the 
Department Chief; 3E'nd of the Year; 4After first bonus increase; S After brigade reform; "'Estimates by 
production managers. 
The few available data might be patchy. though some conclusions can still be drawn 
when support~d by further evidence from interviews. The first not surprising element 
is the high differentiation between production workers, including machine operators 
and the even better-paid foreman assistants, and the rest of the workforce. 
, 
This is particularly evident for the crisis year 1999. At that time, evidently the 
administration struggled to maintain its core workers by substantial increases in 
wages, leaving the others the choice of accepting wage cuts or leaving. Since staffing 
levels fell from around 4000 to less than 3000 between 1997 and 2001, especially as 
a result of ,spin-off of the social sphere and auxiliary jobs. this might be seen as an 
accompanying measure, which facilitated dismissals. Shrinking staff can also 
account for the narrowing of the gap in later years. Although, at the same time, the 
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growing concern of managers for the loss of cadres, amid crisis and non-payment of 
wages, should remind us of the extremely limited room for consistent strategies and 
the enormous side effects of the crisis on the quality of staff. 
Table 6.2 Wages of selected managerial positions in December 2000* 
N. Gender Position Stipend 
1 M Managing Director 5000 roubles 
2 M Chief Engineer 4300 roubles 
3 F Chief Economist (vice-director) 4000 roubles 
4 M Vice-director for General Affairs 3000 roubles 
5 M Quality Control Chief 2000 roubles 
6 M Security Chief 3000 roubles 
7 M Chief of 2nd Department 1000 roubles 
8 F Chief of Personnel Dept. (cadres) 1500 roubles 
9 M Legal Consultant 2000 roubles 
10 F Chief of Secretarial Cabinet' 1000 roubles 
11 F Senior Economist of the Planning Dept. 1280 roubles 
, 
12 M Chief of Wage & Labour Dept. 2000 roubles 
13 F 
• 
Chief Accountant 4000 roubles 
, 
14 F I Chief Accountant Assistant (accounting) 2000 roubles 
15 F Chief Accountant Assistant (finances) 1900 roubles 
16 F Chief of Computing Office 1000 roubles 
17 M Chief of procurement Dept. 2000 roubles 
18 F Chief of Sales Dept. 1600 roubles 
19 M Chief of IT Dept. 1600 roubles 
20 M Chief of Health &safety Dept. 1500 roubles 
21 F Chief of Training Centre 1300 roubles 
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22 M Senior Engineer for Construction 1500 roubles 
23 M Director of Transport-Economy Dept. 1800 roubles 
24 F Vice-director of Transport-Economy Dept. 1600 roubles 
25 M Director of Central Tech. Laboratory 1500 roubles 
26 M Vice-director of Central Tech. Laboratory 1400 roubles 
27 F Director of Spinning Production 2400 roubles 
28 M Vice-director of Spinning Production 2000 roubles 
29 F Director of Weaving Production 2400 roubles 
30 M Director of Finishing Production 2400 roubles 
31 M Chief Mechanic 2500 roubles 
32 M Chief Mechanic Assistant 2000 roubles 
33 F Chief of Trade & Catering 1450 roubles 
34 F Chief of Housing Dept. 700 roubles 
35 M Chief of Health & Sport Complex 1200 roubles 
36 M Editor of Factory Paper 1000 roubles 
37 F Director of technical school 580 roubles 
*Data contained in the General Director's Decree as published by the factory paper (Privolzhskii 
Rabochii, 0811212000). Stipend does not include bonuses and "emoluments" attached to the position. 
Comparing \yorkers' wages with data on individual positions of managers and ITR 
o 
reveals that the divide between workers and managers, including senior managers, 
was not so clear-cut. Neither responsibility nor education was in principle a 
guarantee of higher wages. Production workers could claim and in fact earned higher 
wages than the bulk of ITR as deduced from the fact that workers' wages were 
already higher than the ones of many office chiefs. As a female senior accountant 
confessed, it was still believed that direct producers were the core of the collective: 
'it is scandalous', she passionately argued, 'that the administrative body earns such 
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huge salaries, the workers are those who produce, they in fact maintain us!'. Many 
might not express it so heartily, but both workers and senior managers reasoned that 
office workers were of little use and therefore did not deserve such high pay. 
Obviously there were privileges attached to the position that could outnumber the 
disadvantage of the low pay. A former Komsomol officer now working in production 
remarked how 'for a woman it is much better to work in an office. The working 
timetable fits family duties and the working place, quiet and clean, is more adequate 
to women' (Interview with woman worker, spinning shop, 2001). Workers also 
lamented that managers had obvious social clciut, which could shelter them from 
fines and reprimands. Last but not least, key positions offered chances to make 
personal gains, augmenting substantially what at first glance might seem a meagre 
wage. It remains the fact that social conventions required maintaining traditional 
differentials. In mid 2001, further wage increases, constantly needed to compensate 
for inflation, allowed for a 70% rise to workers and 45% to ITR. This should indicate 
that the newcomers in the meantime were committed to their observance. 
The wage gap between workers was even more startling. The use of piece-rate and 
. . 
incentive pay, as we have seen, tended inevitably to generate differences among 
workers' wa~es even within the same occupational group. Yet, the enormous gap 
between "direct" workers and auxiliaries, and in particular between spinners and 
weavers on one side and other production departments, remains a striking feature of 
the pay scale. 
The general understanding that sweeper or quality controller are jobs with low 
professional content to be left to the less skilled, and often less motivated workers, 
makes common sense. Several managers and technicians, though, noted with regret 
that specific categories of auxiliary workers continued to be paid risible wages. They 
250 
Claudio Morrison: Soviet Management and Transition PhD thesis June 2004 
were alarmed that their poor performance might be extremely detrimental to 
production and economic results. A foreman assistant lamented: 
A lot of money is squandered here. Take this case. Machines sometimes 
break down because production waste has not been duly removed. What can 
you expect from cleaners? This is the lowest job. they earn 600 roubles. and 
they work as much as they are paid. Still. the machine has to be repaired and 
output is defective! (Interview with the mechanic-repairer of the combing-
carding shop) 
Production managers were left once again alone to work out how to get new recruits 
and stem the flood of cadres from their shop. Our key respondent, working from 
1998 to 2000 as chief of the weaving department, referred, during our early 
interviews, to the fact that he adjusted upward the tariffs of the scarcest categories. 
As a senior manager he could plan his wage fund. Since part of the outflow of 
workers was due to temporary leave for more lucrative jobs in the capital city 
surroundings. he sheltered his staffing levels from fluctuations by making seasonal 
adjustments to wages. 
, 
Most of the work though, was made at the lower level where retain and reward were 
indistinguishably tied to the continuous bargaining over pay between workers and 
their shop chief. Discussing with a shop chief over discretionary forms of payment, 
the case of a fitter-mechanic emerged, whom he paid a higher wage under-the-table, 
admittedly to prevent him from quitting. 
This worker is really a special case ... he does all the repair and looks after 
maintenance. In the past there was a special brigade for that but they have 
been dismissed. So I pay him thousands of roubles more. I managed to 
create a special fund for that with the wages destined by the administration 
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for people who do not work here any more. The administration does not 
know about that and it would be very serious if they did. I do not pay him 
because I have to .. .It is to give him a certain status. Otherwise I suppose he 
might leave for a better paid job. (Interview with the Shop Chief of the 
combing-carding shop, 2001) 
As for the level of wages as compared with other enterprises in the local industry, the 
combine seemed to feature well for certain categories of workers while losing out for 
specialists. The average wage at the enterprise, as one worker noted at the trade 
Union conference, was now only approaching the minimum subsistence level (see 
Smimov E., 2001, p. 2). Still, the president of TMS, rejecting grievances over wages, 
noted that 'as for the level of wages the enterprise is rated 13th out of 43 textile 
enterprises in the region' (Privolzhskyi Rabochii, 2001d, p. 1). In fact the factory, 
while having problems with recruiting specialists, was doing quite well with 
workers' recruitment. One respondent, a chief mechanic who had just moved to a 
new factory, referred to the fact that they had lost some weavers to his old employer. 
In that factory wages for main workers were apparently lower, staying at 1300 
roubles. The Director of the factory complained that competing companies in the 
surroundings. were putting a serious threat to the stability of his collective by raising 
wages. He further explained that: 'they are taking advantage of bankruptcy 
procedures. The state of bankruptcy permits them to get away with taxation and 
leave resources for paying better wages' (Interview with the Director of the "Factory 
N.2"). 
The outsiders, therefore, preferred continuing to favour traditional categories, 
upholding the customary differentials. They retreated over policies aimed at 
modifying the pay scale. They also froze plans to centralise and restructure offices 
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dealing with wage and personnel management. Recruiting and retaining cadres was 
to remain a major task of production managers. The objective pursued with this 
policy was to consolidate the labour collective, restoring the administration's 
authority and avoiding generalised conflict. This comes with some specifications. 
The "conservative" move has to be put into the larger perspective of the parent 
company, which was building modem managerial capabilities outside and above the 
enterprise and had therefore less need to restructure. 
The crucial conflict with the workforce, and therefore with management, arose from 
the attempt to combine this policy of least resistance and concessions, with the 
transmission of qualitatively and quantitatively different targets. To understand its 
nature and outcomes we have therefore to look at the reform of the wage system and 
its actual implementation by management. In a traditional soviet policy, it is in fact 
the wage system that has to carry the modernisation drive through incentive schemes. 
Still its manipulation is the essential device by which production management can 
achieve workers' consent. 
Outsiders 20~1: a new wage system 
In between late December 2000 and May 2001, due to developments in bankruptcy 
• 
proceedings, the outsiders' role strengthened, permitting a greater involvement in the 
management of the enterprise. One of the most significant measures taken was the 
remaking of the payment and incentive system. Fulfilling the expectations of the 
Union and experts, the flat rate component of the basic wage, i.e. excluding bonus, 
was raised to around two-thirds of the wage. The new priorities of the administration 
led it instead to replace the traditional bonus tied to the fulfilment of plan targets in 
physical terms with coefficients depending on a combination of qualitative, 
quantitative and discipline-related targets. The reform involved both managers and 
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- workers and prescribed for each different goals, consistently with their role in 
production. In this section we concentrate on the changes to the salary of piece-rate 
workers. The new incentives were meant to modify the way workers made the plan 
and therefore also the job of the managers, who had to motivate and reward workers 
and make sure that the new targets were properly achieved. Differently from the 
brigade wage system, the reform extended to all production departments (spinning, 
weaving and finishing) with little variation. The main features of the new system can 
be summarised in the points given below: 
a) The hourly pay was raised to around 63% of the basic wage, ranging from 62.9% 
in weaving to 64.9% in finishing. The wage of the piece-rate workers, we shall 
remember, consists of three' main components, the tariff component, the piece-rate 
and the bonus. The two former considered together form the basic salary to which the 
bonus is added to as a per cent coefficient. The manager could calculate the piece-
rate in advance on the basis of production norms and piece-rate tariff, presupposing 
fulfilment and prostoi at given rates. The reform altered the structure of the basic 
wage, increasing the tariff or flat-rate component at the expense of the piece-rate. 
Considering the piece-rate component as given, the change consisted in raising the 
wage to the P?int when the other component approached one-third of the total. 
• 
b) The incentive mechanism was completely redesigned. A range of coefficients 
replaced the single bonus, related to the fulfilment of production plans. Workers 
were to be assessed and rewarded mainly for achieving output quality standards and 
observing technological and labour discipline. Foremen and shop chiefs, who are 
stipend earners, had their bonus paid on condition of fulfilling both qualitative and 
quantitative targets. 
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c) The mechanism of computation was also modified. In the previous system the 
bonuses were ideally added to the wage on condition of achieving certain targets. 
Now workers were entitled to a sum made up of all the wage components and had 
them deducted for failures to meet tasks. Managers talked now of a fine-based 
system replacing the previous bonus-based one. 
Theoretically, the objectives of the new system were: to increase workers' 
motivation, achieved by offering higher and more stable salaries; to increase 
productivity and achieve greater accordance between results and reward, by means of 
using of targeted fines. 
The first point was worked out with the participation of the trade union and appears 
formally as the implementation by the enterprise administration of the commitment 
to improve workers' remuneration. As reported in the factory paper: 
According to a tripartite agreement between the Ivanovo administration. 
industrialists of the Ivanovo region and the trade unions. it was established 
that the salary had to be taken to such a point that the tariff component 
would amount to almost 70%. (Smirnov E., 2001) 
The reform indubitably achieved an increase in nominal salaries, though workers and 
, 
I 
even the collaborative unions were unsatisfied with the actual figures. The stability 
of wages should have been another outcome of the reform, giving workers greater 
confidence over future earnings. 
This goal seems also to match with the improved and more stable conditions of 
production produced by the take-over. In a highly unstable working environment, 
heavy reliance on the bonus was understandably the last resort for pressuring 
managers and workers to elicit any effort to keep production going. Now, when the 
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outsiders had provided the financial and material resources to stabilise production 
and work at full capacity, the priority balance shifted in favour of productivity and 
quality targets. The reform moved in this direction by reducing the weight of the 
piece-rate in the basic salary and disentangling it from the calculation of bonuses. 
Workers were now asked to concentrate on improving their performance, while the 
achievement of output targets was the sole concern of the foremen and the managers 
who had to organise and supervise the fulfilment of the plans. 
It has already been observed how nobody among the managers was willing to 
dispose of the piece-rate despite concerns about its growing inadequacy. An 
interview with a top brass representative of the textile industrialists' association 
confirms an identity of views with factory management in terms of finding a mid-
way between the flat-rate pay prevalent in the West and the Russian appreciation for 
incentive schemes. 
I think that workers will remain essential to assuring quality in production. 
This means that we have to attract and motivate qualified workers. I admit 
that the critical point is to strike a balance between stimulation and stability. 
, 
Yet the payment system has to reflect the importance of workers' 
, 
qualifi~ation and dedication. This is why we have to maintain a piece-rate 
I 
wage. Paternalism is necessary, despite all the criticism raised around the 
collusion between managers and workers. We could not cope otherwise with 
such low wages (Interview: Director, "Regional Association of Textile 
Industrialists", 2001). 
In any case, observation of its implementation indicates that the rationale of the new 
system, its motivating potential is not univocal and should not be taken for granted. 
A satisfactory account of the impact of the reform cannot be made without reference 
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to the actual experience of its implementation, carried out by workers and middle 
management and the response it yielded from workers. 
Work and wages after the reform: managerial implementation and 
workers' response 
The reform was formally aimed at achieving higher and stable wages, redirecting 
workers' concerns from quantity to quality and easing the work of managers left in 
charge of plan fulfilment. Implementation on the shop floor demonstrates how its 
rationale turned out to be different from what was intended. Calculating the new 
wage, line managers showed that the stable component of the wage had been reduced 
and workers had to expect cuts in their upcoming pay. Managers and workers felt 
that the· new focus on quality was nothing but an excuse to cut wages. The pressure 
to meet the plan was not reduced. Rather, targets were more ambitious and stringent 
than ever before, and the complication that came with it had changed little. Workers 
rightly maintained that quality has to be a managerial concern, because it depends on 
the state of technology and cotton. They therefore responded to the reform by 
resorting to· a combination of trickery and common understanding with managers. 
For their pa~, managers, while stamping out the most overt violations, have 
\ 
continued manipulating quality indicators and output reports, trying to favour the 
more reliable workers. Therefore informal practices continue with the consequence 
of continued conflicts and bargaining over pay, piece-rate prices and workloads. 
Workers show themselves to be even more divided as they compete for a shrinking 
wage fund. 
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Managers' understanding and implementation of the reform 
We should now tum our attention to the shop floor, where I carried out participant 
observation, so as to verify the implementation of the reform and record people's 
reaction. As· far as managers were concerned I expected satisfaction with a reform 
that met in principle their expectation for a loosening of incentive pressure. It is 
certainly true that managers were going to lose a lever of command, but since the old 
incentives had little motivational effect one might appreciate other, positive, 
outcomes of the reform. First, flat-rate pay would have lowered the conflict over pay 
and put an end to the jiggles with norms and the fabrication output reports aimed at 
"saving" workers', and manager's own, bonus. Secondly, it would have offered 
greater scope to plan production away from workers' individual struggle to meet 
their norms. If these were the wishes of, at least, the manager of this shop they went 
unsatisfied. 
A comparative analysis of the two payment systems from the point of view of those 
in charge of their implementation, i.e. transferring them into the real context of 
worker-mana~ement bargaining, will expose its drawbacks and the substantial lack 
of innovation. If we look at the figures of the old pay in percentages we recall that 
the tariff, i.e. pat-rate pay, amounted to around 30%, piece-rate to 70% to which was 
added a bonus of 75%. In practice, the manager72 explains, the only variable was the 
piece-rate component. Informal arrangements between managers and workers, dating 
back to soviet times, had led to the practice of considering both tariff and bonus pay 
a must: roughly calculating, 105% of guaranteed pay. Now, applying the same logic 
72 This is NikitaAleksandrovich, our main informant. In rnid-2001 he was again working in 
the combing-carding shop as shop chief after losing his job as head of production due to 
conflict with TMS. 
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to the new system, it turns out that the 63% new tariff pay plus the 40% coefficient 
gives a roughly similar figure of 103%. More importantly, within this percentage has 
now been incorporated a 10% bonus/fine for absence due to illness. Therefore, the 
manager concluded, it might well be said that the stable component of the wage has 
in fact been reduced and workers should expect cuts to the upcoming pay. 
Managers, moreover, feel that the pressure to meet the plan, and the traditional 
complications that comes with it, have changed little. So the piece-rate continues to 
operate as a contradictory mechanism spurring productivity at the expense of 
technological discipline. Evidence from various sources among senior managers of 
both the enterprise and outsiders' circles confirms that this is not a distorted 
perception of those in production. TMS managers at' formal and informal meetings 
continued to stress the need to achieve higher production targets and heavily 
remarked failures. The official policy, maintained a well-informed representative of 
local industrialists in September 2001, is one of maximum utilisation of capacity. 
The Chief Engineer, a few months earlier, confirmed, not without a note of criticism, 
that quantity not quality remains the priority. 
What then with the new imperative for quality to which the bonus is now related? 
Several examples from everyday life in the shop reveal how the new element has in 
fact been incorporated into working arrangements and paid the necessary attention, 
but not without conflicts and contradictions. A reminder of perestroika when, it was 
said metaphorically, reforms implementation implied changing the wheel without 
stopping the vehicle driving. 
Technical and organisational constraints are a major obstacle to quality 
improvements, but since this is not the major point here we will reserve to discuss it 
elsewhere. It is sufficient to highlight that, in any case, managers did their best to 
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overcome poor co-ordination and interdepartmental conflicts to keep quality of 
materials processed under constant check. Foremen and workers' co-operation 
remains a key question. 
In one case a foreman complained at the loss of bonus, urging that having met her 
plan she felt there was no wrongdoing on her side. Arguments about bad quality of 
output and poor discipline of her workers did sound a novelty to her. The more so 
workers, both operators and mechanics, who rejected any remark on the achievement 
of higher quality claiming they only felt responsible for the quantity of work done 
while quality results were rather to be made dependent on the materials and 
conditions provided by managers. 
In another case, in the face of another apparent drop in quality, the manager 
convened the foremen and technicians of his shop to make clear the priority of 
quality and again explained ~ts determinant weight on bonus payment. He then 
enumerated possible causes of failures, including technical and human errors. He 
. clearly urged that workers had to put an end to violation of technical prescriptions to 
speed up or ease their work, but he consciously remarked this had to be done 'at least 
'. 
on the line designated for export'. He was adamant that quality characteristics 
continued to, be manipulated in order to meet fonnal standards. Therefore, the 
• 
expected effect of the new coefficient in redressing management priorities, and 
therefore workers' behaviour, from quantity to quality was, at least at this early 
stage, minimal. 
For all the expectations and the detennination to change, once again, a general 
assessment of the situation let him to conclude the conversation with the remark that 
little has changed in the way production in the shop is dealt with. This means that, as 
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exemplified by the analysis of wage computation earlier in this chapter, informal 
determination of wages remains a consolidated practice. 
The key question is therefore the effective discretion of middle management in the 
use of incentives in their struggle with both administration above and workers in the 
shops. Recalling the many examples provided above we can already assume that 
individual bargaining over wages was present and its intensity had not decreased. It 
remains to widen on its evolution within the new framework established by the 
reform, looking again at evidence of bargaining practices observed in the shops. 
During observation of managerial work in the factory, at least until fall 2001, it was. 
extremely frequent to hear about "kompensatsiya" (compensation or indemnity). 
Workers requested or were granted compensation under very different 
circumstances. Nevertheless, these cases seem unified by the consideration that an 
adjustment is possible when the "expected" or "deserved" wage differs from the one 
that workers would be paid, if their job was to be computed according to statistics .. 
A typical case is when workers fail to fulfil the plan or incidents occur which prevent 
them from satIsfying all the conditions settled to achieve a higher wage, like output 
quality, numbers of hours worked, machine operated et cetera. Here the question 
, 
arises whether the worker should be paid in full. That is to receive compensation 
approaching or equalling the expected wage. 
After pri vatisation the unevenness of production had, as we have seen, multiplied 
grievances and related payments. In any case, until a couple of years ago the 
payment of prostoi allowed to compensate almost automatically at least for losses 
due to machine idleness. Now these institutions had been obliterated but the pressure 
was kept high for managers to intervene. As a foreman assistant noted: •... when 
problems arise the women [i.e., machine operators, C. M.] go cry to the manager and 
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sort it out "somehow". Basically, everyone tries to sort it out by himself (Interview 
with Assistant foreman, combing-carding shop, 2001). 
It is a quite different case when the worker claims a higher wage with their foreman 
or shop chief, on the ground that hislher work is not adequately rewarded. These are 
the cases commonly observed in shop chief offices. Workers require higher wages 
irrespective of the number of hours worked, output quality, professional eligibility to 
higher pay rates et cetera, because they are in need, they did unrecorded work or 
simply are used to receiving such a pay. In these cases the manager has first to decide 
whether the claim is grounded. Our key respondent, working in summer 2001 as 
chief of the combing-carding shop, rumbles: 'there are too many workers turning to 
the managers after a chat with fellows pretending that they work better and they 
should get more'. Then the manager is presented with different options: he can use 
the incentive funds available, of which presently a dramatic shortage is felt, or apply 
for individual compensation, in this case there are no guarantees of approval, as 
workers complained. 
Interviews wi!h the most valuable cadres 73 in the shop tell of the expectation of same 
sort of supplementary payments for extra work and more or less explicitly confirm 
the manager'~ continued willingness to compromise: ' ... with the shop chief we can 
73 These are namely two assistant foremen and a fitter-toolmaker. The assistant foreman is a 
key figure within the shops. This is a male only profession. It requires technical knowledge 
and a high level of practical skills. The post is usually granted after an exam requiring 
technical school attendance. The assistant foreman works in constant touch with line 
managers and enjoys their trust and support. As reminded by the Combine Director himself, 
he is a natural leader in the shop. assistant foreman is in charge of fitting looms, replacing 
spare-parts and performing emergency repairs (avariinyi remont), as opposed to scheduled 
overhaul and major repairs, (kapital'nyi remont) which is the job of a separate sub-unit. the 
RMO. 
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come to an agreement on these matters,74. Their discontent with the situation also 
made clear that the manager now had in fact less room to secure resources for 
compensating their services: 
They do not pay me anymore what they should. I get only 10% more than 
those who drink the entire shift around ... [says the fitter7S and] ... they do not 
pay us- as we deserve ... but he [the shop chief, C. M.] himself has not the 
power to change the situation ... [adds the foreman assistant]. 
A last resort, the shop chief confessed, is to arrange outside the official channels, 
offering as reference the above-referred case of the mechanic. In order to reward a 
mechanic for his essential contribution to machinery maintenance and repair he 
diverted funds of the enterprise constituting a shadow fund made up of the wages of 
"dead souls", i.e. workers made redundant and no longer working at the enterprise. 
The· shop chief makes me notice how this is a slippery ground for analysis where 
different phenomena can be observed and changes have occurred over time. We have 
to distinguish the institutionalised practices which descend from the then (Le. under 
74W orkers and managers referred to informal practices of bargaining and mutual 
understandingtwith the well know saying: 'kak platyat tak i rabotaem' (we work as much as 
they pay us) o~ 'vy delaete vid, chto platite zarplatu - my delaem vid, chto rabotaem' (you 
pretend to pay us and we pretend to work) . 
. 7S The repairer or fitter (slesar'), like the assistant foreman, is a highly skilled mechanic. He 
enjoyed the status and the privileges attached to skilled manual professions. This job in 
particular requires higher skills and experience than that of the assistant foreman as he 
decides over the restoration and reconstruction of looms. For this reason he has his own 
engineering shops. He works in pair with the shop chief with whom he exchanges 
information and decides over major technological problems. Here there is overlapping with 
other auxiliary repair services. This can be partly explained by the soviet practice to break 
down tasks and partly with the tendency to autarchy, which dominated at every level of the 
production organisation. 
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"red" directors) approved policy of "stick and carrot" from those managers arranged 
autonomously to favour their cadres. 
The whole case about compensation boils down to the need to use funds in a 
discretionary manner at shop level so as to guarantee workers' loyalty. But we are 
inclined to think that while in the past this was a widely accepted policy now it 
seems to have become the sole concern of the line manager struggling with the 
administration to achieve the necessary funds. Managers have seen with favour the 
gradual elimination of the institutionalised forms of compensation, like prostoi, but 
only in so as far as these are replaced by other mechanisms under their direct control. 
The shop chief suggests for example that the 200% increase of the bonus under the 
brigade system worked to this purpose. Yet, now that the administration pursues a 
stricter financial policy the system has become more rigid and this is felt detrimental 
to managerial authority and to the manageability of the labour force. On this ground 
the historical loss of the plethoric incentive apparatus offered by the socialist system 
continues to be felt negatively and the grip of outsiders on the concession and use of 
compensation. is interpreted as a further limitation. A tentative conclusion should 
therefore concentrate on the following points: 
Objective cOllstraints, technological as well as organisational, still force managers to 
engage in individual bargaining; 
Manipulation of targets and incentives continues but the scarcity of resources has 
seriously undermined the scope of managerial action; 
The conclusive outcome, as commonly reported by respondents,. is the transition 
from a system based on incentives to one managed through fines. 
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For a general appraisal of these aspects it would be useful to explore workers' 
opinions and reaction. Not simply because they are the other party upon whose co-
operation the system relies. Workers, despite having little say in decision-making, 
are still recognised at every level of the managerial hierarchy as a pillar of work 
organisation. Managers, as emerges clearly from the previous account, have to come 
to terri1s with the limits and opportunities offered by their co-operation. Secondly, 
poorly paid and evidently mistreated, workers can offer an entirely different 
prospective on how their work is paid for and why it is not sufficiently stimulated. 
Thirdly, any change should inevitably be understood, at least partly, in the forms and 
within the limits it effectively influences their work. 
Low wages, little incentive: workers talk 
There is very little at the factory workers could be satisfied with and wages are, as 
universally in Russia, a major ground for complaint. Here will be reported those 
causes of discontent directly related to the working of the wage system and its effect 
on work organisation and practices. 
A methodological observation is also due. Workers' opinion has been collected, as 
for managers, in semi-structured interviews, generally with key informants, with 
, 
questionnaires responded collectively by two shifts of the combing carding shops, 
and more generally in discussions, often prompted by workers themselves. In any of 
these cases workers response was more fragmented, less "reasoned", than the ones 
offered by managers and also more reticent. Workers know little about the way they 
are paid, though more than they would like us to believe. They stressed in interviews 
that they are hardly informed about the functioning and changes of the payment 
system. We are forced to believe them looking at their pay slip: a badly- printed 
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piece of paper, the size of a memo, with no explanation or notes just a few figures 
and the corresponding bureaucratic voices. 
Workers, like any employee, are in the first place concerned with the total amount of 
their take-home pay rather than the way this is structured internally. This does not 
mean they ignore completely the functioning of the incentive mechanism, at least in 
term of the priority managers attach to the accomplishment of certain targets and 
tasks. Again, workers pay attention to differentials both within the shop and among 
categories within the enterprise. Those who show a higher mobility, men more than 
women, the younger and skilled more than others, always have an eye on the local 
labour market." Thirdly, there is a marked gender divide not only in the amount but 
also in the form of pay, strengthened by informal practices. 
The overwhelming concern of workers, always lying at the top of their grievances, is 
. . 
the abysmally low level of wages. This is obviously a feature of the country as a 
whole and particularly in this region and sector. Is there therefore any specific 
significance or consideration to attach to this claim? The average wage, according to 
data provided; by the Chief Engineer at the union conference in May 2001, amounted 
to less than 1000 roubles in the previous year and was approaching 1300 Rb - the 
subsistence l11inimum - at the end of the year. But manager-respondents tended to 
give figures higher by at least one-third, probably having in mind the well-paid 
professions, operators and mechanics, which make up the bulk of workers in the 
shops. 
Wages, in any case, vary greatly among categories and within shops: just to give 
examples, from the average wage of weaving and spinning operators around 1700 
roubles, to the three, even four thousands paid to a mechanic, the best paid manual 
profession so far. At the bottom, we find the six hundred roubles for cleaners, 
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internal transport workers and the bulk of the finishing department - considered the 
workers' graveyard - mostly unskilled. Clearly, for the latter, a low wage means they 
cannot hope to sustain themselves on their wage only, for the better paid it is to 
renounce the pattern of consumption they had got used to since the mid seventies. 
Irrespective of differentials, they all feel their work is not adequately rewarded. The 
reference is both to their particular job in the enterprise but also to the industry or 
manufacturing in general. Some respondents also pointed at growing disparities with 
lower managers' pay and to the fact that managerial clout let them get away with 
failures unlike workers. Though this should not bring us to the immediate conclusion 
that any sort of collective consciousness exists, let alone ground for collective action, 
beyond the boundaries of a shift or shop collective. 
In fact, workers claims for fairness steer away from any idea of equality we might be 
used to from traditional European working class discourse. Both men and women, 
operators and mechanics, complained at the fact that differentials were minimal and 
pay seemed to be calculated irrespective of individual performance. This is what the 
workers of the; carding shop said about their salary: 
Furthermore they calculate us [wages. c. M.] all the same. For example, it 
• 
can happen to work all month and make the plan or take half of it off and 
still the wage will be the same. (Interview with shift n.1 of the carding shop) 
A typical drive in discussion was to throw any responsibility on "drop outs", the 
alcoholic journeymen who had little to lose and drove down productivity. This was 
tq disguise a ferocious competition, primarily among shifts, which were "stealing" 
from each other cotton threads, tools, spare parts et cetera: a practice, managers 
commented, coming as a result of the piece-rate, bonus-driven, mentality. 
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Seemingly, complaints about the existence of "unfair" differentials continued to 
poison the atmosphere of the working places. Workers seem to pay enonnous 
attention to even the slightest difference in the level of payments within the factory, 
especially when it comes to the same profession. In one case, reported below, the 
complaint concerns differentials between spinners working on the same type of 
machinery and allegedly producing the same articles. The fact seemed to be so 
serious that complaints were published on the factory paper and managers felt 
compelled to intervene with an explanation. 
The workers' letter was published in the factory paper in February 2001 and a sequel 
of managers' replies and workers' counteraccusations' followed in the next two 
editions (see Ivanova N., 2001, p. 1; Taranova V., 2001, p. 1; Privolzhskii Rabochii, 
23/0212001, p. 2). According to the workers in one shop, the others are paid an 
unjustifiably higher rate. They also maintain that they had their piece-rate price cut 
from 27 to 23 kopecks and accused the Assistant Head of Production of favouring 
'the spinners of the 4th floor'. 
The reply wa~ provided by the Head of the Department, followed by an article from 
the chief engineer for nonn setting in the spinning shops. The fonner presents itself 
as an attempt to clear up what seemed to be a misunderstanding: she explains how 
. 
the tariffs were in reality much lower and only lately raised, to 23 kopecks for the 3rd 
floor and 27 for the 4th. Then, she goes on to explain the reason for this difference in 
pricing (Ivanova N., Ibid.). The point made here is that, given the use of piece-rate 
and the intricacies of nonn setting, one should not expect any easy grasp of the 
matter or a straightforward solution. More explicative but also more paternalistic was 
the second article. First, the engineer explains the details of nonn setting in the case 
. in question. 
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On the 4111 floor, [she says], the norm consists of 6.11 kg of yam an hour, on 
the 3rd floor this amounts to 7.4 kg an hour. Why do norms differ? This is 
because they are affected by the spins. On the 3rd f., it amounts to 1330 spins 
a meter; on the 4111 it is 1370. (Taranova V., Ibid.) 
At first look, it appears that price setting was intended to equalise wages by 
conceding the shop with the lower production capacity a more favourable price. Not 
surprisingly though, the managers do not make the point in their argument. She 
concludes, provocatively: 'so, my dears .. .if you want to work with higher prices let's 
ask a favour. The others [on the 4th floor, C. M.J will take your place with 
pleasure .. .' (Ibid.) 
Workers did not seem fully satisfied with this. To the contrary, they raised doubts 
about the truthfulness of the engineer's account - ' ... we dare say that this difference 
[in spins, C. M.] has arisen only recently .. .' - and urged more serious accounting: It 
is obvious that an account about differences in production nonns should not be given 
in simple words'. (Privolzhskii Rabochii, ibid.)76 
What emerge~ here is, in the first place, an enonnous gap in knowledge, made more 
difficult by lack of information. Yet, communication proves difficult, given the high 
level of mistf).lst, and resentfulness, on both sides. Workers might be badly infonned, 
still they feel quite safe at talking about their job and do not appear to accept being 
contradicted . 
. The use of piece-rates, as the managers themselves suggest, is certainly an objective 
cause of these conflicts. In so far as it naturally produces differentials it results in a 
source of jealousies. What workers claimed, in the end, was higher prices to 
76 Open letter sent to the enterprise weekly paper by 'The spinners of the 3rd floor' . 
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compensate for increased efforts and greater planned output but the only form they 
felt appropriate to formulate their request was to take it out on other workers rather 
than raising an open claim with the administration. 
Consequently these workers, while claiming equal prices, do not seem to show any 
solidarity with their colleagues. For all the criticism spelled against managers, 
workers still make them their only and immediate reference, neither other workers 
nor the trade unions are called into the question. Though at a price, we suspect that 
this might rather reinforce than undermine the managers' authority. 
A separate case should be made for cadre workers, essential figures like fitters, 
repairers and mechanics who suffered particularly from the lack of ad-hoc measures 
to compensate for extra-work. These workers are in charge of repair and maintenance 
and their work has immediate effects on the good state of technology. Their activity, 
gi ven the poor state of technology and the lack of planning, is difficult to measure 
but, at the same time extremely valuable. No wonder it is subject to individual 
bargaining with managers, always in search of an artifice to channel extra money to 
them. The fitt,er in the combing-carding shop reported that his work includes partial 
machine redesign and reconstruction, for which he used to be paid by a special 
department e~isting during soviet times. The department had been closed and now he 
had to "bag" every time to get this kind of work paid somehow. Another mechanic, 
an assistant foreman, complained how his overtime repair work was agreed upon 
with the manager but then remained unpaid as 'up there' rejected the manager's 
applications. 
These accounts stand for the continued dominance of the piece-rate and the goal of 
making the individual norm. Again, the existence of differentials and conflicts 
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between workers reproduces a situation where the manager-worker relationship is 
highly individualised to the advantage of managerial authority. 
Workers, as we saw, also stressed their annoyance and disbelief in a policy aimed at 
stimulating them but closing room for sustaining differentials. What therefore about 
the new incentive mechanism, the coefficients? 
Workers' criticism was pointed at both the quality and illness b~:muses. During the 
previous months these had been the cause of partIal bonus losses and this was clearly 
felt as an unjustified and punitive intervention. Workers maintained in conversations 
that they could do little to increase productivity and quality standards. In particular, 
they stressed the contradiction between the two goals. Female operators and 
mechanics referred to the long night shifts and weekends, when auxiliary services are 
unavailable and managers are away at home, as the time when quality suffers the 
most. They concluded that this was simply a mechanism to reduce wages. The loss of 
bonus for illness absences was particularly stigmatised. The shop fitter commented 
angrily: 
What I found really offensive is the fine for illness leave. In the past, we 
were paid a lower wage but the rate was made dependent on grade and 
seniorlty~ Now workers only [the ITR are excluded from this measure, C. 
M.l are subject to an outright 10% wage cut. Furthermore, those who will 
suffer most are the women, who fall sick quite often because of the bad 
working conditions. (Interview with the fitter of the combing-carding shop) 
This was clearly a disciplinary measure aimed at discouraging "self-reduction" of 
working time. High in the complaints of many managers was in fact the unjustifiably 
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high level of absences due to illness77• Workers, though, felt this was fully in their 
rights given the low level of wages. 
Problems and conflicts also arose along the gender line, represented, in the shop 
under my observation, by the professional divide between female operators and male 
mechanics. The female collective of the shop reported that men and women had their 
own professions, which were therefore paid differently. Engendered pay 
discrimination was not felt as such primarily because women workers intended their 
factory job as something alien to their life. 'We consider that there are no professions 
adequate to women in this enterprise .. .' (Interview with the shift n.l of the carding 
shop, 2001) they reasoned; an argument which reappears constantly in the answers of 
female cadres and managers to this question. 
What they complained about, as far as wages are concerned, was that women were 
forced to take up men's tasks: 'if there is no vozchik (male carrier) or ugarshchik 
(male machine cleaner) then they can put even a woman and, we think, this is not 
fair.' (Ibid.) 
Another shift, of women operators openly voiced at the manager their complaint 
about the continuous absence of auxiliary males. More and more often they were 
, 
forced to take up "male" tasks in order to keep the machines going in their absence. 
The issue was becoming critical because of serious lack of technical, male, personnel 
and growing workloads for those remaining due to deteriorated technology. Women 
pointed out that they received no compensation for that unlike, it might be added, 
skilled male workers. 
77 This and other issues of workers' 'indiscipline' and defiance and policies aimed at 
achieving greater control over workers will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. 
272 
Claudio Morrison: Soviet Management and Transition PhD thesis June 2004 
On their side, mechanics, whose bonus was calculated according to results of the 
brigade, felt particularly penalised by the new system. They openly stated that they 
did not like to see their pay depending on someone else's performance. One of them 
complained how, in case of failure, 'women' went to the managers and solved the 
problem 'crying and shouting' (Interview with Assistant foreman, combing~carding 
shop, 2001). While he suggested he had to find the way 'to make it up', on his own 
'somehow' (koe-kak), referring to the informal bargaining with the manager. 
Workers' general dissatisfaction could be moderated by the observation, with which 
they closed interviews to justify their patience and resignation, that even this was 
better than the terrible years of non-payment of wages and there was not anything 
better out there. Women in particular with their family responsibilities felt little room 
for escaping what is still the only job in town. Men, especially skilled, were more 
flexible, making the life of managers harder with the constant threat to leave. 
Summary and Conclusions 
In summary, we can see that technological and organisational constraints still force 
managers to engage in individual bargaining. The new wage system has failed to put 
an end to th~~e practices and reorient manager-worker relations to the achievement 
, 
of quality or efficiency targets. The only significant change, the transition from a 
system based on incentives to one managed through fines, indicates that workers 
(female more than male, unskilled rather than skilled) are paying the price of 
adjustment. By sustaining differentials and keeping wages low the system tries to 
foster atomisation, defuse conflict and promote enterprise survival despite numerous 
inefficiencies. 
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The point of sufferance was therefore discipline in its various aspects. Not 
surprisingly this issue became another crucial goal in the struggle of the 
administration to strengthen the effectiveness of the production process. It is clear in 
fact that incentives could work only in a normalised environment, that is where 
workers had no choice but to adhere to the prescribed path. Moreover, discipline 
violations are another major element of departure from the experience of capitalist 
industrialised countries. They therefore deserve a speCific analysis, which will be 
carried out in the next chapter. 
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7. Labour and technological discipline: Chaos and 
order in production management 
This chapter presents an analysis of cases of discipline violations and disruptions of 
the production process, in an attempt to trace the ultimate causes of their endurance 
at the enterprise and the implications it bears for restructuring. These phenomena 
may vary greatly as to their immediate causes and consequences and it could be 
questionable whether they should indeed be grouped and analysed under a single 
heading. Still they seem to find a common root in the traditionally limited form of 
managerial control over the production process. Their combined effect, reinforced by 
the material and psychological consequences of transition at the enterprise, provide a 
direct and visible representation of the state of production management at the factory 
and the reasons why half-hearted reforms, including the wage reform seen in the 
previous chapter, are not succeeding. In fact, they account for, and are strictly 
interrelated with, the chaotic state of production, its inefficient and C irregular 
operation, and represent a formidable obstacle to the assertion of managerial control. 
Loss of working time, absenteeism and other discipline violations (theft, alcoholism, 
, 
slack and careless work, output restrictions) were a persistent feature of the labour 
process in soviet factories from Stalin onward (Arnot, 1988; Filtzer, 1986). They 
deepened in the 1970s and 1980s and escalated out of control in the final years of 
perestroika due to labour shortage and the aggravation of supply problems (Filtzer, 
1992, 1994). The situation was such that it is impossible to distinguish between 
objective and subjective causes, i.e. the system both compelled and allowed workers 
to commit such violations. Immediate causes were the most diverse (lack of co-
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ordination, poor pay and motivation, bad working conditions). There is an active 
component in these events, which expresses the conflictual character of manager-
worker relations (attempts by workers to free time for themselves, access scarce 
goods and exercise control over the production process). The sheer size of the 
phenomena is due to the fact that managers and workers alike violated procedures to 
protect their earnings and meet the plan. Their ultimate causes lay in the social 
relations on the shop floor, which resulted in workers' atomisati<?n and managerial 
leniency. 
The case study enterprise presents a record of these phenomena before privatisation, 
which have been growing into a problem of major importance lately, as appears from 
the outcomes of observation and interviews presented hereafter. Discipline violations 
and the more general effects they cast on work organisation and the structuring of 
social relations will be taken into account for each of the most recurrent forms of 
violation. Two categories of violation have been identified, namely those of labour 
discipline and technological discipline: the former comprising loss of labour time, 
theft and alcoholism, the latter referring to workers' circumvention of work 
instructions aimed at easing work or simply making the plan. 
The focus i~ this chapter is on the labour process and managerial strategies. 
However, professional identities, gender issue, and forms of authority will also be 
covered to ascertain the intricacies of conflict and consent on the shop floor 
(Collison, 1992). This chapter consists of two sections. In the first section I analyse 
different types of discipline violations. In the second section I provide an account of 
the disciplinary campaigns assumed by the enterprise administration and present an 
account of shop floor practices that shed light on the contradictions of the production 
process and explain the continued failure of these initiatives. 
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Transition to Increased Indiscipline 
Since the second half of the 1990s, discipline violations in the factory have 
increased, undermining an already deteriorating economic climate and further 
poisoning manager-worker relations. At the factory, there are problems of 
absenteeism, on-the-job time losses, theft, and alcoholism. Staffing levels are 
plagued by high levels of sickness leave and other kinds of administratively 
authorised absences, and by workers simply not coming to work. Idle time, 
especially during shifts, is due to repairs and due to conscious violations, such as 
extending the break period. Theft has raised as much concern among management as 
does absenteeism, and it causes security problems. Alcoholism affects almost all 
cases of .discipline infractions. I review below these phenomena, presenting the 
findings of interviews and observation in order to identify their causes and the extent 
of managerial involvement. 
Absenteeism 
Truancy problems were first brought to my attention while studying the official 
, 
factory diary at the office of the Head of Production. The book contained a record of 
the staffing level and absences in the shops, arranged in three columns~ The first 
column presented the level of staffing minimally needed relative to the production 
capacity installed in the shops (po spisku). The second indicated the maximum staff 
number allowed to insure managers against absences and unusual production peaks 
(a 10% addition to the first figure). Last, there was the actual figure of those at work 
(po yavke) reported on a daily basis. As far as one could see, that figure, though 
fluctuating, was always below the required staffing minimum. The manager 
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commented that there were invariably too many people off work with some excuse or 
another - especially sickness - and that he had to struggle to keep them at work. 
Workers have two legitimate ways to stay out of work for one or more days. They 
could do so either by obtaining a medical certificate or by asking for days off "on 
their own account" (za svoi scher). In the eyes of the administration these allowances 
were being abused by managers and workers to justify truancy. Detailing the daily 
bargaining between managers and workers helps to illuminate this issue. 
In the case of medical leave. a certificate has to be sought from medical services 
either at the factory infirmary or at the hospital7s• The procedure is bureaucratic and 
cumbersome. and the quality of healthcare services inadequate. It does not come as a 
surprise. therefore, that doctors tend to be permissive and, especially after their 
wages declined, amenable to bribes79• Pressure from senior management to restrain 
78 Under socialism, workers were entitled to paid leave on medical grounds for as long as 
medically needed. The only significant exceptions were cases of accidents when it could be 
proved that the injured had been acting recklessly (usually in a state of intoxication). This 
general rule was continued for a period of time after privatisation. The new owners have 
recently decided that each absentee case will be judged individually. 
79 The economy of personal favours,. known as blat, was an important feature of Soviet 
society (Ledeneva, 1998). Here I turn to a case of absenteeism on medical grounds to 
, 
illustrate its operation under current conditions. During my fieldwork in 2001, a friend of 
mine working at the factory had a bad accident which required my help. Since we had 
neither a car nor a telephone, I had to rush to our neighbours asking them to make a report to 
the foreman (he had to arrange for a replacement). Secondly, we had to go to the hospital so 
that the injured friend would be granted her medical certificate. Thanks to my personal 
connections, I managed to obtain the help of the deputy director's driver and, since his wife 
served as a nurse, we received preferential treatment at the hospital. This case suggests that 
personal connections are essential to overcome inefficiencies in the provision of services. It 
must be remembered, however, that informal relations, just as formal ones, have their own 
rules that impose constraints and opportunities. On many other occasions, it proved much 
harder for me to seek or offer favours due to the following reasons. Firstly, becoming a 
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these pennissive attitudes was already mounting in 2000, before the newcomers 
required more stringent action, as illustrated by the following occurrence at the office 
of a weaving shop manager. Quoting from my fieldnotes, 
A male worker comes into the office asking for a day off on medical 
grounds because he has to take a relative to the hospital. The shop chief 
enquires whether he has obtained a medical certificate, to which the man 
replies that they have so far rejected his request; he carries on trying to push 
his case with the manager. At this point, the shop chief cuts short the 
discussion, making clear that things have changed. There are orders from 
above and he [the chief] is certainly not going to expose himself without the 
infirmary giving its consent. 
The pressure from below is equally strong. Two factors lead to the inflation of 
sickness leaves. First, there is an increase in cases of illness directly related to the 
worsening working conditions8o• This emerges clearly from the speeches of the 
factory insider meant that I entered a network based on mutual obligations. This implied, 
among other things, that relations with non-members. who enjoyed different status and 
resources, were discouraged or precluded. Secondly, the very same trend of pauperisation 
and loss in security that resulted in close-knit groups, led others to break up, making 
. 
traditional informal social means unavailable. Workers, oriented to survival, tended to follow 
the former path; managers. more concerned with career and under greater competitive 
pressure, reacted in the latter way. This indicates that personal networks are playing multiple 
roles in shaping social relations during the transition. On the one hand. such networks, while 
working as a safety net, reflect a social system based on inequality and fragmentation. On the 
other hand, in relation to corporate interests they also have a dual character - as an 
autonomous source of obligations they are an obstacle to the extension of formal. centralised 
management of personnel; by the same token, they help to buffer the inefficiencies of 
management and the state, thereby providing some social stability. 
80 There is plenty of evidence that the sanitary situation in the town has deteriorated in recent 
years. Reversing this trend, as managers and workers unanimously reported, has been 
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delegates at a factory trade union committee meeting, held at the end of February 
2001. 
No less emotionally, the issues of working conditions and the situation of 
drinking water were discussed, which are directly related to workers' 
morbidity. Information on this matter was provided by the chairman of the 
commission for production standards ... Leaking roofs, leaks in the water 
pipes, messy and dirty toilets and showers ... these facts appeared again and 
again (in his report). Basically, all living spaces on the production premises 
call for desperate attention ... The issue of living standards was taken further 
by the Assistant Chief Doctor of the town's state hospital... He remarked 
that unhygienic and unpleasant working conditions in several shops 
constitute one of the causes for the rising incidence of diseases among 
workers ... This at a time when hepatitis and tuberculosis are "running" in 
the town and at the enterprise: their incidence has grown already tenfold! 
(Smimov,2QOla) 
This was stated without considering that faulty equipment may also result in disasters 
such as fires and explosions. The State Inspector, visiting the factory after a serious 
incident, had to declare that: , 
The investigation has found out that people in your production work with 
malfunctioning equipment. Such a [slovenly] attitude of factory technicians 
postponed due to production requirements and for lack of funding - and this in a polluting 
industry with many dangerous processes. The ventilation system in the shops. for example, 
works at 50% below standard. working premis.es are literally falling apart, cleaning is carried 
out superficially. and canteens have no washing machines. The situation is more serious in 
bleaching and dyeing shops where aggressive chemicals are handled without precautions, 
prompting one foreign consultant to suggest its closure. Consequently, high levels of 
respiratory diseases, infections, and cases of gangrene exist. 
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toward labour protection not only meets my disbelief, but outrages me 
deeply (Svetlakov, 2001). 
Another factor causing absenteeism and bringing havoc to work scheduling is the 
presence of working mothers in the workforce, especially single mothers. In fact, 
they are entitled to a permit to look after their children. Managers, not surprisingly, 
are not particularly fond of single mothers and consider them the worst category of 
workers in terms of performance. This issue has grown into a problem of its own 
after the transition started. First, the relative proportion of working mothers in the 
workforce has increased,· as they are the least likely to leave and the most 
unsuccessful in finding better-paid jobs. Second, during the transition period their 
. specific needs have grown leading to more absences. 
Workers are also entitled to request days off without pay for personal reasons. 
Though costly, this is a common soiution for workers who want to manage family 
businesses and see to bureaucratic obligations in a town where services are either 
unavailable or flawed by access barriers. Absenteeism worsens during summer time 
when workers; and managers alike spend most of their time on the family plot, and 
when some workers leave for seasonal jobs in major cities81 • Difficulties managers 
encountered ill handling this issue are exemplified by the following case taken from 
my fieldnotes. 
81 For the majority of employees. leaving permanently for a new jobllocation is impossible. 
Most workers are unskilled or trained only in the textile line. There are few attractive jobs 
outside this industry in the region, and the high cost of living in the cities prevents even 
versatile professionals from abandoning their local dacha or flat for good. Existing services, 
such as housing and schooling, help retain married or single mothers. In addition, the 
company town, with its close network of kin and comrades. represents an essential safety net 
against economic disruptions and social dislocation. 
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An argument in the office of Nikita Aleksandrovich (shop chiet). Women 
who work on the cotton supply unit complain about the continuous absences 
of the mechanics. without whom it is difficult to repair the machinery. 
Nikita Aleksandrovich replies that it is difficult to impose tight discipline 
and that. in the end. things have always been going this way. the more so 
when there is the risk of walkouts whenever people are put under even the 
slightest pressure. 
"What about higher wages?" [I later suggested] 
The reply was that, 'people are working in the fields, you have to 
understand, and this is the only way they could prepare for the winter.' 
Absenteeism appears to be well rooted in the social and economic upheaval of the 
transitional experience at the factory. Evidence indicates that managers show 
compliance with workers' claims and leniency towards cases of truancy. Yet, 
workers do not benefit equally from managers' understanding. Greater pressure is 
imposed on the more vulnerable workers, the young, the unskilled and working 
mothers. This; seems to breed overall absenteeism by creating a mismatch in time 
management between workers' needs and managerial concessions. The general 
attitude is to l~t the issue slip down the hierarchy, leaving the problem to the foremen 
and other workers' "leaders." Ultimately, it is up to the workers themselves to avoid 
visible holes in staffing and to ensure that essential duties are covered. 
Time Losses at Work 
Another form of discipline violation that has increased during the 1990s is the 
practice of arriving late at work and leaving before the end of the shift. While 
discussing discipline violations, one key informant maintained that, 
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Arriving late at work has become common practice. People do not even 
bother to seek justification for it - they simply said they overslept (ya 
prospaZ). It is not like in Stalin's times when, as I was told, you could walk a 
long way through the snow to the combine and still you could get 
imprisoned for several days for a five minutes delay. 
Managers consider late arrivals especially pernicious as they create delays and 
bottlenecks in the production flow when the work has to be passed on from one shift 
to another. One cause of this type of indiscipline is dissatisfaction of women workers 
with a new timetable. Replying to my questionnaire, women operators of the carding 
shop wrote: 
The change in the shift system has cast a significant influence on our work. 
[The old system entailed a night shift only twice a month, now it has 
increased to twice a week, C. M.] We believe that it is very difficult for 
women to work on a night shift, both physically and psychologically. Night 
shifts are particularly tiring, but for women there is no chance to rest 
afterwards as they still have a family, a home, and a plot of land [to 
manage]. Vacation days are no longer felt as such. (Interview with the shift 
n.1 of , the carding shop, 2001) 
The most typical forms of time loss are those taking place during the production 
process itself. Textile production is characterised by relatively simple and repetitive 
production tasks; in fact, female workers did complain that their job was as tiring as 
it was monotonous. Therefore, despite the lack of processing material, faulty 
machinery and so on, the working life of women machine operators was, and still is, 
very much confined to the supervision of looms. 
283 
Claudio Morrison: Soviet Management and Transition PhD thesis June 2004 
Matters are different for ancillary and auxiliary jobs staffed mostly by men. They 
enjoy greater autonomy in their work than others do. While regularly inspecting 
factory premises, it was possible for me to spot loaders, cleaners82 as well as 
repairers and mechanics wandering around apparently with purpose. Often, it was 
difficult to determine whether the workers' behaviour was related to a production 
task or was mere loafing. Loaders and shop cleaners, usually young unskilled males, 
are notorious for their indiscipline. Still, if these show so little motivation in 
carrying out their duties, it is also true that their working conditions provide a good 
excuse for such behaviour. As managers complained, loading and unloading devices 
are primitive or non-existent, shipments from the preparation shop are irregular, and 
the shop chief often fight with the manager of the neighbouring spinning shop for the 
use of trolleys. Equally, cleaners, who were often criticised for their poor work, 
could be granted some excuse. With no proper clothing and appropriate tools, they 
have to deal with polluting material scattered all over the shop with a faulty 
ventilation system. In general, the problem for ancillary mechanics is that most of 
their work is left to their own judgement and resourcefulness, and to their ability to 
bargain with the managers. As one assistant foreman put it, 
Of course our work is scheduled, but then again problems begin: no parts, no 
I • 
personnel to help out, and no co-operation. We have to do everything in a 
rush because managers want as many machines as possible at work, so we 
simply make them up and so we keep going! (Interview with assistant 
foreman of the carding shop, May 2001) 
82 Here we refer to the ugarshchik, usually male worker taking care of industrial waste 
removal and cleaning of looms. The cleaning of offices and other living premises is another 
profession (uborshchitsa), generally carried out by women. 
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Whether failure to meet job specifications was the immediate result of higher plan 
targets or workers' attempt to skip them, it is clear that managers found it difficult to 
judge on the matter. Therefore those who were controlled less and/or had greater 
bargaining powers could more easily get away with discipline violations· 
Soaring Theft: Misappropriation or Reappropriation? 
The outbreak of large-scale theft in 1996-1997 and its continuation over time tell us 
much about the nature of the enterprise as a social organisation, and it indicates the 
state of crisis in which management-employee relationships exist. Moreover, it is an 
indication of the inability of management to enforce property rights, a serious matter 
for an enterprise in transition to capitalism. 
By 1997, the second year of shortages of supplies and non-payment of wages, senior 
managers were denouncing in the factory paper the outbreak of thefts. 
This epidemic of thefts continues to be equally worrying among our 
miseries. This is one reason why our production shows worse conditions. All 
measures taken by the administration have turned out to be ineffective. We 
have installed alarm systems in all warehouses. They obviously give results, 
but until people understand that they are robbing themselves -- until they 
stand up to preserve enterprise assets -- there will be no change (Svetlakov, 
1997). 
The factory paper started a regular a section about zaderzhany c pokhischennym 
(detained with stolen property), reporting full details about employees stopped and 
( 
charged with theft. These notes read as follows: 
6th of February, K. Vladimir. V., loader of the packaging shop, [found in 
possession of] 6,9 m. of bleached calico. 
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14th of February, K. Galina V., machine operator of the combing carding 
shop, [ ... ] 850 gr. of copper. 
19th of February, Sh. Konstantin V., assistant foreman of the weaving 
section, [ ... ] 860 gr. of aluminium parts of ATPR looms (Privolzhskii 
Rabochii,2001a). 
16th of May, L. Ljubov' V, [female] accountant of the catering shop, [ ... J 4,4 
m. of bleached calico (Privolzhskii Rabochii, 2001 b). 
Managers lamented that all were involved, though men were more likely to steal than 
women, because their profession as auxiliaries gave them easier access to goods and 
greater freedom to move; by contrast, workers (mostly female) stole more than ITR 
because of their greater need. The fact that employees continued to plunder the 
enterprise property, irrespective of the controls and punishments administered, 
reveals that senior management was not equipped to control such an outbreak of 
insubordination. 
The long-term causes of this situation can be traced to the Soviet approach in 
allocating the'means of production. The fact that there was no identifiable owner to 
assume its pJ;oper use is usually blamed for the large-scale misuse of state property. 
, 
That said, the' situation on the ground seems to point to a more complex set of causes. 
State ownership and a planned economy meant that the state enterprise owned 
everything and the people nothing; shops were empty, and most essential goods and 
services were unavailable for individual purchase. The illegal, private use of 
enterprise property was an unavoidable consequence of this situation. Yet, under the 
Soviets misappropriation of enterprise property did not mean generalised and 
unregulated plundering. In contrast to the later transition period, there were strict, 
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even if informal, rules about who could have what. Under the Soviets, at the core of 
this mechanism were not property or money but status and authority. This enabled 
managers to retain customary income and wealth differentials between themselves 
and workers. 
With most goods and services nowadays available only at un affordable prices in 
private establishments, the temptation has increased to use illegitimate means to get 
resources. Moreover, workers have felt justified in pilfering when noticing the 
blatant escalation of money squandering and misappropriation displayed by senior 
management of the enterprise in the early 1990s. At that time, while the enterprise 
was obtaining high-interest credits, the director and his deputy did not deny 
themselves the construction of villas worth tens of thousands of U.S. dollars, and 
management took business trips, thereby depleting valuable hard currency. Evidence 
suggests that privatisation itself could neither prevent the misappropriation of 
collective property, nor tum it into the efficient allocation of resources. 
The Factory and the Bottle: Alcoholism and Discipline. 
The abuse of alcohol consumption has long been a distinctive characteristic of 
Russian society. In an encompassing study of the anti-alcohol campaign launched by 
soviet authorities in the second half of the 1980s, it is reported that, already 'in the 
1970s, alcohol was not simply "Commodity number 1" but also "Calamity number 
I" .. .' (White, 1996, p. 41) in the Slavic parts of the Soviet Union. Soviet economists 
-in the 1980s were alarmed about how 'violations of labour discipline ... were nearly 
always associated with alcohol' (White, 1996, p. 49). This was the one issue on 
which the CPSU and the Soviet state fought and lost its last battle for social control 
and cultural hegemony. More specifically, it tried to fight the issue in the workplace 
with the prohibitionist policies initiated under Gorbachev in 1985 (White, 1996). 
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The company town -- with its exiguous social life, its empty shops, and a factory that . 
combined hard work and low pay -- offered a climate conducive to high rates of 
alcoholism. This is probably the reason why the anti-alcohol campaign was 
implemented here in its most vehement form: 
First of all that year [in 1985], and this cannot be overlooked as it is our 
history, we all tried to struggle for a sober way of life. The town was 
declared an area of absolute sobriety by the city council. [After its demise 
the campaign attracted such comments:] What a pity it is, said the retired 
worker Elena G., as we, women, had all to gain from this campaign. At 
home things were easier, without that poison, men (muzhiki) began to come 
back home sober and, on the job, to work (Schelkov and Antonov, 1998, p. 
41) 
The failure of the 1980s national campaign gave way to an increasingly gloomy 
picture (Schelkov and Antonov, 1998, p. 41). In 1997, during my first stay in the 
town, I observed how drinking of spirits was common among the workforce and that 
it reached into factory walls. Security· guards were at times too 'happy' to operate 
gates, or a brigade leader on a repair job could handle a bottle and the direction of the 
works at the 'same time. Vodka would flow during convivial occasions, trade talks, 
, 
and even during electoral ballot counting. In 2000-2002, the situation appears to 
have turned even worse as suggested by my experience. To quote from my 
fieldnotes: 
Returning to the research site after several years, I looked forward to seeing 
those I had dealt with on my first visit, among them a security guard. 
Enquiring to a friend about his whereabouts, I was informed that he had 
died, stabbed by his wife at a time they were both drunk. The fate of the 
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surviving partner was no less surprising. She escaped punishment by bribing 
the judges, I heard in bewilderment, and was now back at work in her shop. 
Still shaken, I enquired as to why no one had reported such a shocking event 
to me. The reply was that "somethirig like that happens every day." 
Less dramatic cases leading to divorces, domestic violence, infidelity, and so on are 
more common and are responsible for contaminating interpersonal relations and 
broader social networks. Drinking has not simply continued to be a main ingredient 
in an increasing number of domestic tragedies, it has become also a major problem in 
the factory. Shop floor leaders presented the shop chief with a constant flow of 
reports about cases of on-the-job alcoholism. The chief's desk was never short of 
fresh hand-written slips reading: "I have to inform You [the Chief] that [this worker] 
has been found in a state of intoxication and has been expelled from work." 
The perception and the level of tolerance by senior management had also changed by 
the second visit in 2000-02. If they could pretend that in the early 1990s 
troublemakers were a minority that could be easily dealt with, now top managers 
could not refrain themselves from bitterly remarking that their workers were "a 
. 
bunch of untrustworthy alcoholics". Punishments include demotion and relocation, 
. . 
and increasingly firing workers, especially when, as it is often the case, drunkenness 
, 
is the cause of discipline violations. In this, as in other instances, line managers 
demonstrate a reluctance to intervene, fearing unpopularity, but also out of awareness 
that better workers are not available. Part of the explanation for the lack of action in 
this area is provided by the failure of the Soviet-time anti-alcohol campaign, and 
rests on the commonsensical understanding that the pervasiveness of the 
phenomenon would not be solved by half-hearted interventions. 
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As a result one could have the perception that the problem is not dealt with seriously 
but at the level of conversation. In fact, during the fieldwork period it was clear that 
drinking in itself was not a problem even when taking place on the factory premises, 
except when it became excessive and harmed someone's status as a reliable and 
respectable cadre. Secondly, I observed that while drinking appeared to be a 
pervasive practice, its impact on factory life followed the economic and social· 
dislocation of the enterprise. This 'anti-social behaviour' seemed in many cases to 
combine defiance and despair among workers in the face of an unbearable material 
and psychological situation. Managers, therefore, can do little to reverse such trends 
and do not want to risk open confrontation with the workforce by addressing 
alcoholism and its consequences openly. Whatever the economic costs related to 
alcohol abuse, it is easier to let it serve as a coping strategy for the harshness and 
. sheer lowliness of everyday life. 
From soviet populism to managerial authoritarianism? 
In this section I will analyse the policies introduced by the administration to deal 
with discipline violations. The first part of this section will review the Soviet-time 
attitude as it '~as retained by the enterprise management during the early transition. 
I 
This will be followed by a review of the measures introduced after pri vatisation. 
Finally, in the third part the more recent decisive actions brought forward by the new 
owners will be considered. 
Disciplinary Problems and Solutions in the Soviet Context 
DUring the last decade of Soviet rule, discipline in the workplace became a major 
target of Party policy in an attempt to revive a stagnating economy. Several 
campaigns were launched to raise awareness of the damage produced by violations 
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and to mobilise labour collectives 'in the struggle for strong discipline.' The case 
enterprise has records of participating in these initiatives as well as of experiencing 
their long-term failure. 
In mid 1980s, strengthening of labour discipline became an acute problem at 
the combine. During a single year more than seven hundred cases of 
unjustified absenteeism (progul) were reported. That's no good at all! How 
many moral and economic losses have such violations of labour discipline 
brought about! Could textile workers further accommodate these losses? No! 
Therefore, in 1996 ... brigades ... began to work under the motto 'Labour 
discipline - pledge of the collective'. The moral factor was placed highest as 
a resource of the labour collective in the struggle for strong discipline. 
Brigades wrote it down in their work instructions and from that moment 
began to operate the lever of material incentives (Schelkov and Antonov, 
1998, p. 40). 
This campaign was combined with the equcllly extensive and no more successful 
anti-alcohol campaign (Schelkov, 1998, p.41). 
, . 
Ten years afterward the situation was further aggravated by the consequences of 
transition. We already reported, in the previous chapter, the alarm raised by senior 
production managers on theft and demoralisation, years later the Chief Engineer, 
reporting publicly on the state of affairs at the enterprise, still remarked the 
seriousness of the issue. 
As in the past, the level of labour discipline is low. As a whole, in the past 
year, four hundred sixty eight people were involved in discipline violations, 
which is one hundred seventy eight more than in 1999. Among them four 
hundred fifty six were cases of absenteeism, of which one hundred nineteen 
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were related to alcoholism. One hundred fifty three people have been fired 
for absenteeism. The number of thefts amounted to two hundred twenty 
eight, or twenty-one cases less relative to 1999, but this negative tendency 
has not been eliminated and the combine continues to suffer serious losses 
because of theft. (Smimov E., 200lb, p. 1) 
These reports speak for themselves as for the seriousness and continuity of the 
phenomenon. They also suggest that, if only figures could be comparable, the 
absolute decline of cases, seen in perspective with the fall in staffing levels, which 
affected the less productive and certainly the persistent offenders, corresponded to a 
relative increase. The managers' opinion was confirmed by even the most superficial 
observation that these phenomena had become generalised among the workforce. It 
now involved more than the usual suspects (the working class underdogs, the 
alcoholics et cetera), following the deterioration of living standards and the growing 
cynicism surrounding the state of the enterprise and the managers' ability to handle 
it. The persistence and the scale of the disruptions mean that these phenomena could 
not be simply treated as individual cases and referred to the correct administration of 
. . 
, 
the disciplinary procedures but called for a wider policy aimed at the strengthening 
of managerial control and workers' consent. Soviet and enterprise leaders were, 
, 
, 
despite all, well aware of that and the above-referred campaigns embraced these 
objectives. 
The two strategies behind most of these initiatives were, first, an attempt to raise 
managerial status and organisational capabilities and, second, to appeal to workers, 
specifically the cadre elite, to address these problems themselves through a 
combination of material rewards and political pressures. The approach senior 
management of the combine tended to embrace was the bonus-driven populist appeal 
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to workers. This approach involved persuading without open confrontation in 
accordance with the way social relations in the shops were traditionally constructed. 
Well into the 1990s, enterprise administrators continued to rely on this strategy, 
maintaining that the "principal means to ensure· the respect of discipline is the 
personal interest (zainteresovannost') of the worker in the results of work" 
(Enterprise Code of Conduct, 1998, p. 13). 'The check over workers' discipline, 
including the right to initiate hiring and firing procedures and impose reprimands and 
fines' was formally attributed to shop chiefs, with personnel offices relegated to the 
traditIonal rubber-stamp role (Interview with the shop chief of the weaving shop, 
2000). 
The official position of senior management on the issue is offered by a formal 
interview with the. Director, reported in a commemorative publication. The 
interviewee praises the leading role of cadre workers in labour organisation and 
suggests the kind of behaviour expected in the management of critical situations. 
In his shop he [the assistant foreman, C. M.] revealed his talent as organiser 
and edllcator. He works with people individually, always aware of their 
problems, personal as well as professional. He helps as he can. In his shift 
• 
are employed six youngsters - two of them are "difficult". Still he can find a 
. 
common language with all of them." (Schelkov and Antonov, 1998. p. 62) 
This meant that the management of punishments and rewards was left in the hands of 
line and production managers. and was handled in the customary Soviet manner. 
Managerial tactics on the shop floor 
Lower managers and workers' leaders are therefore those who normally deal with 
diSciplinary problems. In the context produced by privatisation and crisis at the 
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factory, line management found itself confronted with the need to tighten discipline 
if it wanted to achieve higher productivity in the face of decaying technology and a 
reduced, and less skilled, workforce. Workers, though, were less committed to their 
factory work due to decreasing pay, declining social services, and the physical and 
moral deterioration of the social environment in which they worked and lived. In the 
face of the central office's tightening bureaucratic and physical control, line 
managers seemed caught between Soviet-style compliance and a new and more 
authoritarian approach. 
Managerial response during transition can be understood within the framework of the 
Soviet-type relationship on the shop floor. In Soviet times, managers exercised 
authority over workers by entering into individual bargaining and by using their 
. . 
powers in a discretionary manner. In this context, managers were expected to 
consider workers' needs on an individual basis, taking into account the different 
status of categories and even of individual workers. Therefore, entering the 
transition, managerial attitude toward discipline violations was neither consistent 
(with new tougher policies), nor based on (increasingly pressing) workers' needs. It 
tended, instead, to favour previously privileged categories, penalising instead the 
most vulnerable and less combative among workers, such as the unskilled, the young 
trainees and women, especially single mothers. 
Furthermore, their tactic - again in line with the Soviet informal rules concerning the 
exercise of authority - was one of avoidance of conflicts and responsibility. 
Managers would routinely allow exit or leave permits if foremen had done so and 
reject them if no other authority supported the requests. They would not start a 
disciplinary procedure unless forced to do so, such as if the case had been made 
known to senior management. They took care in making their intervention appear as 
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resulting from the specific circumstances of the individual case, rather than 
stemming from the imposition of an impersonal law. In this way, line managers were 
able to tum workers' solidarity in their favour and encourage workers to isolate 
wrongdoers singled out by managers. 
The likelihood that the discipline problems could be reduced in this manner was dim. 
As for the rewards, they were too limited and were unequally distributed. Already 
thriving cadres were more likely to· be rewarded than low-earning and 
underachieving workers. As for the punishments, there were limits to their use. This 
was the case especially concerning dismissal. As my key respondent, the head of the 
weaving department, remarked, in the late Soviet period the policy was to educate 
rather than to expel offenders. The labour collective was a community that had to 
take care of all of its members. The Soviet disciplinary system worked as a 
complement to the incentive system to marginalise wrongdoers, not dismiss them. 
Tackling discipline? Crisis of Authority in the Newly Privatised Enterprise 
From the mid 1990s, discipline violations became one of the major issues in the 
enterprise anq a key ingredient in the polemics between the administration and 
employees. Now the enterprise could no longer afford the amount of waste this 
entailed. Th~refore, while still pledging allegiance to the voluntaristic and 
paternalistic approach of Soviet times, senior management began to introduce 
measures aimed at strengthening control over workers. One of the first signs of this 
was the installation at the factory's main gates of barriers with magnetic cards in 
1999, shortly before TMS took over the enterprise. Security staff was also instructed 
to strengthen their vigilance over movements of people and goods. Soon after, CCTV 
cameras appeared on factory premises, and tools were locked up in warehouses and 
safes. It seemed that years after privatisation, management was finally displaying the 
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will to transform the 'old socIalist enterprise' into a modern private firm, and to 
assert its control in an impersonal and orderly fashion. Yet, the eventual failure of 
these measures showed the limits and contradictions of these actions. 
In the first place, security personnel were limited in number and notoriously 
unreliable. Retaining the arrangements of the Soviet time, the factory continued to 
employ recruits of the local police (militsia), who colluded with the workforce and 
tended to ignore infractions. Moreover, workers, seemingly so deferential and 
apparently incapable of asserting even their most basic rights, reacted angrily at any 
attempt to be physically controlled. Guards complained that they were subjected to 
physical and verbal abuse by workers while carrying out their search duties. 
More importantly, even the new ability to electronically monitor the movement of 
employees through the gates did not alleviate the problem of truancies. Because 
production managers, down to the level of shop chief, retained the right to admit 
people into the factory whenever they wanted, it was up to them to keep late-comers 
out. However, they frequently failed to do so. As one manager commented during an 
informal conversation with me, 'the data are there but no one from the shops cares to 
use them.' Instructions were also issued to put an end to absenteeism. In any case, 
truancy, as ot~er forms of discipline violations, continued to proliferate. 
I 
The second phase in privatisation and the new owner's struggle for control: 
Restoring (what) order? 
When in the year 2000 TMS prepared to take over the enterprise, its incoming 
management strongly criticised the inaction and the ambivalence of the former 
management toward discipline violations. It made it abundantly clear that it was 
going to take decisive action to restore order in the factory. 
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In a long interview with the factory paper, the leader of TMS, Anatolii Zaryanovich, 
after accusing the old management of continuing to "work under socialism," 
presented the action plan of the new administration by arguing that, 
it is also essential that we, all together and each of us on his own. will join in 
the struggle against theft. In the end. is it not true that they [the workers] are 
stealing from themselves and those closest to them? For this reason. in the 
case of theft-related charges we will punish harshly whomever. from the 
worker to the manager. We will not allow anyone to work 'staying aside. 
working for himself; similar attitudes will translate into instant dismissal 
and full repayment of the material. damages incurred. Having said that, we 
will also offer everyone the opportunity to earn on the basis of real work 
performance. high quality of output. efficient use of resources. and strong 
discipline (Smimov E., 20(0). 
Between mid 2000 and the end of 2001 the new owners made discipline one of the 
key goals, in order to achieve greater productivity at lower costs. Managers were 
now targeted no less than workers as part of the wider bid for control over the 
enterprise, and were subject to constant pressure and deprived of some prerogatives. . 
Security issues were to be dealt with centrally by a restructured security department. 
whose chief was now a man installed by TMS and made accountable only to it. 
Security personnel, both at the gates and elsewhere, were selected by him. These 
personnel were given greater powers to check the movements of people and goods, 
and they received the right to inspect any freight or employee by means of personal 
searches. Managers were also given greater responsibilities. The enterprise territory 
was divided into sectors, and heads of production were made responsible for any 
accident occurring in their area. Controls extended into the shop with TMS 
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dispatchers who assessed the progress in production, and who frequently appeared in 
offices of the shop chiefs to verify that they were carrying out their duties. 
Administrative controls consisted of requiring managers to record their own 
activities. For any spare parts, wage money, or other activities involving extra 
expenses or use of materials, a request had to be filed and submitted to senior 
management. To make this control system more effective, the security department 
was entrusted with inspection powers to verify the observance of these internal 
procedures. This caused some problems. In the shop I studied, the shop chief 
maintained that requests were usually agreed to by upper management. This was in 
the autumn of 2000. A year later, after the new rules were implemented, the situation 
had changed. When another shop chief was carrying out repair work after an 
accidental explosion, he encountered resistance by the financial department for a 
consignment of fabrics. As noted in my fieldnotes, 
A bureaucratic nightmare. Nikita Aleksandrovich has signed an order to 
obtain fabrics. A lot of confirmations are required, but the whole procedure 
is stopped by the accountants. They are afraid to attract the attention of 
security because to the latter asking for fabrics automatically means theft. 
An effective,: though quite crude, way to achieve savings in the use of resources 
(such as spare parts) consists in limiting the flow of material into the shops; in fact, 
shortages were already acute since the onset of privatisation due to mismanagement 
of supplies and lack of funds. Currently, however, with the new owner stocking the 
warehouses, shortages are the result of a conscious decision, as confirmed by one of 
the assistant foremen, ' ... there is a severe shortage of spare parts. Foremen seem to 
care little and the procurement service is uncooperative. Those in the warehouses 
. refuse to hand out. spare-parts because they have been ordered to economise' 
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(Interview with Assistant foreman, combing-carding shop. May 2001). As a result, 
the shop chiefs now have to arrange for worn-out pieces of equipment to be repaired, 
and mechanics and workers alike have to seek "easy fixes" to keep machinery going. 
Restrictive measures were accompanied, as promised, by interventions in the area of 
incentives, with the reform of the wage system. In this way, the newcomer's strategy 
seemed to revamp, ideally, the traditional soviet campaigns, which matched appeals 
and initiatives in favour of stronger discipline with a renewed set of incentives. The 
administration of bonuses is now guided by the new philosophy of making the 
"rouble" the new "criterion of work assessment." This takes the form of fines for 
failures, rather than of bonuses for improvements (as said in the previous chapter). 
To tackle truancy disguised as sick leave, a fine amounting to 10% of the incentive 
pay has been introduced for any such case, causing outrage among employees. 
Already in May, a few month after its introduction, the management staged a retreat, 
agreeing minor corrections presented by the trade unions in the resolution approved 
at their annual conference: 
The ~dministration should also ... amend the Regulations on work 
remuneration in the following points: 
, 
- if sick leave extends from one month into another, then the loss of bonus 
will apply to the first month only. 
- Working mothers, with children up to three years of age, will have their 
bonus paid in full, in case of child's sickness. (Privolzhskii Rabochii. 
25/05/2001, p. 3) 
Even like this, there were plenty of workers losing their bonuses, as exemplified by 
countless grievances against the new wage system. Workers feel that they are being 
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cheated and managers tend to agree that workers could not be expected to do better 
in the present precarious conditions. 
By May 2001, discipline violations did not show any signs of decline despite the 
many dismissals (Smirnov, 2001b). An important test lay ahead during the 
forthcoming summer. As I previously noted, the summer is a time of large seasonal 
outflow of workers and managers into private enterprise and agricultural work, 
against which now stood the determination of the new administration to keep 
production going - business as usual even during the summer83. 
At the end of August 2001, in answer to the workers' claims for higher wages, 
Anatolii Zaryanovich presented a very gloomy picture of the performance of the 
enterprise in the previous summer months - discipline violations were again singled 
out as the main reason. 
Since April, labour productivity has sharply declined, the amount of defects 
[in products] has increased and labour discipline has fallen ... Inexplicably, 
the number of truancies went up. For instance, in one shift the staffing 
records, count 126 employees, and out of this figure 40 are off on medical 
grounds. Who is going to benefit from this? We planned an output of 650 
• 
tons of yam and we got 550. Late arrivals and early exits at work are 
I 
proliferating. Assistant foremen hand over a shift without seeing each other. 
not reporting what went on during the shift and what problems are left to be 
83 The interest of TMS management to put an end to this practice requires explanation. While 
in the early years of the transition the market cycle had affected businesses in this 
season/summer with low prices and a scarcity of raw materials. eventually local 
manufacturers had managed to stabilise both sales and supplies. This good news came from 
an interview with the director of the local textile industrialists' association, chaired at that 
time by the ubiquitous Anatolii Zaryanovich. He was convinced that his own factories could 
now make the most of the market innovation he himself had fostered. 
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sorted out. All this impacts seriously on the quality of work (Privolzhskii 
Rabochii.2001d) 
A further tightening of the grip on labour organisation was eventually introduced in 
January 2002, after disappointment had already emerged from the results of the first 
wave of interventions. This time, production managers were instructed to file cards 
reporting any movement of workers within the factory, but outside their usual 
workplace, explaining the purpose of these 'business trips'. Quite commonsensically, 
this initiative in particular, but in general any bureaucratically informed measure, 
was taken by most production managers, at best, as a boutade or worst as a 
nonsensical act of coercion. In order to understand why we can report an excerpt 
from a workers' letter that exemplifies how difficult it is for managers no less than 
for workers to. plan time and conditions of work and how workers' autonomous 
deCision-making is the rule in overcoming his/her daily amount of uproars: 
At the beginning of their workday (razvod), brigade leaders receive their 
daily tasks for their brigade. Yet, quite often these tasks have to be put aside 
and we; are all sent to the loading/unloading job. Here they come, trolleys, 
ropes, panels, crowbars. What bright minds have not invented; but then 
again '~hese bare hands remain the most reliable "mechanism" in Russia. 
, 
After heavy work, as a rule there'll be some smoking where everyone joins 
in. including the non-smokers. We just light up when the foreman rushes in 
"with fire on his tail" (nastegannyi): here we got another disaster (avral). 
Cigarettes fly into the dustbin and once again to work. Obviously, it is not 
like that every day, but it does happen ... Still, time passes and the daily plan 
must be fulfilled, especially since shift workers press us. Here, there is no 
need for managerial control. Everyone can understand that the faster 
machinery is repaired the less problems we have, the less stoppages. True, 
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our equipment is astonishingly die-hard. Our belts and conveyors, pulleys 
and reducers, which become "a century old every year", keep working fine, 
till they eventually disintegrate. How this super-new computerised 
machinery could ever compete with them! Here will come welding tools, 
milling machines, or sometimes just a bit of a worker's wit. (L. S., 2002). 
This account shows that the production process has maintained its traditional - that 
is, Soviet - disorganised elements and that, consequently, cadre workers continue to 
be relied upon for their skills and flexibility "to keep things going somehow." Their 
autonomy remains unchallenged and their daily movements difficult to restrain in 
practice. A closer look into the production process will unveil much of the rationale 
for managerial compliance with discipline violat~ons. 
Workers autonomy and the production process 
In this section I will analyse a case of technological discipline violation to show how 
the production process relates to manager-worker relationships that result in 
continuing breaches of discipline. In this case, the problem of improving product 
quality amon~ female machine operators is considered. It is acknowledged that 
quality standards of textile goods in the Ivanovo region are low (Okhotnikova, 2001), 
and that they have continued to deteriorate since privatisation. There are several 
\ 
external factors involved in this decline that range from the disruption of the supply 
chain to low cotton quality. However, factors internal to the factory are' also 
important. With managerial consent, workers tamper with goods and machinery in 
order to achieve more output, and they do so mainly because of the piece-rate 
payment system. The new owners have made upgrading of quality a strategic aim 
and have reformed the wage system accordingly, making bonus payable on quality 
and discipline performances. 
302 
Claudio Morrison: Soviet Management and Transition PhD thesis June 2004 
With the co-operation of the shop chieF\ I recorded an account of the production 
process for the carding-combing shop, detailing workers' infringements of 
technological discipline, which lowers product quality. The following summarises 
the manager's argument and technical observations. 
In order to make the plan, workers have developed a series of practices 
which violate technological discipline. Some of them are detrimental to the 
quality of output. A detailed description of the production process and of 
some characteristics of cotton processing reveals the causes of these 
. practices. Unlike synthetics, natural fibres, such as cotton, present the 
disadvantage that their physical characteristics cannot be easily 
predetermined. Maintaining quality requires strict adherence to certain 
procedures and constant control over standards. The lack of sophisticated 
testing and control equipment installed on machinery and in laboratories at 
the factory makes workers' skills and dedication essential to maintaining 
high quality standards. One of the important properties to determine the 
quality of cotton in carding and combing processes is the weight of threads, 
which should be kept constant at 4 kilotex. Obviously, if we measure this 
value over time, figures tend to oscillate around this standard. The quality 
indicator considered in the field is the coefficient of variation of this 
. 
measure, CV. After the preparation process, consisting of cleaning and 
opening of cotton bales, carding and combing are the first phases of the 
production process. A conveyor leads the raw cotton to the carding 
84 The following notes were collected when the struggle for quality was first implemented on 
the shop floor. The shop chief agreed to explain how it came about that workers were 
disrupting the production process. Interviews with the chief engineer, the chief of the quality 
department, and with quality controllers confirmed that similar practices were common 
elsewhere in the enterprise, and in fact also in other factories of the region. 
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machine, where it is transformed into threads (the card slivers) which are 
wound up into drums placed below each carding head. The machine lies 
longitudinally to the conveyor, and has ten carding heads which are fed in 
succession. The cotton tends to be deposited according to its weight, so we 
will find that the weight of the threads has descending values, moving from 
the first drum onward. The second phase of the process consists in the 
combing of slivers. The same drums are now laid out in two layers of six on 
each side of the combing machine, which feed the slivers into two main 
heads. After combing, the threads end up in two larger drums. This phase is 
important because it allows the mixing of the cotton threads to achieve the 
4-kilotex standard, while sharply reducing the CV. The crucial task in this 
process is the dislocation of drums between the two machines. The drums, 
which carry slivers with different kilotex values, have to be placed in a 
certain order so as to achieve a proper mix in the combing process. Care has 
to be taken in the preparation of the two extra drums required by the 
combing machines, but which were not filled automatically by the carding 
machine. Workers, however, are mainly concerned with having a constant 
supply;of slivers to feed into the combing machines because this output 
represents their plan. For several reasons -- including problems with carding, 
comp~ption between shifts, and delays in shipments -- it regularly happens 
I 
that workers are short of slivers. The solution is simply to run the combing 
with fewer dr_urns or to fill the empty drums with slivers picked up from the 
others. Sometimes -- due to lack of time, inaccuracy, sloppiness, or 
irresponsibility -- workers simply ignore the rules about the deployment of 
drums. In other cases, workers run the very same slivers more than once 
through the combing machine. Since there is a counting device installed on 
this machine from which metres produced are counted and the piece-rate 
quota fulfilment calculated, this is an easy way to meet the production plan 
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in case of shortages of cotton threads. In all these cases quality is 
compromised. To make matters worse, because of the complexity of testing, 
it is difficult to determine the causes. The low quality of the raw cotton and 
the machines are also responsible for the poor quality and the chaotic state 
of production. Therefore, to determine responsibility is always discretionary. 
Managers, admittedly, know about these practices but feel unable to put an 
end to them. Foremen and workers are determined to meet their plan at any 
cost. Managers themselves are convinced that until the administration 
provides better working conditions and greater powers to managers, there is 
no reason to modify their behaviour. 
This case suggests that what seems to be discipline violation represents in fact the 
form in which the production process itself takes place. The technical shortcomings, 
as well as the lack of effective organisation, which appear to cause these disruptions 
and are usually blamed for the failures of managers and workers, are themselves the 
product of the labour process. In other countries the relative simplicity of the 
technical processes involved in textile production resulted in strict supervision and. 
managerial phmning a long time ago. In the present case, management still seems far 
from achieving these goals. There seem to be two key problems. First, there is the 
continued reI:iance on the commitment of individual workers in determining the 
actual form of his/her activity in production. This dilutes control mechanisms to 
nothing more than an ex-post assessment of the worker's performance. Second, 
there is the corresponding disengagement of line managers from intervening in the· 
production process. 
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What went wrong? Managerial discipline and workers' control 
In order to strengthen discipline, senior management wanted to impose 
accountability while trying to promote initiative. In practice, though, the measures 
adopted introduced greater individual responsibility, which foster parochialism and 
narrow-mindedness in low-ranking managerial decision-making. In the Soviet 
system shortcomings were overcome by informal, and often wasteful, initiatives 
which bridged the gaps between complementary services. The new measures, 
however, while addressing gross mismanagement and inefficient use of resources, 
endanger co-operation. Senior management has been increasingly conscious of this 
issue and has, in fact, taken counter-measures. Usually this consists of tying specific 
monetary incentives to collective targets in order to prevent individual self-interest 
from undermining these targets. For instance, collective payments - the brigade 
system - were introduced in weaving in 1998 by the previous administration. More 
recently, repairers in the spinning department have been promised a bonus payable in 
case the women in their shifts operate a greater number of looms (Privolzhskii 
Rabochii, 2001c). The returns, though, are disappointing because the relationship 
between managers and workers has remained dominated by the traditional 
motivations df individual achievements and accountability . 
. 
The other major obstacle to stronger discipline is the weak position of the enterprise 
as an employer in the job market. It is not enough to have regained the full right to 
hire and fire, if due to the low ability of the enterprise to pay decent wages, the best 
workers are leaving and the unskilled are the most likely to be hired. Disciplinary 
measures, including firing, do not work as a deterrent because, as many workers 
pointed out, 'the "truant" (gulyaka) or the "idler" (bezdel'nik) "does not fear 
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dismissal because he knows that the shortage of personnel will drive him back to the 
factory' (Interview with the shift n.l of the combing-carding shop, 2001). 
To sum up, organisational and job market conditions tend to reproduce a peculiar 
relationship between managers and workers that permits the latter to violate 
discipline and encourages the former to tolerate it. This form of relationship on the 
shop floor prevents the establishment of discipline from above. 
Discipline violations as aform ofsabotage? 
A vast literature suggests that the violation of discipline in the workplace, whatever 
the immediate form it assumes or the reasons adduced, contains an element of 
intentionality. It is, in other words, a way to manifest dissatisfaction with the 
condition of alienated and dominated work in an exploitative and hierarchical system 
(see Sprouse, 1992). Here we briefly consider how this argument applies to the 
Soviet economy and what implications it might have for explaining discipline 
violations at the enterprise after transition. 
In the Soviet Union the large-scale occurrence of discipline violations has been 
explained, among others, as a form of individualised resistance of the atomised 
workers. In f~ct since the 1930s, the banning of strikes and the transformation of the 
. 
trade unions into a satellite of the party-state, channelling and enforcing its targets 
from above, left workers with no means to further their grievances and engage in 
collective action. Therefore, 'denied any means of collective organisation and 
opposition, soviet workers, at least until recently, have adopted essentially defensive 
and generally individualised, responses towards both management and the regime 
(FiItzer, 1992, p. 41). 
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The disappeanince of the party-state and the transition to liberalism, both in the 
political and economic spheres, has not meant an automatic resurgence of the 
workers' movement. Despite the fact that perestroika ignited mass protests and 
strikes, which replicated in the mid-1990s, neither new independent organisations 
nor the old trade unions emerged to foster the democratisation of industrial relations 
(see Filtzer, 1994; Clarke, 1993, 1996,2002). 
If collective action or trade union activism should be taken as an indicator of change 
on these grounds, the enterprise shows a high level of continuity with the past. 
Workers staged only one strike during the entire decade, in 1998, when non-payment 
of wages had thrown the majority of employees into misery. For the rest of the time 
both the old and the new administration successfully adopted a paternalistic 
a:pproach, leaving to line managers the handling of day-to-day individual bargaining. 
As for trade unions, they survived by perpetuating their role of welfare 
administrators and management aides as indicated by the following passage in the 
factory paper: 
In all Productions and Departments of the combine, the primary Trade 
Union cells play, indeed, a noticeable role in the life of labour collectives ... 
• 
Today.I would like to remind the administration, and in the first place ,the 
\ 
foremen, that primary cells are their first assistant in their job. By making 
the proper arrangements with these organisations ... you can overcome 
mountains. Their influence on the climate in the labour collective, on 
productivity, quality of production and labour discipline should be 
reappraised. One of the main tasks of the cells consists in co-operating with 
the administration to constitute the adequate conditions for the achievement 
of plan targets, to conduct educational work with workers and so forth . 
... Where the tandem "foreman - T. U. cell" works in harmony, as a single 
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bundle, things proceed significantly better. The primary cells in conjunction 
with other Trade Union activists, especially with insurance delegates, 
provide, let us say, sick workers with visits at home. This has not only a 
great moral and psychological effect but also reinforces discipline ... The 
trade union is now a school of life and survival and we should remember 
that. (Sloveva E., 2001) 
This does not mean that unions are respected and influential as their leaders pretend 
it to be. In private, managers, clerks and workers alike would all play down their 
effective ability to operate. In the opinion of managers, these organisations are 
powerless and inefficient, for workers they are nothing more than corrupted 
individuals manoeuvred by the administration. Still, in the eyes of the administration, 
they serve as a fonnal counterpart in industrial relations and for workers, as 
providers of what is left of the enterprise welfare. More importantly, such an 
organisation is something of a hindrance to the emergence of any alternative to 
individual action. 
Managerial power on the shop floor is in any case a more immediate and certain 
obstacle to any attempt by workers to challenge the administration in direct fashion 
on fundameri,tal issues. Workers themselves depicted in this way the situation of 
I 
industrial relations and the actual causes of their apparent resilience: 
They [the workers] fear managerial authority. If a worker receives a 
reprimand the others would rather line behind the management throwing the 
blame at him/her. If I acted as a trade union leader they would find a way to 
kick me out. The trade unions are totally on the side of management; the 
enterprise pays each and every of them. (Interview with spinner, 2001) 
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Others signalled that their condition, in terms of bargaining power and status vis-a-
vis their superiors, had deteriorated significantly after the end of perestroika. 
Enterprise employees, therefore, had only as much scope, if not less, to make their 
voice heard and achieve improvements than they did in the socialist past. The moral 
and material aggravation that transition had brought in terms of material deterioration 
of living conditions and growing divide of status and consumption levels with the 
few at the top provides the fuel for cynicism and social hatred. Under these 
circumstances, workers' demands and expectations rather tend to surface in the form 
of individual destructive actions85• Managers, especially those on the frontline in the 
8S Short of collective action and outright defiance, everyday forms of resistance may take the 
form of 'foot-dragging', 'dissimulation', 'false compliance', pilfering' et cetera (see Scott 1., 
1985, p. 29-34). They are 'covert', 'anonymous', 'concerned largely with immediate de facto 
gains' (ibid., p. 33) so as to avoid exposing the perpetrator to the risk of retaliation. 
'Resistance is influenced by the existing forms of labour control and probability and severity 
of retaliation ... .' (Ibid., p. 34). Where piece-rate prevails, resistance is likely to find 
expression in ... "the short weighting of finished cloth, defective workmanship and the 
purloining of materials" (Wright M., 1978 in Ibid.) rather than in slow-down. Many cases 
already described in the chapter fit well in this categorisation and the ensuing analytical 
argument. An extreme case was, for example, reported in the Factory n. 2. Here a worker 
was electrocuted for having accidentally touched an unprotected wire. The investigation 
concluded that a section of it had been chopped with the intention to steal(Interview with the 
, 
Chief of labour protection and safety standards, 2001). Less dramatic cases, such as stealing 
vital tools, processing materials or spare-parts or concealing their whereabouts may have 
serious consequences for plan fulfilment, the state of technology et cetera. This is, bearing in 
mind the distinction drawn between female and male jobs, very much the product of male, 
especially mechanics', activity. Most of the time, 'minimal or reluctant compliance' is 
sufficient to wreck managerial plans. Loom operators could simply fail to report machinery 
faults, resulting in defective output or protracted idleness. Again, these actions, while lacking 
the intentionality of sabotage, certainly imply the consciousness of producing disruptions. 
When workers have no immediate interest in it, they justify such behaviour by saying that 
working more or better is not worth the pay and the treatment they receive. Finally, it is also 
important to consider that' ... forms of resistance are also intended to ... deny claims made by 
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shops, can merely accept it as a safety valve, as they have to face a very tense 
situation augmented by the personalised nature of intra-employee relationships. As 
they often put it, they could not ask more from workers, also because, very much like 
the latter, line managers feel themselves cheated upon by the directorate. 
Summary and conclusions 
Delays, idleness, misappropriation of employer's property, and outright sabotage 
occur in the world of production wherever domination and alienation exist as 
structural features of the production process. The experience of the Soviet economy86 
is nevertheless unusual, for discipline violations proved to be exceptionally 
widespread and pernicious, enjoying silent support or at least tolerance by production 
managers. This is because Soviet management and their present-time successors -
contrary to the widespread assumption of a converging path of the major 
superordinate classes' (Scott J., ibid., p. 32). There is an argument between a fitter and a 
shop chief that well exemplifies it. Nikita A. reproaches a repairer for not having completed 
his work on time, the mechanic replies that it is not his fault if spare parts do not fit and have 
to be replaced; or rectified. Listening to him, Nikita clarifies that those parts were of the 
needed specification and turns it into a matter of principle. He asks: 'if you dismantle a 
machine and replace all of its parts with new ones, will it not be the same again?' The 
workers rejectirtg the point disclose his thoughts: 'this is what you read in books but it is not 
the same in practice!' As to remind us that resistance is also a symbolic struggle concerning 
thoughts and ideas that define roles regulating everyday activities. 
86 The history of western management is interwoven with the struggle to achieve full control 
over the production process. Though this goal could hardly be fully achieved and is 
constantly put into question by workers' individual and collective action, the historical 
changes usually associated with the names of Taylor and Ford have marked a turning point 
in this direction. The separation between design and execution, hence the standardisation of 
social practices, at work and beyond, and the diffusion of ever more sophisticated 
mechanism of supervision to achieve their implementation, have all meant that discipline 
violations are aimed against this pervasive control a~d limited to the grey area outside it. 
311 
_______ ~~, •• __________ • _______ • _____ .0 •• 
Claudio Morrison: Soviet Management and Transition PhD thesis June 2004 
industrialising countries - have transferred the responsibility of everyday production 
management to workers, and to their cadres and supervisors. 
The cases of discipline violations presented in this study highlight how far post-
Soviet managers are from achieving control over the place, the time, and the methods 
in which production takes place. This failure not only allows considerable room for 
infractions to go undetected, but more importantly, contributes to a type of 
management-worker relationship in which the former has no interest in preventing 
discipline violations, and in some cases instigate them. Discipline violations, in fact, 
are not only a safety valve -- the only form workers have been left with which to 
express their mistrust and dissatisfaction - but also are a means to solve personal and 
production problems. 
Still, infractions do not pass without consequences. Even if they are not prevented 
and harshly sanctioned, they are still punished by the social stigma and loss of status 
that allows management to reinforce its upper hand over the workforce. Therefore" 
discipline violations represent an organic part of the mechanism of social control and 
work organis~tion at the enterprise. This explains the caution with which line 
managers have handled the latest disciplinary campaigns by the new owners and 
, 
brings to ligh~ the contradictions of the newcomer's policies. 
We can now return to the debate about manager-worker relations, and the nature of 
workers' control and resistance in Soviet and post-Soviet Russia. Our findings 
suggest that (1) the persistence of discipline violations indicates a continuity with the 
Soviet past in manager-worker relations; (2) yet, discipline violations do not 
represent organised protests against the steady deterioration of working and living 
conditions and/or the acceleration of production. Therefore, they do not qualify as 
conscious resistance. Instead, discipline violations by workers are a last resort used 
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by. them, since the means of collective bargaining and open conflict are denied to 
them (cf., Scott, 1985). This supports Clarke's thesis that considers workers' 
autonomy as a consequence of managerial strategy. To put it in terms of di Leo's 
(1973) idea of the Soviet social order as a political accommodation, with 
privatisation the existing compromise between upper enterprise administration and 
workers has been breached unilaterally from above, without workers being able to 
renegotiate this process. Once again, this confirms the intrinsic weakness of the 
workers' position. Discipline violations, and the underlying model of work 
organisation, are another obstacle to the introduction of best-practice Western factory 
systems. Yet, present management does not seem ready to reject the past Soviet order 
in the factory; instead, it is adjusting incrementally to the new constraints imposed by 
the commercialisation of the economy. 
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8. Conclusion 
The case study enterprise and the fate of enterprise restructuring in 
Russia. 
A central argument of this study is that the dismantling of the institutional framework 
of the soviet economy would have delivered neither free market nor enterprise 
restructuring. Liberalisation, rather than freeing enterprises and imposing the more 
rational control of hard budget constraints has seen the reaffirmation of stifling 
political tutelage and economic control by outside agents such as banks, trading 
companies and industrial groups. The newest industrial-financial groups have proved 
no more capable of fostering change than early formations based on soviet ties and 
certainly better equipped to tum autarchy into solid monopoly. If hard budget 
constraints and greater trade volatility have continued to lower enterprise revenues 
and decision-making, exacerbating the problems enterprises suffered under planning, 
the contradictions of the system at this level had more chances to worsen than to be 
overcome . 
. The fundamental task of management, I contended, was to regain control over the 
, 
production p~ocess so as to regularise production and increase productivity as the 
only way to generate profits. I maintained that managers in soviet times had to rely 
on workers' co-operation, therefore tolerating low productivity and high indiscipline. 
This system of social relations allowed management in tum to atomise workers and 
defuse conflict, allowing for labour force flexibility against a picture of scarce 
resources and uneven supplies. The current lack of resources, the decline in 
technology and the unfavourable job markets have all played in favour of 
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strengthening the need for workers' co-operation as other options seem barred by 
lack of serious investments. 
Why, more specifically, could not marketisation, hard budget constraints and even 
outside ownership achieve this goal and what does it mean for the enterprise to 
reproduce these practices in an entirely new economic and institutional context? The 
findings of the case study, within its own limits, show what is the intrinsic rationale 
of retaining the soviet form of management. 
In the third chapter I observed that management was both conscious and willing to 
carry out reforms. However, the external environment in which they operated left 
them with neither resources nor opportunities to turn a production unit into a market-
oriented firm. Given the evident dysfunctions of soviet management in planning, 
accounting and marketing goods, one would have expected greater determination by 
outsiders to achieve these goals once their involvement in enterprise management 
had increased. They tried to make managers more responsible and production 
management more efficient by strengthening control, streamlining decision-making 
without grant~ng autonomy or conceding anything to requests for investments. Over 
the two following years of outside ownership I experienced the growing frustration 
of the new o~ners' attempts to get results because of managerial resistance, amidst 
claims from management that they were unable to bring order in the shops. I set out 
to better understand the substance of these arguments by looking into the situation of 
production units. 
In the fourth chapter I consider to this purpose the functioning of the wage and 
incentive system. Managers had been used to manipulating the existing soviet system 
so as to achieve workers' loyalty and overcome production bottlenecks. They 
maintained that the piece-rate and a large array of bonuses were an essential tool to 
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elicit workers' efforts. The deterioration of material and economic conditions during 
the 1990s has deprived the system of much of its potential. The reforms introduced 
by the new owners, though, have not met with either workers' or managers' favour. 
The findings of my investigation show that in fact reform, rather than altering the 
system, has more simply reduced the scope of managerial discretion and lowered the 
resources available for the wage fund. Since low wages and poor technical conditions 
have not changed the conditions in which production takes place, managers are still 
forced to enter into informal bargaining with workers. Evidently the new owners 
were content with the system, being rather oriented to intensification than 
rationalisation. 
One of the prices that management had to pay for renouncing control over the 
production process, apart from low productivity and higher costs, was the high level 
of workers' indiscipline. Violations of labour discipline have been growing in the 
1990s at the enterprise and have not shown signs of decline following the apparently 
tougher stance assumed by new owners towards them. In the last chapter of the case 
study I try to understand these phenomena that puzzled me, no less than worrying 
senior and line managers. Findings suggest that workers find indiscipline to be the 
only way to'. express their discontent at the deterioration of living and working 
I 
conditions, given the impossibility of overt and organised conflict. Managers' 
tolerance, though, was the result of a peculiar situation, which saw them allowing 
those practices in so far as they helped achieve production targets. They exploited 
workers' failures to diminish their social standing vis-a-vis their fellows, while also 
appreciating the relief of tension they produced. 
What I found at the factory was therefore not simply the chaotic state of production 
and the stubborn reliance on old soviet practices denounced by reformers, but a 
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system that, despite its inefficiencies, manages production within the constraints of 
scarcity and lack of technological and economic means for controlling workers. 
Soviet informal practices still prove a formidable tool for social control. Despite the 
abysmally low level of wages and steady deterioration of working conditions, the 
new owners have managed to intensify work, contributing to generate the evident 
redistribution of resources in their favour without entering into open conflict with 
employees. 
Managers know that a different strategy is possible and so do the outsiders, but they 
are also aware of the costs. So far, despite much waiting for financial-industrial 
groups to enter into direct control of enterprises, in our case they have shown neither 
a different approach to organisational change nor a commitment to restructuring. 
What are the conclusions regarding the nature, progress and determinants of 
transition at the level of the enterprise, which emerge from these cases? In trying to 
answer this question we confine ourselves to the results of our case studies. At the 
same time, while recognising the importance of restricting our conclusions, it is 
equally essential to point out that the cases presented here are not isolated. Indeed 
. . 
evidence suggests that enterprises across regions and branches of the economy 
. 
, 
display simil~ features. 87 The significance of the pervasiveness of similarity compels 
87 There appears to be a considerable degree of commonality between a vast 
number of Russian industrial enterprises in the area of wages and management, as 
confirmed by the results of collaborative research projects between the Centre for 
Comparative Labour Studies, University of Warwick and the Institute for 
Comparative Labour Relations Research, Moscow, which have involved longitudinal 
and survey-based studies in Moscow, Kemerovo, Samara, Syktyvkar, Perm', 
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us to make some basic claims about the nature of the social organisation of 
production in present-day Russia. 
The conditions in which managers operate in the realm of production have not 
significantly changed, while the contradictions of the Soviet production process, 
which justified many managerial practices in the past, have become more acute. 
In such conditions, any alteration of informal soviet practices, such as individual 
bargaining over wages, tolerance towards indiscipline and so on will immediately 
translate into open conflict with the workforce. Low wages, wage arrears and non-
payments mean that managers are constantly required to defuse conflict over these 
issues, which is chiefly achieved by dividing and fragmenting workers. 
Enterprise management can hope to challenge the limitations imposed by the current 
form of organisation of production by thorough restructuring on the basis of large-
scale investment. However, economic instability hampers such a radical 
transformation of production management, generating low morale and poor 
productivity which constitute the major obstacle to attracting the badly needed 
private investment. 
Restructuring at a second textilefactory: a different model? 
Every enterptise is a unique combination of general, country- and sector-specific 
, 
, 
features and the individual factors provided by the interaction between managerial 
strategies and environmental conditions. In the Russian case, as pointed out 
throughout this work, both the constraints of soviet legacy and the limiting 
circumstances of transition left very limited scope for strategising. Then again, the 
Yekaterinburg, St. Petersburg, UI'yanovsk and Minsk. Fieldwork reports and 
statistical sources can be obtained from the project website, 
http://www.warwick.ac.uk/russia/. 
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situation and path of development of each enterprise is not identical, depending on a 
plurality of factors such as its ability to export, its role in the local economy, its ties 
with local authorities and soviet-time networks (Clarke, 1994, pp. 12-14). From this 
prospective, the position of our case-study enterprise was defined by its status of 
company town, or city-making enterprise (gradoobrazuyuschoe predpriyatie) as the 
Russian term literally translates. This condition imposed a specific set of constraints 
and opportunities. The enterprise capitalised on strong political ties and preferential 
treatment in resource allocation due to the fact of being the sole employer in the 
locality. It also bore the weight of its social responsibilities. Its isolation also 
influenced local labour market conditions, making it difficult to recruit specialists but 
easier to retain the bulk of the city workforce. The combination of these elements 
weighed heavily on management strategies, in the sense of preventing restructuring, 
even when the outsiders took over. Even though company towns abounded in the 
USSR and were the model-type for planners, it was felt that conclusions drawn from 
this case should rather be tested on a second unit that primarily for its urban location 
might show a different set of strategies and outcome. A second enterprise88 was 
88 The enterprise was a cotton spinning and weaving textile manufacturer. Like our main 
, 
case study it Was a quite large enterprise by output, capacity and staffing levels, which 
amounted to above 5000 just before privatisation, and size of the social sphere. This 
enterprise too was an historical establishment, founded in the late 19th century, with most of 
its infrastructure dating back to the immediately pre- and post-revolution years. Privatisation 
was carried out along the same lines, though with quite different outcomes. 
Visits at the enterprise were paid regularly during May 2002. Interviews were carried out 
with all key managers in the main offices and in production. Gatekeepers again were 
fundamental in the task of identifying and then securing contacts and access as well as 
providing vital background information. These were namely: the Chief Mechanic, previously 
working at the Combine, and the former Combine legal assistant. As a private consultant the 
latter had assisted the management of the second factory pilot the bankruptcy of the 
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therefore identified in the neighbouring province capital city, which presented very 
different characteristics indeed and proved an interesting case for comparison. 
I would like to highlight that what attracted me when I was first presented with this 
opportunity was the fact that a summary description of the enterprise affairs seemed 
to respond to the ideals of restructuring as advocated by western consultants. In fact, 
the enterprise was already solidly under outside ownership and had severed all ties 
with its soviet past. The labour collective had been disbanded, with old and new staff 
alike recruited according to market conditions. Wage differentials were much higher 
in favour of management, as the more dynamic urban market would.have suggested. 
More importantly, staffing levels had dwindled to a mere 500 so that most of the 
cumbersome managerial and auxiliary apparatus of its soviet predecessor had been 
dismissed. It was equally the case with the social sphere, which had been turned over 
for a profit to building developers. But production and marketing also looked 
promising. Capacity was retained only in profitable export areas and was planned 
according to market demand, finishing and maintenance were outsourced. If analysis 
had stayed at this level, this enterprise would represent, as said before, a restructuring 
ideal-type and would certainly occupy the opposite side, relative to the Combine, in 
an ideal spec~rum measuring managerial attitudes to restructuring. Then again, both 
, 
the history of privatisation, managerial practices and the state of production make 
this success story a bit more complicated. 
The enterprises presented very similar initial conditions in terms of economic and 
organisational structure, but the way managers dealt with transition made all the 
enterprise. The process concluded with its purchase by outsiders, making it a profitable deal 
for both parties, apart from the workforce, dismissed en masse without compensation and 
deprived of its ownership rights. 
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difference. This second enterprise had suffered since the late soviet period from poor 
leadership and was subject to high top management turnover. This proved 
detrimental to the establishment of a network of connections, which proved vital to 
the initial survival of the Combine. To make things worse, from the start, alleged 
cases of embezzlement of funds by the Director jeopardised key procurement deals 
and seriously undermined his authority among lower managers and workers. Since 
the early 1990s the enterprise had struggled to keep production going and already 
key shops destined to export production were rented out to outside businessmen. The 
1998 crisis brought the final blow and the enterprise came to a standstill, with all its 
workforce sent on administrative leave indefinitely. The enterprise stayed idle for 
two years, during which top management designed the most profitable way out of the 
crisis. The enterprise was split into two legal entities, in the words of the layer who 
actually designed it, 'we left the liabilities in the old company, including the labour 
collective, and we transferred all assets, estates, machinery and equipment to a new 
one'. Stocks were purchased from workers for pennies as they put up little resistance 
after two years of unpaid leave, one of them regretfully admitted. 
But it was the way in which personnel was managed that betrayed greater similarities 
with our orig\nal case than might have been expected. The managerial structure had 
I 
been highly simplified, in particular by cutting the shop chief layer, whose tasks had 
been transferred to the head of production on the one side and the foremen on the 
other.89 It was apparently aimed at streamlining decision-making and, we suspect, at 
eliminating a main point of resistance (and bargaining). Then again it did not seem 
that the head of production, foremen or brigade leaders were in any way satisfied 
89 Interestingly, such an innovation was introduced a year later at a Combine restructured 
under TMS control and experimented with at our Combine. 
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with it. They reported very much the same complaints that shop chiefs had filed at 
the Combine, such as shortages of personnel and materials, unrealistic production 
plans, conflicts with other departments and main offices and so on. They also 
engaged in informal adjustments with workers. Here the difference was, while the 
wage system had been left unaltered, wages were very low and differentiation 
minimal. The result was that managers had to tolerate high levels of indiscipline and 
turnover, because as they said, 'with such wages it was impossible to recruit better 
workers' (Interview with the head of weaving production). The same problems arose 
with outside maintenance contractors, as the Chief Mechanic pointed out. As a result 
working conditions were if possible even worse than those at the Combine, and this 
despite the fact that operating premises were only one tenth of those at the latter. 
Incidents, including fatal ones, were one of the tragic consequences of this situation 
(Interview with the Head of Safety department). As for relations along the 
managerial hierarchy, greater interaction between the director, the chief engineer and 
the marketing director, on the one side, and top production managers, on the other 
,had brought neither greater inter-personal understanding nor better planning. On the 
, 
contrary, the objective proximity of a much smaller enterprise meant that pressure 
was exerted for results on a daily basis and failures and successes were personally 
, 
\ 
reviewed, and rewarded accordingly, by the Director. In one word, smaller size and 
more favourable market conditions did not mean that production managers had 
greater control over production nor that top managers were very concerned with this, 
continuing to act toward production as an outside entity. 
Other than just similarities in specific areas, therefore, I felt that the policies toward 
production, as well as the way in which relationships with subordinates were 
managed, remained very much the same as in the previous case. This case also 
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conveyed the solid conviction that whatever changes had occurred, this was in the 
sense of making old soviet practices more acute and their effect more pernicious 
descending along the hierarchical line. 
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